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Abstract 
 
Humans exhibit a number of suboptimal behaviours in the wake of a loss. For 
example, gamblers often ‘chase’ their losses in an attempt to break even. 
Similarly, investors tend to hold on to losing stocks too long in the hope that the 
declining share price might make a recovery. However, the neural mechanisms 
that instantiate such behaviour are poorly understood. I begin the introductory 
chapter with a basic historical overview of fundamental economic concepts, 
interleaving intersecting ideas from psychology and neuroscience. This leads to 
a more in-depth exploration of the notion that loss-related behavioural biases 
might provide insight into the neural mechanisms that underlie risky choice. 
From this, I argue that rats represent a viable animal model of risky decision-
making for neuroeconomic research. The original research presented in 
Chapters 2 – 5 pave the way toward advancing our current understanding of 
loss-related biases in behaviour with rat models of risky decision-making. By 
employing insight from psychology and economics, I developed two models of 
rat behaviour that can be used to study the neural substrates of loss valuation. I 
presented the experimental paradigms in Chapters 2 and 5, while 
demonstrating novel loss-related correlations between the midbrain dopamine 
system and observed loss behaviour in Chapters 3 and 4. The results 
presented in Chapter 5 demonstrate that rats are capable of producing 
behavioural patterns akin to loss aversion and the disposition effect. This work 
has also highlighted a number of areas for future research. In Chapter 6, I 
explore potential theoretical implications of the results discussed in previous 
chapters. In summary, this thesis uses experimental risky decision-making 
tasks in rats to advance our current knowledge of the ways in which concepts 
such as loss aversion critically influence our internal representation of value. 
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When deciding between two risky options, it is often the case that we change 
our behaviour in the face of a loss. If the resulting outcome leaves the 
individual worse off than an alternative, then it is considered suboptimal. 
Neoclassical economic theories typically label the resulting suboptimal choice 
as ‘irrational.’ This introductory chapter outlines key topics in understanding 
‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ economic choices. Beginning with a basic historical 
overview of fundamental economic concepts, intersecting ideas from 
psychology and neuroscience are discussed. Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory stands as a turning point, marking the beginning of a truly 
interdisciplinary pursuit toward understanding the ways in which concepts such 
as loss aversion and risk aversion critically influence our internal representation 
of value.  
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Introduction 
While neuroeconomics as a discipline remains only in its infancy, the 
intersection of the biological sciences with the economic sciences has a longer 
history than one might expect. In 1828, the Scottish Botanist Robert Brown first 
observed the natural oscillations of microscopic pollen grains that occurred 
after the granules had been submerged in water (R. Brown, 1828). The 
mathematics of this continuous random motion was later developed by Albert 
Einstein (1905) to become a pillar of physics, but not before French 
mathematician Louis Bachelier (1900) applied the principle to the stock market. 
Thus the notion that a ‘random walk’ could describe the movements of tiny 
submerged particles of biological matter just as well as the fluctuations of asset 
prices in the stock market was born.  
From pollen grains to neurons, this thesis is written with the specific intention of 
informing the study of economics with experimental evidence from psychology 
and neuroscience, and vice versa. In an effort to engage the reader in a critical 
interdisciplinary enterprise, this chapter will begin by offering an introductory 
historical review of the relevant concepts, models and assumptions from 
economics and finance. While not exhaustive, this introduction is intended to 
provide the non-specialist with a general impression of the field and its 
formalisms, while simultaneously highlighting areas of economic theory that 
have been (or could be) improved by incorporating a behaviourist tradition. 
Beginning with conceptual and formal notions of valuation and risk, this section 
will guide the reader through progressively more comprehensive theories of 
economic decisions making. Throughout, theoretical prescriptions of rationality 
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will be juxtaposed with empirical observations of behaviour. This is done with 
the intention of imparting the reader with a clearer understanding of the 
fundamental struggle in neuroeconomics: finding the optimal point between the 
prescriptive power of formal theoretical models and the descriptive accuracy of 
behavioural models. The chapter will then shift focus to a collection of studies 
that implicate neurobiological mechanisms in the modulation of the economic 
parameters and behavioural biases reviewed in the preceding sections. Taken 
together, these studies constitute the backbone of the newly established 
neuroeconomics literature and reveal an obvious dearth in their ability to 
describe ‘loss’ and ‘risk’ using current behavioural and neuroscientific 
paradigms.  
Homo Economicus: Rational Economics  
The field of economics represents a long tradition of breaking decisions down 
into quantifiable variables with the goal of objectively representing decision 
outcomes and mathematically prescribing the best course of action to achieve 
that outcome. In both psychology and economics, there is an intuitive 
understanding that what is good in the immediate sense is not necessarily good 
in the long run. Thus, the first step in terms of modelling an optimal decision 
becomes defining a value function that estimates how good or bad an action 
will be in the future.  
Expected Value 
Pascal (1670) was the first to formalize the objective measurement of decision 
outcomes in terms of expected value (EV), which has formed the basis of 
normative economic models. 
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Table 1: Pascal’s Wager 
 God exists  
(50%) 
 
God does not exist 
(50%) 
Expected Value of  
Choice Set 
Believe ∞  ×  0.5    (Infinite) −𝑥  ×  0.5      (Finite)  (∞  ×  0.5) + (−𝑥  ×  0.5) =   ∞ 
Do not believe −∞  ×  0.5 (Infinite)       𝑥  ×  0.5            (Finite)  −∞  ×  0.5 + (𝑥  ×  0.5) =   −∞ 
Table 1 displays ‘Pascal’s Wager,’ which examines the expected value, or payoff, of believing in God 
versus not believing in God. Given any probability that God exists (displayed here as a 50/50 chance), the 
infinite gain of believing is greater than the infinite loss of not believing.   
Pascal theorized that a decision maker would maximize long-term future 
payoffs by choosing the action that leads to the outcome with the highest 
expected value, which is based on its current value (positive or negative) and 
the likelihood of it occurring (probability). A decision-maker can maximize her 
payoff by simply multiplying these two variables for each alternative within a 
decision set, and then by choosing the option with the greatest resulting 
expected value, where: 
EV = Value  ×  Probability  ( 1 ) 
Therefore, a payoff of high magnitude that has an extremely low likelihood of 
occurring in the future (e.g. winning the lottery) would have a lower EV than a 
second payoff with a smaller magnitude but that will occur with relative certainty 
(e.g. gaining interest on savings). As simple as it may appear, this formulation 
has far-reaching implications for economic theory both past and present.  
The probability distribution that results from calculating EV can be used to 
describe a given outcome or a set of outcomes. Mathematically, the 
distribution’s first moment (mean) represents the ‘expected value’ of the set of 
outcomes, while its second moment (variance or its square root, standard 
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deviation) denotes the ‘expected risk.’ Variance (𝜎!) is a measure of a 
distribution’s dispersion and is equal to the mean of the squared deviations 
from the expected value, formally expressed as: 
𝝈𝟐 = 𝑽𝒊!𝑬𝑽 𝟐𝒏𝒊!𝟏   𝑵  ( 2 ) 
Above, the expected value (EV) is subtracted from the observed value (V) at 
time i, and the total sum of the squared result from time i to n is divided by the 
total number of observations, N.  Thus, variance is a measure of the relative 
certainty with which one can say that an outcome will be near the mean, with 
low variances reflecting a group of numerically similar outcomes. The variance 
of the outcome distribution is therefore conventionally regarded as an objective 
measure of a decision’s riskiness. Importantly, this definition represents a 
divergence of the term ‘risk’ from its more colloquial meaning of the potential for 
a loss.1 Instead, economic risk denotes how certain one is about whether the 
                                                
1 A considerable muddling of concepts arose as psychologists, neuroscientists 
and economists began integrating theory and research. A particularly confusing 
disconnect can be seen between the definit ion of the term ‘risk.’ Psychologists’ 
view of risk often hinges upon the magnitude of a potential loss (e.g. loss of job, 
loss of l i fe). Risk within economics or f inance has a much narrower, mathematical 
definit ion, and is often conceptually closer to the colloquial notion of 
‘uncertainty.’ While the two definit ions do partially overlap, this oversight may 
underlie several l ines of diverging evidence, especially with regard to aberrant 
risk processing. For example, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) is 
often invoked as stereotypical impulsive behaviour, which is defined by poor risk 
assessment. However, the definit ion of risk assessment clearly depends on one’s 
definit ion of risk—an impulsive individual is often understood as someone who 
acts with a sense of spontaneity and often with disregard to the magnitude of any 
potential losses that may result. Thus, an economist is more l ikely to attribute 
ADHD to abnormal discounting of delays or cost-benefit analyses (first moment) 
rather than incorrect risk evaluations (second moment), per se. Since 
pathological conditions are often advantageous in revealing the hidden structure 
and connectivity of many functions in the brain, it is imperative that the field 
collaborate in order to remedy such ambiguity.  
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outcome will be close to the mean expected value in a given range of 
possibilities (the known unknowns). If there is a narrow range of possible 
outcomes in a decision set, then one can be relatively certain that the outcome 
will lie near the mean (expected value). Alternatively, a decision with outcomes 
spanning a wide range of expected values would be considered risky, because 
one is relatively uncertain about whether the actual outcome will be similar to 
the mean expected value. It is also of note that economists formally distinguish 
decisions under uncertainty, which indicates a known probability distribution but 
an unknown outcome, from decisions under ‘ambiguity,’ which implies that the 
probability distribution itself is at least partially unknown (the unknown 
unknowns).  
While Pascal’s formulation of expected value was able to explain a great deal 
of behaviour, it failed to describe the circumstance typified by the ‘St 
Petersburg Paradox,’ in which a probability distribution had an infinite expected 
value. The St Petersburg paradox was described as a game in which a coin 
was flipped, and the player must bet on how many flips were needed before it 
landed on heads. The game ends when heads is flipped, and the player wins 
£2 for every toss that occurs before then (i.e. £2 for each tails flip). According to 
Pascal’s formulation, the expected value of this gamble is the sum of all the 
possible outcomes multiplied by their respective probabilities, or: 
𝑬𝑽 = 𝟏𝟐×  𝟐 + 𝟏𝟒×  𝟒 + 𝟏𝟖×  𝟖 +⋯ = 𝟏 + 𝟏 + 𝟏 +⋯ = ∞   ( 3 ) 
 So if a player could play the game enough times, she could bet any finite 
amount of money and still beat the house. Put differently, a player should pay 
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an infinite amount of money to play the game. Since this answer obviously did 
not describe true behaviour, it was clear that expected value alone was not 
sufficient to describe realistic economic behaviour. 
Expected Utility 
In 1738 a mathematician named 
Daniel Bernoulli published a solution 
to the St Petersburg Paradox, which 
entailed the transformation of 
expected value into expected utility 
based on a person’s current wealth 
(Bernoulli, 1738). Bernoulli observed 
that expected value did not take into 
consideration whether or not the 
player was a pauper or a prince – 
and that one’s state of wealth had implications for (a) the pleasure one gained 
from a marginal increase in wealth, and therefore (b) one’s willingness to take a 
financial risk. In other words, a pauper would receive more utility from a £100 
outcome, which might double his current wealth; whereas a prince would 
receive marginally less utility from the same £100 increase in wealth. This 
formulation has become known as ‘utility,’ (u) and is often expressed as a 
logarithmic2 transformation of wealth: 
                                                
2 Importantly, any nonlinear transformation that results in a concave uti l i ty 
function is allowed here (some work better than others in specific circumstances), 
but it is common to represent uti l i ty with the logarithmic function as a tribute to 
Bernoull i ’s original proposal, which used the logarithmic function.  
Figure 1: Marginal Utility 
       
Figure with permissions from (Craig R. Fox & 
Poldrack, 2014) demonstrates the marginal utility 
of a $1K gamble experienced by an individual with 
wealth W1 compared to an individual with a higher 
starting wealth, W2. The marginal increase of the 
same objective amount is experienced differently 
between the two individuals. The person with W1 
perceives the $1K increase (and any respective 
decrease) as large relative to the person with W2. 
 
 10 
𝒖 𝒙 =   𝚯𝐥𝐨𝐠 𝝎 + 𝒙    ( 4 ) 
This function takes the log of the value of the increase in wealth, ω, from a 
possible outcome, x, and multiplies it by some parameter Θ. The Θ parameter 
dictates the curvature of the line when x is mapped onto the x-axis. Here, the 
utility of a gamble would take the form of a concave value function seen in 
Figure 1, where the utility of a gamble increases at a decreasing rate. To make 
this clear, if the utility function were linear, a gamble that would increase a 
person’s wealth from £10 to £20 would provide the same amount of pleasure 
as it would when increasing wealth from £100,000 to £100,010. In contrast, a 
logarithmic function implies that the hedonic experience gained from an 
increase in wealth decreases as wealth increases. As will be explained further 
in the section on Prospect Theory, if an individual’s behaviour fits with a 
logarithmic utility function, the set of choices can be described as risk averse.  
The resulting relative units of wealth, referred to as ‘marginal wealth,’ are 
expressed as ‘utils’. Given this utility function, one can calculate the expected 
utility (EU) of a future action (A) by summing all the utilities of each possible 
outcome (x) multiplied by the respective probabilities of x occurring given A 
(PA): 
𝑬𝑼 𝑨 =    𝑷𝑨 𝒙 𝑼 𝒙    ( 5 ) 
This allows for the direct comparison of actions based on their expected utility, 
and highlights economic models’ reliance on a ‘common currency’ in order to 
compare individuals’ subjective utility across all types of goods, services, 
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actions, and contexts. For example, common abstract units are necessary to 
evaluate a worker’s choice between a cash bonus and extra vacation days. 
Although the cash bonus may hold more expected monetary value, the extra 
vacation day may hold more expected utility to the overworked employee. In 
order to achieve this common scale mathematically, economists transform 
cardinal values into ordinal utilities. In other words, the expected utility model 
changes objective values into rank-ordered preferences. For this transformation 
to hold true in expected utility theory, a number of axioms, or formal 
assumptions, have been developed and refined over the past three centuries 
since its original formation by Bernoulli (1738). With the conclusion that 
behaviour is subject to an individual’s preferences that cannot be explained 
purely by objective measures, economists had (perhaps unknowingly) created 
a common interest with the cognitive sciences.  
The separate fields forged independent pursuits of many of the same questions 
– only from different angles and with different terminology. For example, B.F. 
Skinner (1953) formulated his theory about operant conditioning (i.e. how 
individuals form preferences) at the same time that Houthakker’s (1950) 
General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) formalized how individual’s 
preferences form behaviour. 
General Axiom of Revealed Preferences (GARP) 
Of particular interest to behaviourists is Houthakker’s (1950) General Axiom of 
Revealed Preferences (GARP). GARP defines a rational decision-maker as 
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one that is internally consistent across decisions.3 To clarify GARP rationality, 
take for example the situation in which little Stevie must choose how to spend 
his £15 allowance.  At the movie theatre, tickets to see Star Wars and Star Trek 
both cost £5. Over the course of the week, Stevie is observed buying 2 tickets 
for Star Wars and 1 ticket for Star Trek. The next week, Star Wars tickets are 
offered at the matinee price for £3 while Star Trek tickets increase to prime time 
price at £6. Little Stevie would be acting irrationally if he decided to spend his 
next £15 allowance on 2 Star Trek tickets and 1 Star Wars ticket, since it is 
inconsistent with his previously revealed preference for Star Wars over Star 
Trek. Satisfaction of this axiom is both essential and sufficient in order for 
individuals to be described with a single, continuous and monotonic utility 
function. This is critical in that it allows economists to infer that an individual’s 
preferences—which are inherently unobservable—are revealed by observable 
choices. A person who satisfies GARP behaves as if she had multiplied utility 
by probability in her head and chosen the outcome with the highest expected 
value. In other words, unquantifiable internal subjective utilities become 
quantifiable (or at least able to be rank-ordered) when GARP is satisfied. It is of 
note that psychologists make similar inferences when assessing individuals’ 
preferences. For example, ‘real-life’ risk preferences are inferred from scores 
on experimental tasks such as the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART) or from 
questionnaires like the Domain-Specific Risk-Taking (DOSPERT) Scale. The 
key difference being that experimental analyses of such psychological 
preferences remain largely unconstrained by the demands of mathematical 
                                                
3 It is of note that satiety effects are explicit ly assumed away in GARP. In other 
words, Houthakker recognized that an individual’s preferences may change with 
increased consumption of a good, but chose to ignore that in the model.   
 13 
formalisms, and thus hold dissimilar validation requirements (i.e. replication of 
results vs. mathematical proof)4. Note that the level of risk aversion implied by 
any given utility formation described above is based on the objective probability 
of the event occurring. 
Subjective Expected Utility 
Savage (1954) took expected utility theory a step further by incorporating 
subjective probabilities and utilities into the model. Savage’s model implies that 
each individual has a unique expectation of how likely an event is to actually 
occur, and this expectation influences the likelihood of choosing a particular 
outcome.  This accounts for the fact that individuals rarely if ever have 
complete knowledge of the true likelihood of an event, which causally attributes 
to variance in preferences. The model is as follows, where Subjective Expected 
Value (SEV) simply takes the subjective transformation of probability multiplied 
by value. This is extended to Subjective Expected Utility (SEU):  
𝑺𝑬𝑽 = 𝑺 𝒑𝒓𝒐𝒃𝒂𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚   ×  𝒗𝒂𝒍𝒖𝒆    ( 6 ) 
𝑺𝑬𝑼 𝑨 =    𝑺(𝒑𝒂)×𝒖(𝒙𝒂)  ( 7 ) 
In SEU, the utility of an action, A, is the aggregate of all possible outcome 
utilities (u(xa)) multiplied by their respective subjective probabilities (S(pa)). Note 
the transformation into standard notation from equation 6 to equation 7. In plain 
words, subjective expected utility is the combination of a person’s preferences 
                                                
4 Notable exceptions to this exist (e.g. Reinforcement learning, signal detection 
theory), but generally the argument holds true given that there is yet no 
universal, all-encompassing mathematical ‘theorem of psychology.’ 
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(outcome utilities) with his or her personal beliefs (subjective probabilities). The 
fact that subjective probability is distinct from utility implies context-independent 
risk attitudes. In other words, subjective utility theory allows for trait risk 
preferences. This also represents an important link to reinforcement learning 
theories, which reason that personal beliefs/subjective probabilities are the 
culmination of past experiences. 
Subjective Expected Utility Theory, like Expected Utility Theory, requires that a 
number of axioms be satisfied for a decision-maker to be considered rational 
(see Fishburn, 1986). Again, these axioms are simply a set of criteria that need 
be fulfilled in order for the mathematical calculation of utility to hold true. Some 
axioms are stronger than others, and some can be relaxed if suggested by 
empirical data. However, in general when an axiom is violated this indicates 
that no single monotonic utility function exists to describe the individual’s 
behaviour.  Thus, the definition of a ‘rational’ economic agent lies in the 
conformity of the agent’s behaviour to a single utility function and not in the ‘fit’ 
of an agent’s behaviour to any particular function or model. Satisfaction of the 
axioms simply confirms that a single utility function exists for the individual – it 
implies nothing about functional form. This point will be demonstrated further in 
the following section. Axiomatic models can therefore be viewed as tools to 
assess whether or not a function exists to describe an observation – a tool that 
has recently been extended to the behaviour of neurons (Caplin & Glimcher, 
2014). However, when deviations from axioms are systematic and 
multiplicative, this implies that the model itself (i.e. Subjective Expected Utility 
Model) likely requires modification. 
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Homo Sapiens: Irrational Economics  
Despite the appealing simplicity and power of GARP as a means of 
mathematically modelling utility preferences, an alternative body of empirical 
research demonstrates that humans and animals systematically deviate from 
rational decision-making. It quickly became apparent that people consistently 
violated the axioms of Savage’s subjective expected utility theory. Two famous 
examples of this are known after their proposers as the ‘Allais paradox’ (Allais, 
1953) and the ‘Ellsberg paradox’ (Ellsberg, 1961), which reliably elicit ‘irrational’ 
choices when decisions are made under risk. 
There exist a number of well-documented psychological effects known to 
robustly bias economic behaviour, such as: when choices are framed as a loss 
compared to a gain, called loss aversion or more generally the framing effect 
(Johnson, Hershey, Meszaros, & Kunreuther, 1993; Krupenye, Rosati, & Hare, 
2015; Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998), temporal discounting, when choice 
outcomes are delivered at different points in the future (Ainslie, 1975; Berns, 
Laibson, & Loewenstein, 2007; Kable, 2013), and the ‘sure thing principle,’ 
when information about previous outcomes are known vs. unknown (Savage, 
1954; Shafir, 1994; Tversky & Shafir, 1992; Waite, 2001). From this 
extensive—yet not nearly exhaustive—list of examples, it is apparent that 
choices often cannot be modelled as context-independent.  It is generally 
argued that the observed choices in these examples represent decision making 
errors – which may have arisen from a variety of factors such as cognitive 
limitations or inattention – and therefore such decisions should not be 
considered true revealed preferences.  
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Such decision-making errors are exemplified by reverse-reward experiments in 
psychology, where the delivery of a larger volume of reward requires the 
subject to choose the smaller reward option (e.g. choosing the 3 candy option 
results in 5 candies being delivered), and vice versa.  Preschool children 
(Carlson, Davis, & Leach, 2005), chimpanzees (Boysen & Berntson, 1995), and 
cockerel chicks (Hershberger, 1986) all demonstrate immense difficulty in 
learning to overcome this conflict between Pavlovian approach and 
instrumental response. Thus, this represents a decision-making error rather 
than a revealed preference. Since the inference that preschool children 
generally prefer 3 candies to 5 candies is obviously incorrect here, it should be 
concluded that cognitive factors directly impose constraints upon ones ability to 
reveal a true preference through choice.   
An analogous dissociation between internal preferences and revealed choices 
also arises in the context of addiction. Although an individual may no longer 
want to consume a substance, his or her actions directly conflict with this 
desire. Berridge (1996) makes the distinction between wanting and liking. 
Berridge demonstrates that incentive motivation, or wanting, arises from 
separable psychological and neural processes as incentive palatability, or 
liking. The dopaminergic midbrain is purported to modulate wanting, while the 
opioid system is implicated in hedonic pleasure of reward (Symmonds & Dolan, 
2012).  Further studies have corroborated this, providing evidence for 
pharmacologically and neurophysiologically dissociable behaviours arising from 
reward salience/motivation and hedonic pleasure in rodents (Wilson, Laidlaw, 
Butler, Hofmann, & Bowman, 2006) and primates (Rolls, Sienkiewicz, & Yaxley, 
1989). Furthermore, Tindell and colleagues (2009) demonstrate that 
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manipulations of physiological state can alter the dominant value mechanism 
regulating choice. In this study, a previously non-preferred salt reinforcer 
triggered neurons in the ventral pallidum (previously associated with the 
preferred sucrose reward) to fire when rats were put into a salt-deprived state.  
The neuronal activity here, if equated to a measure of subjective utility, reflects 
a preference reversal where firing rates do not represent the preferred sucrose 
reward but rather the item that fulfils a homeostatic need. This suggests that 
the brain’s representation of value is based on information from multiple 
systems that have the ability to conflict and create reversals depending on 
psychological and physiological state. In summary, these examples 
demonstrate that psychological and physiological limitations often prevent an 
individual from revealing his or her true preferences, leading to behaviour that 
would be characterised as 'irrational' under Expected Utility Theory. Given 
these constraints, the universal applicability of the Expected Utility model has 
been called into question, which highlights an opportunity for coordinated 
efforts toward modification with the psychological sciences.  
Prospect Theory 
The multiple-systems approach has also been argued for decisions resulting in 
asymmetrical effects of gains and losses. Both Expected Utility Theory and 
Subjective Expected Utility Theory assume that preferences among potential 
prospects reflect ‘description invariance.’ For example, imagine an individual is 
asked to choose between option A) a 50/50 gamble of either £1000 or £0 and 
option B)  £500 for sure. The individual’s stated preference is assumed not to 
change based on the manner in which the available options are described. 
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Given that both options have the same expected value (𝐸𝑉! = 0.5  ×  £1000 +0.5  ×  £0 = £500  𝑎𝑛𝑑  𝐸𝑉! = 1  ×  £500 = £500), a preference for option B 
implies that the subject is risk averse to the variability of outcomes in option A. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) tested the postulated description invariance of 
70 subjects by comparing subjects’ preference between A and B to preferences 
between C and D, where option C) is a 50/50 gamble of either £0 or losing 
£1000 and option D) represents losing £500 for sure. As before, options C and 
D have the same expected value and therefore any preference between the 
two will reveal either a relative preference or aversion toward risk. The only 
difference in the choice between A and B and the choice between C and D is 
that the former is framed as a gain while the latter is framed as a loss. 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) found that while 84% of subjects indicated a 
preference for option B over option A (i.e. risk aversion), 69% of subjects 
preferred option C over option D (risk seeking).  
Using a similar paradigm, the authors also found evidence in support of a 
second violation of description invariance whereby subjects exhibited risk-
seeking behaviour for large, but highly unlikely gains (e.g. winning the lottery), 
yet risk-averse behaviour for large, but highly unlikely losses (e.g. purchasing 
home insurance). These dichotomies can be conceptualized as a ‘four-fold 
pattern’ of risk attitudes, outlined in Table 2 below: 
Table 2: Prospect Theory risk attitudes 
 Medium – High 
Probability of Occurring 
 
Low Probability of 
Occurring 
Loss Risk Seeking Risk Averse 
Gain Risk Averse Risk Seeking 
Table 2: modified from Kahneman & Tversky (1979), the four-fold pattern of risk attitudes for gambles 
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framed as losses or as gains with a medium-high or low likelihood of occurring. 
 
In response to this, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) proposed Prospect Theory 
as a framework for utility maximization under risk that accommodated for 
cognitive biases and boasted a better fit to empirical data. Prospect Theory 
also received a considerable amount of attention for its ability to account for the 
Allais paradox. Tversky and Kahneman (1992) later developed an axiomatic 
version, Cumulative Prospect Theory, which is arguably the most successful 
approach to behavioural economics thus far (cf. Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; H. 
A. Simon, 1959).  
By drawing heavily from the field of psychology, Kahneman and Tversky (1979) 
constructed Prospect Theory with three distinctive attributes that allow it to 
better describe individual behaviour. First, Prospect Theory incorporates a 
variable reference point (Figure 2a), which typically refers to the ‘status quo’ 
rather than to wealth as does Bernoulli’s utility formulation. To make clear the 
Figure 2: Prospect Theory 
                    
Figure with permissions from Fox and Poldrack (2009, p. 149), (A) represents a value function over 
losses and gains, with the ‘kink’ at the origin representing a steeper curve for losses than for gains, 
and (B) a weighting function for probabilities with ‘S-shape,’ implying that values at the extremes 
behave differently. The value function results in a utility curve that is concave for gains (implying 
risk-averse behaviour) and convex for losses (implying risk-seeking behaviour). Furthermore, the 
origin is not fixed at zero, but rather is variable, subjective, and often equal to the status quo. The 
weighting function captures the observation that individuals tend to overweight probabilities near 
zero (e.g. impossible) and underweight probabilities near one (e.g. certain). 
 
 20 
notion of a reference point, consider the example where Robert unexpectedly 
earns a bonus of £1,000. Robert is quite satisfied with his bonus until he 
discovers that colleagues of his, Peter and Katy, both received bonuses of 
£3,000. As a result, Robert now finds himself quite unsatisfied with his bonus. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981) might assert that, in comparing himself with 
Peter and Katy, Robert’s reference point for gains and losses shifts from a 
baseline of zero (as the bonus was unexpected) to £3000 (the status quo). This 
implies that what was previously modelled as a gain of £1000 is now treated as 
a loss of £2000. Prospect Theory’s second important distinction is that outcome 
probabilities are weighted by an ‘S-shaped’ probability function so that very 
unlikely outcomes have a stronger effect relative to very likely outcomes 
(Figure 2b). This fits with the ‘Four-Fold pattern’ of risk attitudes in Table 2 
above. Finally, loss aversion is modelled by computing utility for losses and 
gains with separable functions, as seen in equation 8 below: 
𝒖 𝒙 = −𝝀(−𝒙)𝜷, 𝒙 < 𝟎𝒙𝜶, 𝒙 ≥ 𝟎   ( 8 ) 
The utility function detailed here dictates that gains are subjected to a (risk 
aversion) coefficient (α), while losses are influenced by a (risk-seeking) 
coefficient (β) and a loss-aversion coefficient, λ. In sum, these parameters 
result in a concave utility function over gains and a convex function over losses, 
with a kinked shape around the reference point indicating a steeper slope for 
losses than for gains (Figure 2a).  
In equation 8, note the distinct parameters for loss-aversion and risk-aversion. 
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While the two terms can certainly interact5, they should not be confused. Risk 
aversion distinguishes between option probabilities while holding value 
constant, whereby choice reflects a preference for a certain option over an 
uncertain option. By contrast, loss aversion describes the robust tendency of 
individuals to make decisions as if negatively valenced outcomes were twice 
the amount than they actual are with respect to comparable gains. With regard 
to equation 8 above, consider the individual who is evaluating the utility of the 
outcomes of a gamble that had a 50/50 chance of winning or losing £5. 
Assuming a risk-neutral attitude and a loss aversion coefficient of 2 (i.e. λ = 2, α 
= 1 and β = 1), the individual will multiply the utility of a £5 gain (𝑢(𝑥) = 5) and 
a £5 loss (𝑢(𝑥) = −2×5 = −10) by their respective probabilities of 50% in order 
to establish an expected utility for the gamble.  Therefore, an individual is more 
sensitive to the prospect of a loss than to the prospect of a gain in Prospect 
Theory.  
The λ coefficient of loss aversion is commonly cited at 2.25, which is the 
average provided by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Gächter, Johnson, and 
Herrmann (2010) report that individuals’ loss aversion estimates remain 
constant between decisions involving risk (e.g. gambles) and decisions that are 
riskless,(e.g. contrasting willingness to pay vs. willingness to accept for a good, 
see equation 10). However, numerous studies report substantial variation in λ 
across individuals (Haigh & List, 2005; Johnson, Gächter, & Herrmann, 2006) 
and decision attributes (Neumann & Böckenholt, 2014; Sayman & Öncüler, 
                                                
5 Indeed, the effects of the two terms can interact in a way that one can even fully 
account for the other. For example, Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) 
demonstrate that loss aversion accounts for a large proportion of observed risk 
aversion in gambles involving small losses and gains. 
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2005). Thus, despite its prevalence, it is unclear what loss aversion is exactly. 
Some researchers, such as Johnson and colleagues (2006) and Camerer 
(2005), suggest that loss aversion could represent: 1) a stable attribute of 
preference decisions, 2) something akin to a personality trait, 3) an affective 
response , or 4) the result of conflicting dual systems underlying losses and 
gains.  Addressing the true nature of loss aversion presents an exciting 
opportunity for the collaboration of psychology, neuroscience, and economics.  
All three fields stand to gain by establishing the cognitive and neural 
mechanisms underpinning this source of variability. In order to fully consider 
this question, it would be useful to first gain an understanding of how loss 
aversion manifests in financial markets as well as the tools that have been 
utilized to measure it.  Thus, we first shift our focus to the marketplace, after 
which point we will revisit the nature of loss aversion in the context of current 
neuroscientific research thereafter.  
Efficient Markets: Rational Finance 
Here, instead of goods and gambles, we consider assets (stocks and bonds) 
and trades. It is interesting to note that while economics often considers the 
prices of goods and services, the primary focus in financial markets lies in 
highly abstract representations of value and ownership. For example, buying 
100 shares of Apple, Inc. stock in July of 2015 would have cost an investor 
$1,275.00. In return, that investor would be the proud owner of 0.0000000175th 
of Apple Inc. Thus, although a stock fundamentally represents a share of 
ownership in a company, an investor may struggle to fully comprehend it as a 
tangible good. From a psychology standpoint, assets are far closer in nature to 
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a secondary reinforcer (e.g. currency) than a primary reinforcer (e.g. food).  
Moreover, given that fluctuations in stock prices generally approximate random 
walks (see Introduction), and that there is no contract associated with a stock 
(i.e. the company is under no contractual obligation to pay out dividends, etc.), 
the true value of a holding is neither fixed nor certain. An asset can become 
virtually valueless in an instant. Given this unique set of features, financial 
markets are particularly conducive to the study of cognitive mechanisms that 




Finance is defined as a subfield of economics; while the two share similar 
normative ideals, finance has naturally developed its own traditions and field-
specific methodologies. While expected utility is the primary computation of 
future subjective value in economics, the finance tradition generally relies on a 
similar but mathematically distinct construct: namely, the risk-return model 
proposed by Markowitz (1959). In its most basic form, the return, r, on an 
investment is calculated as the percentage of profit gained from a trade, by: 
𝑹 =   𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆!𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑩𝒖𝒚𝑷𝒓𝒊𝒄𝒆𝑩𝒖𝒚   ×  𝟏𝟎𝟎   ( 9 ) 
The return is therefore a measure of the change in price between buying and 
selling with relation to the original purchase price. As with expected value, 
taking the product of an investment’s returns and respective probabilities 
provides an estimation of expected return (ER). Importantly, the variability in 
returns on an investment over a given time period is regarded as a measure of 
the asset’s risk. This is expressed as either the standard deviation (σ) or 
variance (σ2), and represents the spread of the distribution of returns around 
the mean. It is therefore a general truism that greater risk confers the potential 
for greater return.  
Markowitz (1959) states that one can construct an ideal portfolio based on 
preferred risks by eliciting the amount that an investor is willing to pay (WTP) 
for assets over varying degrees of risk and return (see Figure 3), using: 
𝑾𝑻𝑷 = 𝑬𝑹 − 𝒃(𝝈𝟐)   ( 10 ) 
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Thus, when b represents an individual’s risk preference, an investor’s WTP for 
one unit of decreased risk will be reflected in the difference between expected 
return (ER) and subjectively weighted risk (σ or σ2). Take, for example, the 
decision in which an investor chooses how to divide her portfolio between ‘risk-
free’ government bonds that offer 
a certain return of 5%, and stocks 
that have a higher rate of return 
(between 5-15%) but also greater 
associated risk. This example is 
depicted in Figure 3, where the 
investor chooses point X, dividing 
her money between the two 
assets. A risk-averse investor 
would position X toward the left, 
and a risk-tolerant investor would 
position X toward the right. Therefore, b-Values offer a direct measure of an 
individual’s risk preference from observed choice behaviour.   
Efficient Markets 
In parallel with the normative economic models implying the existence of a 
rational Homo Economicus, there also existed a similar sentiment regarding 
financial markets. Although it was not formally defined until the 1970’s, much of 
the financial discourse centred around the notion that markets were efficient 
(Sewell, 2011; Shiller, 2003).  
Fama (1970, p. 383) made the fundamental assertion that the price of a stock 
Figure 3: Risk-Return Models 
            
Figure 3 with permissions from Glimcher (2008). An 
investor chooses between how to divide her portfolio 
between ‘risk-free’ government bonds that offer a sure 
return of 5%, and stocks that have a higher rate of 
return but also a greater associated risk. The investor 
chooses point X, dividing her money between the two 
assets. A risk-averse investor would position X toward 
the left, and a risk-seeking investor would position X 
toward the right. b-Values offer a direct measure of an 
individual’s risk preference from observed choice 
behaviour.  
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acts as a signal to the market about the economic health of the company, and 
that in an efficient market, this signal “fully reflects” all available information. 
Importantly, this notion includes all types of information (e.g. financial, social, 
political, etc.) that might have a direct or indirect effect on the marketplace. As 
an example, consider the situation where the CEO of a company is publically 
accused of cheating on his wife. Although this information may have little to do 
with the financial abilities of the company itself (and indeed, the accusation 
need not necessarily even be true), an ensuing fall in stock prices would reflect 
a loss of shareholders’ trust in the company’s leadership. Thus prices are a 
reflection of the information that investors have, as well as their expectations 
about how other investors will react to that information.  
By this logic, changes in price will reflect a combination of: new information, 
investors’ own reactions to new information, and investors’ expectations about 
other investors’ reactions to the new information. While the composite reaction 
itself may be unpredictable, it can be assumed that the price change will fully 
depend on the new information and thus be independent of previous 
information (and previous price).  Therefore, the idea of efficient markets 
became coupled with the concept introduced in the beginning of this chapter, 
namely that stocks prices follow the ‘random walk’ pattern of Brownian motion 
defined by Einstein in 1905. In other words, stock prices are completely 
random, denoting that future prices are completely independent of current 
prices. This represents a particularly grim conclusion for the individual whose 
job it is to predict future market trends. Indeed, given an efficient market in 
which prices are a reflection of all information, all investors privy to all prices by 
definition have access to all information. Therefore, ‘bargain’ stock prices do 
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not exist, and any attempt of one investor to outperform another investor is 
futile, and only adds to the overall randomness of prices. Fama (1965, p. 10) 
stated bluntly: 
If, as the empirical evidence seems to suggest, the random-walk 
theory is valid, then chartist theories are akin to astrology and of 
no real value to the investor. 
Despite these rather self-defeating implications, the efficient markets 
hypothesis found a great deal of success in the field and remains a strong 
theoretical pillar. In support of the efficient market hypothesis, a number of 
researchers have highlighted the fact that even professional money managers 
do not beat the market (Rubenstein, 2001).  
The efficient market hypothesis refutes the idea that irrational investors (often 
referred to as ‘noise traders’) can influence market prices in any meaningful 
way, since rational investors would quickly identify and take advantage of any 
deviation from fundamental value (Friedman, 1953). There also exists the 
possibility of beating the average by reacting to new or insider information more 
quickly than the time it takes for the market to adjust to its new average. It is 
generally accepted that while an investor may occasionally beat the market by 
reacting quickly to new information, it is not possible to sustain this on the 
average. Proponents of the efficient market theory and the Capital Asset 
Pricing Model (Markowitz, 1959) conclude that although it may not be possible 
for investors to beat the market on average, it is still possible to perform at 
average by maintaining a sufficiently diversified portfolio.  
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Inefficient Markets: ‘Noise Traders’  
Fama (1970) himself admits that a purely efficient market, where all information 
is freely known, is not an accurate description of any real world markets. In fact, 
he supplied a number of examples of markets exhibiting variable levels of 
efficiency in his (1970) paper, including the scenario in which information is 
monopolistically held and exploited. In general, behaviourists such as Barberis 
and Thaler (2003) argue that the effect that ‘noise traders’ have on market 
prices is not always cancelled out by quick-acting rational investors (otherwise 
referred to as ‘arbitrage traders’ in the finance literature).  The authors argue 
that arbitrage, or the ability of rational investors to take advantage of mispricing 
from noise trading, is both risky and costly. In real markets, arbitrage does not 
fully cancel out the effects arising from psychological biases, as asserted by 
Friedman (1953). 
There also exists a long-standing debate about whether or not the average 
stock’s movement over time carries momentum, meaning it is more likely to 
continue on its current trajectory than to reverse directions, or whether its 
movement more closely approximates a random walk.  While many argue that 
asset fluctuations are entirely random (notably, Malkiel, 1973), others provide 
evidence for serial autocorrelation (Bondt & Thaler, 1985; Campbell, Lo, & 
MacKinlay, 1997; Shiller, 2003), suggesting that psychological factors such as 
herding behaviour and heuristics lead to serial correlation in prices over time.  
Within psychology, the term ‘heuristic’ refers to an intuitive reduction in choice 
sets due to the limited computational or attentional capacity of a decision-
maker. Tversky and Kahneman (1974, p. 1124) assert that: 
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[P]eople rely on a limited number of heuristic principles which 
reduce the complex tasks of assessing probabilities and 
predicting values to simpler judgmental operations. In general, 
these heuristics are quite useful, but sometimes they lead to 
severe and systematic errors.  
In colloquial terms, a heuristic is a rule of thumb based on subjective beliefs. 
When a heuristic consistently leads to a departure from rationality, it creates 
what is called a ‘cognitive bias.’ Cognitive biases tend to be extremely robust – 
even prior knowledge of the bias often cannot effectively preclude its 
expression. This is akin to perceptual illusions such as Jastrow’s (1899) duck-
rabbit, whereby one’s previous knowledge of cognitive psychology and 
perception does not change one’s inability to see both the duck and the rabbit 
at the same time. When even very small departures from rationality arise as 
systematic reactions to market dynamics, the aggregate influence across 
thousands of investors can be powerful. Thus, many finance experts are eager 
to capture the effect that these systematic deviations have in predictive asset 
pricing models. 
The Disposition Effect 
Shefrin and Statman (1985) labelled one such bias the ‘disposition effect,’ 
which describes investors’ inclination to sell profitable stocks too soon while 
holding on to losing stocks for too long. This effect is extremely robust and has 
been observed in both professionally managed and individual investment 
accounts (Shapira & Venezia, 2001), as well as across investor classes (P. 
Brown, Chappel, da Silva Rosa, & Walter, 2006), cultures (G. Chen, Kim, 
Nofsinger, & Rui, 2007) and genders (Feng & Seasholes, 2008). However, the 
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underlying causes of the disposition effect remain unclear. 
In the past, it was argued that the disposition effect could be attributed to 
investors’ irrational belief in ‘mean-reversion,’ i.e. that the direction of the stock 
will eventually flip and revert back to the mean (for review, see Mukherji, 2011; 
Poterba & Summers, 1988). If this explanation were correct, investors would be 
just as likely to realize gains and losses, as the investor would assume both an 
increase and a decrease in price would quickly return to average. However, the 
observation that investors tend to realize gains at a much higher rate (about 
50%) than losses allowed Odean (1998) to refute this explanation.  
Shefrin and Statman (1985) initially argued that this behaviour was instead a 
product of Prospect Theory utility, whereby an investor holding a stock that 
goes down in price after purchase would use the original price as a reference 
point. This places the investor in the steeper, convex loss domain of the 
Prospect Theory utility curve (i.e. the lower left-hand quadrant of Figure 2a). 
Compared to the concave gain domain, the now risk-seeking investor requires 
an even lower price before she is willing to sell. This process could potentially 
perpetuate itself until the stock no longer had value, or until the investor 
changes the reference point (e.g. by lowering expectations). The opposite 
would be true for individuals holding a winning stock, whereby the investor 
would find herself in the concave risk-averse gain domain (i.e. the upper right-
hand quadrant of Figure 2a). Less willing to risk losing the current gain, the 
investor would be biased toward selling the winning stock too soon. Through 
this process, Prospect Theory provides an explanation for why individuals hold 
losses too long while selling winners too soon.  
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A number of alternative explanations for the disposition effect have also arisen. 
For example, Thaler (1998) highlighted the affective processes that impede 
action in the face of a loss, stating that selling a losing stock is more painful 
than holding on to a ‘paper loss.’ Alternatively, others have hypothesized that 
the act of selling at a gain bears inherent utility, while respective disutility is 
derived from selling at a loss (Barberis & Xiong, 2012; Barberis & Xiong, 2009; 
Frydman, Barberis, Camerer, Bossaerts, & Rangel, 2014). Hirshleifer (2001) 
postulates a third alternative in which investors avoid selling losing stocks 
because the act of doing so represents a self-signal that they have performed 
poorly. Hirshleifer’s hypothesis aligns with the concept of self-justification in 
cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Given that poor performance 
may be seen as a reflection of low ability, the investor is motivated toward self-
deception in order to maintain a notion of high self-regard. In all three of the 
alternative explanations introduced above, the investor disassociates the 
outcome of holding a gain/loss from the outcome of selling a gain/loss. In other 
words, even though an investor has already lost real money when she is 
holding a stock that has plummeted in value, this notion of financial loss is 
qualitatively different than that experienced upon actually selling the losing 
stock.   
The ‘Realization Hypothesis,’ in which individuals conceptually separate a 
paper gain/loss from a realized gain/loss, has found traction in recent 
neurobiological research. Frydman and colleagues (2014) reported a large 
spike in fMRI BOLD activity in the ventral striatum (an area critically involved in 
reward processing) after participants decided to sell at a gain compared to 
when they decided to hold at a gain. In short, the researchers found that a 
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realized gain elicits quantifiably distinct reward-related neural activity compared 
to a paper gain. This study constitutes an important link between economics, 
psychology and neuroscience, because if clues to the origins of the disposition 
effect lie in subcortical structures such as the ventral striatum, then further 
testing in the laboratory may reveal important predictions about behaviour in 
the marketplace. 
Economic Animals 
In order to fully explore the neural mechanisms underlying behaviour in the 
laboratory, it is often ethically and economically preferable to use simpler 
organisms (e.g. rodents or birds). This is generally justified with regard to 
reward-related behaviour, because while cortical structures between 
mammalian species show potentially meaningful functional and 
cytoarchitechtonic differences, subcortical brain areas responsible for 
representing and learning from reward are remarkably evolutionarily preserved 
(this concept is developed in detail in the following section, and the reader is 
referred to Figure 5 for illustrative comparison of the reward system between 
species). Indeed, these underlying similarities may even help explain the 
successful migration of rational economic models of the early 20th Century into 
models of optimal reward-related decision making behaviour in the ecological 
literature (e.g. Optimal Foraging Theory) beginning in the 1960’s (Cowie, 1977; 
Mäki, 2009; Stephens & Krebs, 1986). This also suggests that laboratory tasks 
with animals such as rats could potentially represent valid behavioural and 
neural models of economic decision-making. 
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In order to explore the viability of modelling economic behaviour in rats, 
researchers (e.g. Collier, Hirsch, & Hamlin, 1972; Kagel et al., 1975) in the 
1970’s began explicitly developing 
laboratory-based economic tasks. In 
one experiment, which Kagel and 
colleagues (1981) called a 
‘consumer demand’ task (Figure 4), 
rats bar-pressed for food pellets up 
to a limit of 350 presses (Z’). The 
experimenter either decreased 
‘budget’ by decreasing the amount 
of lever presses allowed to 250 
while holding the payoff magnitude 
constant (Z), or increased the ‘price’ 
by requiring more presses per unit of 
reward (Z’’). Doubling the price resulted in the same effect on demand for water 
as did decreasing the allowable budget. Thus the authors concluded that rat 
consumption patterns obey the basic principles of consumer demand theory. 
Similar studies report analogous findings with preferred and non-preferred 
substitutes, essential and non-essential commodities, and changes in wealth 
and labour-supply (Collier et al., 1972; Kagel & Battalio, 1980). These studies, 
which represent some of the first direct tests of economic theory using 
laboratory rats, provide robust evidence that maximizing behaviour under 
environmental constraints is not a capability unique to humans. 
More recent research demonstrates that we may also share our ‘irrational’ 
Figure 4: Rat Demand Curves 
   
Figure 4 with permission from Kagel, Battalio, 
Rachlin, and Green (1981, p. 4): Demand curve 
for rats between two ‘goods’, where doubling the 
required bar presses for a given magnitude of 
water (x-axis) from Z to Z’’ had the same effect on 
demand for water as halving the amount of fluid 
that paid out per bar press. This bar press per unit 
of reward measure corresponds with the definition 
of ‘price’ in consumer demand theory. 
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behavioural biases with our evolutionary ancestors. For example, Chen and 
colleagues (2006) reveal that non-human primates are also similar to humans 
when they behave irrationally. By creating a token economy with fruit, the 
authors find that while capuchin monkeys respond rationally to changes in 
wealth and price, they exhibit both reference dependence and loss aversion 
(refer to previous section on ‘Prospect Theory’) when risk is also incorporated. 
Work by the same group found that capuchins also exhibit framing effects – 
becoming risk seeking when gambles were presented as a loss and risk-averse 
if the gamble was presented as a gain (Lakshminaryanan, Chen, & Santos, 
2008). These studies further support the notion that the mechanisms underlying 
choices that involve the potential for loss extend beyond the human species. 
Researchers can take advantage of the fact that animals behave similarly to 
humans in many contexts. Like Kagel (1975) and his contemporaries, one can 
test theoretical assumptions of economic theories without the confounding 
‘human factors’, such as prior assumptions about how an economy works or 
differing levels of numeracy amongst participants. In this way, animal 
paradigms offer clear advantages to neuroeconomic study. However, there are 
also disadvantages and operational obstacles to working with laboratory 
animals. For example, it is not possible to describe the outcome values and 
probabilities of a potential gamble to an animal – it must learn the 
contingencies of an action through trial and error. Furthermore, it is extremely 
difficult to operationalize resource loss in an animal task, for one can easily 
reward an animal with food or drink, but it is difficult to then retract the reward 
once it has been consumed. The development of tasks that overcome such 
challenges will be key in facilitating a comprehensive characterization of the 
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neural structures and functions that give rise to economic choices.  
Reward Learning and Expectation in the Brain 
Up to present, animal work has been instrumental in achieving our current 
understanding of how rewards are learned and represented in the brain. While 
a number of mechanisms underlie valuation and choice during decision-
making, the dopamine system plays a central role in the neural processing of 
reward-related behaviour (Fibiger & Phillips, 1986). From an anatomical 
standpoint, the rat (and to a lesser extent the pigeon) dopaminergic system 
shows striking similarities to the human system (see Figure 5).  Dopamine 
neurons primarily 
originate in the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) 
and the substantia nigra 
pars compacta (SNc). 
Bilaterally, the rat has 
between 40,000 and 
45,000 dopamine 
neurons in the VTA and 
SNc combined, while 
healthy young adult 
humans have 400,000 – 600,000 (Puig et al., 2014). The striatum represents 
the most densely innervated target area of midbrain dopamine projections 
(Björklund & Dunnett). Postsynaptic target cells express D1- (low dopamine 
affinity) or D2-like (high dopamine affinity) receptors that function as slow-acting 
  
Figure 5 reproduced* from (Puig, 
Rose, Schmidt, & Freund, 2014): 
Comparative neuroanatomy of the 
dopamine system in the primate, 
rat and pigeon.  Dopamine 
neurons originate in two main 
midbrain nuclei, the ventral 
tegmental area (VTA) and 
substantia nigra pars compacta 
(SNc), and project to many areas 
(projections shown in red), 
especially the striatum and 
prefrontal cortex (PFC). Striatal 
areas are shaded in blue, cortical 
areas are shaded in gray, and the 
hatched areas represent PFC (or 
its structural equivalent in birds, 
the nidopallium caudolaterale; 
NCL). *Figure reproduced under 
Creative Commons Attribution 
License (CC BY).  
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G-protein coupled neuromodulators (Santana, Mengod, & Artigas, 2009). 
Dopamine neurons demonstrate two types of firing patterns: 1) phasic, quick 
bursts of action potentials and 2) tonic, slow ramping currents. It is theorized 
that the two modes of firing fulfil separate functions (i.e. transmit different types 
of information) with respect to reward prediction and motivation (Howe, Tierney, 
Sandberg, Phillips, & Graybiel, 2013; Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2003), which 
may also be facilitated by the asymmetrical D1- and D2-like receptor affinities 
for dopamine.  
Robust evidence supports the theory that the midbrain dopamine system elicits 
a phasic learning signal, or Reward Prediction Error (RPE), in response to 
expectations about reward (Schultz, Apicella, & Ljungberg, 1993; Schultz, 
Dayan, & Montague, 1997; Schultz & Dickinson, 2000). Unexpected rewards 
reliably evoke an increase in phasic dopamine activity (positive reward 
prediction error) in dopaminergic midbrain areas such as the VTA and nucleus 
accumbens (NAc), while the omission of an expected reward consistently 
inhibits activity in these areas, resulting in a negative reward prediction error. 
The error signal has been shown to equate to the expected (mean) value of a 
reward distribution divided by its standard deviation (Preuschoff & Bossaerts, 
2007; Schultz, 2010; Tobler, Fiorillo, & Schultz, 2005). Thus, the prediction 
error signals a normalized value of how much an obtained reward differs from 
expectations. By modulating synaptic plasticity in midbrain dopamine neurons, 
it is theorized that this signal selectively reinforces rewarded behaviour while 
discouraging unrewarded behaviour (Suri & Schultz, 1999; Sutton & Barto, 
1998). In this manner, dopaminergic modulation allows an organism to reliably 
update expectations about an outcome that lead to better predictions (and 
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thereby better information on which to base decisions) about similar encounters 
in the future.  
Given that the majority of research presented above was in animals, Zaghloul 
and colleagues (2009) used single neuron recording during deep-brain 
stimulation in Parkinson’s disease patients to establish whether reward 
prediction errors could be observed in 
humans as well. In this study, the 
authors employed a probabilistic 
gambling task where participants 
could choose from a relatively safe or 
risky deck of cards to earn 
hypothetical money. As has been 
observed in previous animal studies, 
Zaghloul and colleagues found that 
neurons in the substantia nigra 
responded to unexpected gains and 
losses with increased or decreased 
activity, respectively (see Figure 6). However, since Parkinson’s Disease is 
characterized by extensive targeted cell loss in the substantia nigra, it could be 
argued that the results depicted here may not reflect those of a healthy 
individual (Aarts, 2012). Furthermore, the authors are not explicit about whether 
subjects perceived losses within the task as a monetary loss (e.g. Begin: $50 
è Outcome: -$5 è End: $45) or as a non-reward (e.g. Begin: $50 è 
Outcome: ‘Loss’ è End: $50). The later would more closely approximate 
animal studies on reward prediction error. Either way, this study provides 
Figure 6: Activity of Single Neurons in the 
Substantia Nigra of Parkinson’s Disease 
Patients after a Financial Gain and Loss  
 
Figure 6 with permissions from Zaghloul, et al. 
(2009) depicts the single unit activity of 
substantia nigra neurons of Parkinson’s 
Disease patients during a probabilistic choice 
task. (A-B) Increased activity after unexpected 
gains and suppressed activity after unexpected 
losses, (C-D) Small increase activity after an 
expected loss – no change after expected gain. 
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evidence that the human brain holds some representation of the expected 
value of an outcome, and that midbrain dopamine activity responds to any 
deviation from that expected value. 
Put in the context of the stock market, reward prediction errors may offer some 
intriguing insight. Similar to midbrain activity in gambling tasks, one would 
predict that phasic dopamine signals would respond with a relative increase in 
firing rates after a large unexpected gain on a trade, and vice versa after a 
large unexpected loss. Dopamine neurons then encode the difference between 
expected and experienced reward, which provides a learning signal for 
updating expectations about subsequent events. The dopamine-modulated 
relative increase in expected outcome could potentially be responsible for the 
fluctuation of an individual’s reference point. In the case of gain omission, as is 
the case when firms choose to withhold dividends for a certain period for 
example, dopamine activity would be suppressed, and a negative reward 
prediction error would provide a learning signal not to repeat the investment 
action that lead to the omission outcome. Indeed, Michaely, Thaler, and 
Womack (1995) found that firms significantly underperformed compared to the 
market one year after announcement of such a dividend omission. The 
opposite was also true for those announcing the initiation of dividend payments. 
Given that past market performance is a notoriously poor predictor of future 
prices, and that monitoring of individual stocks does not accurately represent 
portfolio-level performance, this reinforcement-learning signal may lead to 
maladaptive investment behaviour.  
Since stock prices are in constant motion and few reliable signals of 
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increasing/decreasing future prices exist, observed prices would rarely – if ever 
– perfectly match predicted values. This implies that reinforcement learning 
prediction errors may have a sustained effect on investor behaviour, as price 
stochasticity requires constant updating by large increments. In reinforcement 
learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998), a primary reinforcement signal can itself 
become reinforcing (i.e. a secondary reinforcer). When applied to the market 
place, reinforcement learning theory suggests that the act of trading itself could 
become a reinforced behaviour. If this were the case, successful investors 
would be biased to trade more frequently and unsuccessful investors to trade 
less often. Evidence for this hypothesis presents itself in work by De, Gondhi, 
and Pochiraju (2010), who find that investors were indeed more active after 
experiencing recent success. In this way, reinforcement learning may act as a 
fundamental motor of investment decisions. 
Over time, repeated maladaptive learning signals from the nervous system may 
become more established as investors learn action-outcome associations. In 
laboratory tasks, rats learn to associate actions (such as running down a 
runway to retrieve reward) with outcomes that lead to a rewarding state (e.g. 
consuming a sugar pellet), which is called an action-outcome association 
(Tolman, 1932). Similarly, Karlsson, Loewenstein, and Seppi (2009) 
demonstrate that investors log on to examine their trading accounts more often 
when markets are doing well than when markets are doing poorly. This 
suggests that investors also have a neural representation of an action-outcome 
association between accessing the online portfolio and the likelihood of 
experiencing a gain or loss. While action-outcome association learning is 
necessary and adaptive in many contexts, the resulting behaviour in the above 
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example would potentially bias investors toward holding on to losing stocks too 
long and selling winning stocks too quickly (i.e. exhibit the disposition effect).  
Value Representation in the Brain  
When given a choice between outcomes, including mixed gambles (i.e. those 
involving both wins and losses) and decisions that involve costs (e.g. effort, 
monetary, or foraging costs), outcome valuation allows an individual to ascribe 
a subjective value to a possible outcome based on its attributes (e.g. 
desirability, valence, salience and risk) as well as any previous experiences 
associated with that outcome. Thus, valuation represents the first stage of a 
simple three-stage neural decision process (see Figure 7) proposed by Platt 
and Plassmann (2014).  
 
 
Figure 7 with permissions from Platt and Plassmann (2014, p. 239): In 
stage 1, observed and predicted attributes of options are consolidated 
into a subjective value signal. In primates, this occurs primarily in areas 
highlighted in yellow such as the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (dlPFC), 
the anterior cingulate cortex, the orbitofrontal cortex and the striatum. In 
stage 2, the subjective value signal is transformed into action signals in 
the parietal cortex (green) for the motor systems to carry out the choice. 
Once the outcome is actually experienced, outcome values are signaled 
in stage 3 in areas highlighted in red, such as the insula striatum and 
orbitofrontal cortex. These stages are not required to operate in the order 
presented, and could potentially operate in parallel.  
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Once the value signals are computed, they are passed on to comparator 
regions and subsequently converted to action values so that motor areas can 
realize choice. In the final stage, the brain encodes the value of actually 
experiencing (e.g. of receiving or consuming) the chosen outcome. This final 
stage then feeds back to the first stage to update predicted values as 
reinforcement learning. It has been proposed that the vmPFC, OFC and 
striatum encode the subjective value of rewards, while the lateral interparietal 
area (LIP) translates subjective values into action values. The insula, striatum 
and OFC are implicated in signalling experienced reward.  
When evaluating the value of one option within a set of options, it is important 
to note that one option's value will invariably be affected by the other alternative 
options' values. Tobler, Fiorillo, and Schultz (2005) observed 
electrophysiological recordings of single midbrain dopamine neuron activity in 
awake Macaque monkeys responding to liquid rewards. The researchers found 
that activation of dopamine neurons increased monotonically as a function of 
reward magnitude and probability (i.e. the components of expected value) with 
both predicted and unpredicted rewards. Thus, when given a choice between a 
set of alternatives, the outcomes associated with the other choices become 
reference points for the subjective value that one assigns to a chosen outcome. 
It is of note that dopaminergic activity did not adapt to the absolute value of 
rewards, but rather to the standard deviation of the most probable potential 
outcomes. This evidence suggests that the brain consolidates information by 
representing reward in a context-depend manner within the dopamine system, 
offering critical insight as to why one’s choices are often subconsciously 
influenced by the options surrounding it. For example, given a choice between 
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three competing brands, consumers will often choose the middle option – which 
can mean either the option with the middle price point or the option literally 
spaced in the middle of the visual field (Sigurdsson, Saevarsson, & Foxall, 
2009; Simonson, Nowlis, & Lemon, 1993). 
While research regarding the neural encoding of reward consistently points to 
targets of dopaminergic midbrain areas as primary modulatory substrates, 
much less is known about how the brain encodes resource losses. Taking 
insight from Prospect Theory’s (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) oft cited concept 
that losses loom twice as large as gains (see Figure 2), researchers have 
proposed two different hypotheses regarding the neural representation of 
losses. Loss aversion suggests that either: a) there is an affective response 
that biases evaluations involving losses in a dual system (Ashraf, Camerer, & 
Loewenstein, 2005; Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005), or b) gains and losses are 
handled asymmetrically within a single system (for review, see Kable & 
Glimcher, 2009). These two competing hypotheses of whether the valuation 
system is guided by a single system or dual-systems are fuelled by 
contradictory findings that have sparked a heated debate within the field.  
On the one side, studies such as Tom et al. (2007) provide human 
neuroimaging evidence in support of the single-process theory that focus on 
valuation centres in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) and striatum. 
Tom and colleagues (2007) gave participants a series of gambles that they 
chose to either accept or reject. Each gamble was associated with an equal 
(50/50) probability of winning or losing. The authors suggest that BOLD 
responses in the vmPFC and ventral striatum at the time of decision selection 
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exhibit ‘neural loss aversion.’ In other words, the same areas that encode 
reward not only show decreased activity to losses, but the decreases in loss-
elicited activity were also greater than equivalent increases in gain-elicited 
activity. Furthermore, the study did not find any correlation between losses and 
activity in regions associated with negative emotions (e.g. amygdala or anterior 
insula).  
Contrary to these findings, Gan and colleagues (2010) investigated whether 
costs were tracked by dopamine release in the rat nucleus accumbens with the 
use of fast-scan cyclic voltammetry. Rats were placed in a decision-making 
paradigm, whereby reward magnitude and effort-based cost were each 
manipulated. The results demonstrated that, while phasic dopamine in the 
nucleus accumbens of rats did track probability-weighted reward magnitudes 
as in Tobler et al. (2005), extracellular dopamine levels did not correlate with 
changing costs or a net cost-benefit utility function. Therefore, midbrain 
dopamine neurons appear to encode information about the benefits of an 
outcome but not specifically its costs or net utility. 
Instead, a number of studies implicate the amygdala and anterior insula as the 
counterpart to reward in neural loss processing, particularly with respect to loss 
aversion. A recent study by McHugh and colleagues (2014) recorded both local 
field potentials and hemodynamic tissue oxygen signals, which are putatively 
equivalent to human BOLD signals (Lowry et al., 2010), in the basolateral 
amygdala of freely moving mice during a fear-conditioning (foot shock) task. 
The authors found an increased hemodynamic response to an unexpected foot 
shock and suppressed activity following an unexpected foot shock omission. 
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Furthermore, greater evoked hemodynamic and theta signals were predictive of 
better discrimination ability between aversive and nonaversive stimuli in 
subsequent sessions. This is in line with theories implicating theta oscillations 
in enhanced information transfer (Buzasaki, 2002) and attentional gain 
(Sejnowski & Paulsen, 2006). While these findings are intriguing in that they 
parallel dopaminergic reward prediction errors in the midbrain, it is unclear 
whether the (pre-synaptic) measurements in this study truly confirm that the 
aversive prediction errors generate from the amygdala.  
De Martino, Camerer, and Adolphs (2010) found that patients with Urbach-
Wiethe disease, a rare neurological disease that causes selective bilateral 
lesions of the amygdala, have difficulty processing fear. Similarly, rhesus 
monkeys with amygdala lesions have been shown to exhibit a lack of fear in 
approaching novel stimuli compared to non-lesioned monkeys (Mason, 
Capitanio, Machado, Mendoza, & Amaral, 2006). This led the authors to 
investigate whether the patients also exhibited loss aversion differently than 
healthy controls. Indeed, the study showed that amygdala-lesioned patients did 
not exhibit loss aversion under an experimental paradigm closely paralleling 
that of Tom et al. (2007), whereas healthy controls did. Interestingly, the 
authors also showed that despite this absence of loss aversion, patients with 
amygdala damage did still exhibit risk aversion (a preference for safer rather 
than riskier gambles) similarly to healthy controls. The researchers were able to 
conclude, therefore, that the amygdala is critical in the processing of losses in a 
manner that is independent of risk evaluation.  
Loss aversion is also fully predicted by the somatic marker theory, which 
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implicates anterior insula in the integration and experience of emotional and 
somatosensory information (Bechara & Damasio, 2005; Craig, 2002; Damasio, 
1994). Furthermore, the anterior insula has been associated with fear (Adolphs, 
Tranel, & Damasio, 1995), anticipatory anxiety (Chua, Krams, Toni, 
Passingham, & Dolan, 1999), as well as the anticipation of monetary losses 
(Kahn et al., 2002) and aversive physical (Buchel & Dolan, 2000) and visual 
stimuli (Simmons, Matthews, Stein, & Paulus, 2004). Given that the anterior 
insula mediates negative affect and the anticipation of negative outcomes, 
emotion may therefore contribute to a greater impact in the perception of losses 
than of gains, which supports the dual-system perspective. In further support of 
this hypothesis, Sokol-Hessner and colleagues (2009) found that losses elicited 
greater physiological arousal than gains in human participants, consistent with 
loss aversion. Moreover, participants were able to attenuate behavioural and 
physiological effects of loss aversion through intentional cognitive-regulation 
efforts. A second study not only correlated behavioural and physiological 
expressions of loss aversion with BOLD activation in the amygdala, but also 
demonstrated that successful cognitive-regulation strategies reduced activity in 
the amygdala (Sokol-Hessner, Camerer, & Phelps, 2013). Importantly, the 
changes in BOLD signals in the amygdala associated with cognitive regulation 
correlated with responses to losses, but not to gains, and also coincided with 
increased activity in prefrontal regions and the striatum.  
Upon experiencing an outcome, a rat study conducted by Steiner and Redish 
(2012) argues that the OFC encodes information about counterfactual options 
when a loss is incurred, thereby representing something akin to ‘regret.’ The 
authors designed an economics-based task to induce regret in rats, while 
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recording from single neurons in the OFC and ventral striatum. Regret was 
defined as the revaluation of a previous choice in terms of the current choice. A 
four-armed “Restaurant Row” task was implemented, wherein each arm 
contained an equal amount of different flavoured pellets (e.g. cherry, 
chocolate). As a rat approached the entrance to one arm, the pitch of a tone 
indicated the length of wait time required before the reward could be 
consumed. The rat then had the choice of waiting the given amount of time or 
moving on to the next arm. The wait time varied randomly between 1-45 
seconds. Due to time constraints, any skipped arm that was comparably better 
than the subsequent arm was considered a missed opportunity, and cause for 
regret. Disappointing sequences, or sequences where a non-preferred outcome 
resulted from chance rather than from the rat’s decision, were analysed as 
controls to regret. For example, a disappointment-inducing sequence would 
result when a non-preferred outcome was (correctly) skipped, but followed by a 
similarly non-preferred outcome. By contrast, a regret-inducing sequence would 
occur when the rat (incorrectly) skipped a preferred outcome for a comparably 
less-preferred outcome. Intriguingly, in regret-inducing circumstances (as 
opposed to disappointing circumstances as controls), representations of the 
previous zone/arm were most strongly signalled in the OFC and ventral 
striatum. The representation of regret in these areas more closely related to the 
missed action rather than the missed outcome. This was likened to human 
regret, in which people tend to ruminate over actions taken or not taken rather 
than the missed outcome itself (Gilovich & Medvec, 1995). Together, these 
studies represent a robust argument in favour of neural separation of losses 
and gains. 
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Thus it is possible that rewards and losses are initially encoded in distinct brain 
areas and subsequently integrated into one comparison signal via a third 
region. Evidence from fMRI and lesion studies would suggest that a decision’s 
benefits are signalled primarily by the ventral striatum (Basten, Biele, 
Heekeren, & Fiebach, 2009; B. Knutson & Cooper, 2005; Roesch, Singh, 
Brown, Mullins, & Schoenbaum, 2009), while the costs associated with a 
particular outcome are relayed by the amygdala and insula (De Martino et al., 
2010; Yacubian & al, 2006). The combined signal would then act as a net 
value, akin to the economic concept of expected value. Thereafter, researchers 
have hypothesized that these two signals are combined in the vmPFC or OFC 
into a reward- or action-value signal, depending on the type of decision6 
(Gläscher, Hampton, & O'Doherty, 2009; Kolling, Behrens, Mars, & Rushworth, 
2012; Lebreton, Jorge, Michel, Thirion, & Pessiglione, 2009). Further fMRI 
evidence shows that the combined valuation signal then accumulates in the 
parietal cortex until a decision threshold is met (Basten et al., 2009).  
Clark and Dagher (2014) recently incorporated the separable dopamine signals 
into a Prospect Theory utility model of risky decision-making. In this model (see 
Figure 8a), the utility of potential gains and losses are computed separately 
(gains in the vmPFC and striatum and losses in the amygdala and insula) and 
then integrated into a decision value in the striatum. The degree of loss 
aversion, characterized by the steeper slope of the value function over losses, 
is determined by the balance between opposing tonic and phasic action-
                                                
6 There is some debate regarding value assignment in the prefrontal cortex, 
especially with regard to different types of decisions (e.g. economically 
constructed binary goods-based decisions vs. explore-exploit decisions with 
greater ecological plausibil i ty). See Rushworth and colleagues (2012) for a 
comprehensive discussion. 
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selection signals.   
 
This model offers an intriguing application of the dual dopamine signals in loss 
aversion (i.e. the steeper curve for losses than for gains). However, its authors 
make the assumption that risk is equivalent to the proportion of potential 
losses, and not to the uncertainty, or variance, of the potential outcomes. Thus, 
the model does not explicitly incorporate dopamine as a risk signal in the 
economic sense, per se. Unfortunately, the authors also refrain from 
speculating about how dopamine might play a role in the two other key aspects 
of Prospect Theory, namely: 1) the ‘s-curved’ weighting function (see Figure 
2b) and 2) the variable reference-point. Despite its apparent incompleteness, 
the model offers a good starting point from which to base further investigations.  
Note that in the Clark and Dagher (2014) model above, it remains unclear how 




Figure 8 reproduced* from (Clark & Dagher, 2014): 
(A) The brain is hypothesized to compute utility from 
potential gains and losses in different substrates. In 
the model, utility from gains is computed in the 
vmPFC/striatum and utility from losses is computed 
in the amygdala/ insula. These separate utility 
signals are then integrated into a decision value in 
the striatum. Note that the likelihood (i.e. probability) 
and risk (i.e. variance) are either 1) also represented 
separately for gains and losses or 2) are computed 
elsewhere upstream. The combined decision value in 
the striatum reflects loss aversion, whereby the 
losses in the steeper red domain result in greater 
disutility than the utility of equivalent gains in the 
flatter blue domain. (B) The model hypothesizes that 
tonic and phasic dopamine activity fulfil distinct 
modulatory functions, whereby tonic dopamine 
controls the steepness of the value curve in the loss 
domain and phasic dopamine controls the steepness 
of the value curve in the gain domain. 
*Figure reproduced under Creative Commons 
Attribution License (CC BY).  
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does not detail how the riskiness of an outcome reduces/increases phasic or 
tonic dopamine activity. The following section will explore the implications of 
different model classes on the representation of risk in the brain.  
Encoding Risk in the Brain 
Two competing models of risky decision-making are utility-based models (see 
Expected Utility & Prospect Theory), and risk-return models (refer to Risk & 
Return Models). Utility-based theories assume that decision makers weight the 
value of various options and then sum the weighted value of all available 
outcomes in order to decide which option is best. In contrast, risk-return models 
focus first on the average return of an option and its associated risk, and 
thereafter undertake a comparison of all options based on risk-corrected mean 
returns. Often times, the two models’ behavioural predictions are very nearly 
the same, which makes it difficult to determine which one more closely 
resembles the true neural processes underlying risky decision making—or even 
if either of the two models are biologically plausible.  
Although relatively little is known about the neural encoding of risk, a number of 
studies measuring hemodynamic responses of risky decisions point to the 
anterior insula, anterior cingulate cortex, nucleus accumbens, and inferior 
frontal gyrus as key areas in mediating risk (e.g. Mohr, Biele, Krugel, Li, & 
Heekeren, 2010; Paulus, Rogalsky, Simmons, Feinstein, & Stein, 2003; 
Preuschoff, Bossaerts, & Quartz, 2006; Tobler, O'Doherty, Dolan, & Schultz, 
2007). The amygdala has also been implicated in risk tracking, but primarily in 
decision-making under ambiguity when probabilities are unknown (M. Hsu, 
Bhatt, Adolphs, Tranel, & Camerer, 2005; Rutishauser, Mamelak, & Schuman, 
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2006). Significant activations typically disappear when probability distributions 
are learned over time or explicitly stated (Bossaerts, 2010), but nonetheless 
represent important excitatory inputs for risky decision-making.  
 Tonic activation of the dopamine neurons within these areas may play an 
important role in the physiological modulation of risk in expected reward. Fiorillo 
and colleagues (2003) found that for binary reward outcomes (e.g. reward or no 
reward), both reward value and reward risk (as variance or entropy) were 
encoded by monkey midbrain dopamine neurons. Whereas the value of a 
conditioned stimulus correlated as expected with phasic burst firing, the authors 
found that sustained tonic responses encoded risk between stimulus onset and 
reward delivery. This tonic activity was highest when a reward was maximally 
uncertain. Kuhnen and Knutson (2005) used functional imaging to investigate 
the neural mechanisms underlying financial risk taking in humans. The authors 
asked participants to choose between two risky stock options with the potential 
for both large gains or large losses, or a safe bond option corresponding to a 
certain but small gain. The study showed that nucleus accumbens activity 
increased prior to risky choices and risk-seeking mistakes, serving as a 
predictor of future risky decisions. Further studies have corroborated these 
findings, suggesting that increased activation of the nucleus accumbens may 
increase one’s tendency to choose options associated with higher risk and 
greater reward (B. Knutson, Wimmer, Kuhnen, & Winkielman, 2008; Matthews, 
Simmons, Lane, & Paulus, 2004; Rao, Korczykowski, Pluta, Hoang, & Detre, 
2008). In support of this association, selective inactivation of the rat nucleus 
accumbens has been shown to elicit the opposite reaction. Stopper and 
Floresco (2011) found that inactivation of the nucleus accumbens shell using 
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localized microinjections of a dopamine antagonist reduced the tendency of 
rats to choose large/risky options versus small/safe options. This evidence 
suggests that dopamine release in the nucleus accumbens is not limited to a 
singular role of signalling reward prediction error via phasic bursts. Instead, 
tonic dopaminergic activity in the nucleus accumbens offers a putative signal 
about the variance, or uncertainty, of receiving an expected reward. The shared 
presence of these two separable signals in a common neurotransmitter and 
brain area is in line with the Markowitz (1959) mean-variance approach – 
although not specifically at the exclusion of utility models. In conclusion, 
although much work is being done in this area, it remains unclear which class 
of model (if any) more nearly approximates the brain’s integration of risk and 




In the preceding sections, it has been established that decision-making under 
uncertainty requires an individual to dynamically update and contextualize 
information about the potential magnitude, valence, likelihood, and desirability 
of an outcome.  It is hypothesized that in the brain, this information is integrated 
into a coherent standardized representation of subjective action value that an 
individual then maps over all potential outcomes in a preference-weighted 
manner. However, the subjective treatment of objective variables such as 
magnitude and probability often make it unlikely that an individual will achieve a 
utility-maximizing behavioural response, as defined by classic rational models 
(Expected Utility). For example, a decision maker in a risk-seeking frame (Levin 
et al., 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) may preferentially weight the 
subjective value of an uncertain option to bias its selection over more certain 
options with equal or greater expected value. It remains unclear how valuation 
mechanisms within the brain instantiate such behaviour.  
While interdisciplinary collaborations in neuroeconomics have made great 
strides in understanding the neural representations of expectations about 
rewards and punishments, little is understood about the mechanisms that 
encode financial losses as well as the mechanisms that allow the prospect of a 
loss to bias representations of value, risk and ultimately behaviour. With this in 
mind, the following chapters represent a collection of original research intended 
to facilitate the study of resource loss on the brain and behaviour. 
We sought to achieve a number of specific goals with the research presented in 
the following chapters. Most generally, we intended to establish the viability of 
 53 
rat decision-making tasks to neuroeconomics research. The majority of 
neuroeconomic research is carried out in primates (humans and to some extent 
in monkeys). This may be due to an implicit assumption that higher order 
cognitive faculties are required for the economic decisions of interest, or 
possibly to the difficulties that arise in operationalizing economic decisions. For 
example, it is not difficult to elicit a mental representation of gains and losses 
from human participants. One must only signal that a loss (e.g. -$5.00) has 
occurred within the task. However, eliciting an abstract representation of 
resource loss is much more difficult in animal work. In general, it is not possible 
to retract a reward once it has been consumed. Previous researchers (e.g. N. 
W. Simon, Gilbert, Mayse, Bizon, & Setlow, 2009; Zeeb, Robbins, & 
Winstanley, 2009) have resolved this issue by substituting punishers (e.g. 
footshocks) and opportunities costs (e.g. timeouts). Given our lack of 
knowledge regarding the neural substrates that encode loss, it is unclear 
whether such substitutes are supported by the same mechanisms as is 
resource loss in the brain. Therefore, it could be argued that neither pain nor 
frustrative non-reward represent valid substitutes.  
The research presented in the upcoming chapters aims to address this 
specifically by developing and validating two novel implementations of resource 
loss. The first operationalization of loss is based on expectations of potential 
gain, while the second is based on notions of a reference point (see ‘Prospect 
Theory’) between perceived gains and losses. Once it is established that rats 
form a representation of loss in each of these tasks, we also aim to determine 
whether or not rats exhibit similar loss-related behavioural biases (e.g. loss 
aversion) to humans and primates (Barberis & Xiong, 2009; M. K. Chen et al., 
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2006). While rational economic behaviour has been observed in rat tasks 
(Kagel et al., 1975), suboptimal behavioural biases such as loss aversion and 
the disposition have never before been explicitly elicited from rats. The 
preceding review suggests that such behavioural biases may occur due to 
conflicting neural processes in the dopaminergic midbrain, and that there are 
marked similarities between the rat and primate midbrains. Therefore, a final 
aim of this research is to implement the novel rat paradigms to further elucidate 





Chapter 2  
 





Previous research has established a role for the dopaminergic midbrain in 
reward-related behaviour (e.g. reward prediction errors), but evidence 
implicating the dopamine system in the encoding of losses is conflicting. This 
critical lack of understanding may be attributable to difficulties in 
operationalizing resource loss in laboratory tasks – especially those with animal 
subjects. Thus, we developed a rat gambling task that utilizes a novel 
operationalization of resource loss in order to facilitate better translations 
between behavioural and neural research in animals and humans. In the task, 
thirsty rats (N=29) were trained to sustain a nosepoke for up to a maximum of 2 
seconds in order to receive liquid reward. At each 100-millisecond interval of 
the nosepoke, the total volume of potential reward increased while the 
cumulative probability of winning that potential reward decreased. Thus, 
animals decided between longer poke durations for larger uncertain rewards or 
shorter poke durations for smaller certain rewards over a 0-2 second 
continuum. Rats also chose between three different contingencies of reward 
magnitude and probability on free-choice trials. The experimental results 
indicated that rats predictably altered behaviour to changes in either reward 
probability accrual rates or reward magnitude accrual rates, which suggests 
that rats were sensitive to contingency manipulations in the task. Furthermore, 
rats spent less time poking in error and moving to collect reward on trials 
immediately preceded by a loss compared to those preceded by a win. This 
supports the notion that rats adjusted behaviour to compensate for a loss. Rats 
also alter contingency choice and subsequent stay-shift behaviour after a loss, 
exhibiting a loss-stay/win-shift pattern of behaviour. 
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Introduction 
With the knowledge that individuals often act as if losses are twice as impactful 
as equivalent gains (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), a topic of considerable 
debate amongst neuroeconomics researchers is whether the brain encodes 
gains and losses via a single, bivalent system or via multiple competing 
systems. Evidence for both the single (e.g. Tom et al., 2007) and competing 
(e.g. Kuhnen & Knutson, 2005) system theories can be found. Methodological 
differences between human and animal research on loss aversion may 
contribute to the lack of resolution over this topic. On the one hand, human 
research benefits from its ability to exact abstract representations of monetary 
loss from participants, while animal research relies on operationalized notions 
of loss such as pain (e.g. a foot-shock or an air-puff) or opportunity cost (e.g. a 
time-out). On the other hand, animal research allows researchers to investigate 
the neural mechanisms driving behaviour at the level of single neurons, while 
commonly employed measures of neural activity in humans generally must 
sacrifice either temporal (e.g. functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging, or fMRI) 
or spatial (e.g. Electroencephalograph, or EEG) resolution. Given these trade-
offs, animal research has been limited in its ability to translate to studies of 
human loss aversion up to this point, and vice versa.  Thus, the development of 
an animal model of risky decision-making that incorporates resource loss 
represents a critical undertaking in allowing researchers to better understand 
the neural mechanisms subserving loss aversion.  
Previous rodent models of risky decision-making demonstrate limited face and 
construct validity to human paradigms with regard to their operationalization of 
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losses. Whereas outcome gains are easily integrated into an animal model by 
resource gain (e.g. by varying the number of food pellets given to hungry rats), 
simulating outcome losses has proven to be a critical obstacle given that 
animals tend to consume outcome gains immediately. For example, rats in the 
previous risky decision making tasks could gain food pellets, but they could not 
arrive at an overall loss by the end of testing session, as would be the case if 
humans were to lose money in a gambling paradigm. 
One way in which previous studies have attempted to model loss in rats is by 
substituting punishers for rewards,7 such as food pellets saturated with quinine 
to make them less palatable than sugary rewards (e.g. van den Bos, 2006). 
Alternatively, some task designs introduce opportunity costs in the form of 
‘time-outs,’ during which time rats cannot work for reward (e.g. Zeeb et al., 
2009). In using either punishment or frustrative nonreward, the previous rat 
models do not incorporate true resource loss, which may confound translations 
of results into humans. By means of a simplistic example, consider an 
experiment in rats in which footshocks are employed as a substitute for 
resource loss. In the event that neural measures taken during the task suggest 
a significant interaction exists between one system encoding gains and a 
separate system encoding losses, the experimenters would not be able to rule 
out the possibility that one system measures value and the other measures 
pain. While one might argue that the emotional response elicited in the contexts 
of resource loss and punishment both demonstrate substantial overlap (Prelec 
                                                
7 In the reinforcement learning literature, a clear distinction is made between the term ‘reward’, which is 
associated with hedonic experience, and the term ‘reinforcer’, which refers to learning invoked by reward. 
Both terms are applicable in this task, but we use the term reward in order to generalize to the wider 
interdisciplinary audience. 
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& Loewenstein, 1998), one cannot conclude from this that the same 
mechanisms encoding the (negative) value of a punishment also encode the 
(negative) value of a financial loss.   
However, this is not to say that emotion should or even could be decoupled 
from risky decision-making tasks. Positive and negative states of affect and 
arousal play an important role in guiding decision making in many contexts, 
including financial decisions (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2011).  Indeed, tasks that 
elicit emotionally engaging responses to choice sets and outcomes are often 
more predictive of naturalistic everyday risky decision making than those that 
do not (for review, see Schonberg, Fox, & Poldrack, 2011). Thus, while it is 
important to incorporate affect and arousal in the task, it is still necessary to 
dissociate them from value. 
The Balloon Analogue Risk Task (BART), developed by Lejuez and colleagues 
(2002), represents one human risky decision-making task that is both 
particularly emotionally engaging and also reliably predictive of naturalistic risk 
taking such as stealing, smoking and substance abuse (Bornovalova, 
Daughters, Hernandez, Richards, & Lejuez, 2005; Lejuez et al., 2007; Lejuez et 
al., 2003). In this task, participants are asked to pump up a series of virtual 
balloons with the goal of cashing out before a given balloon ‘pops’. The 
participant accrues reward with each successful pump of the balloon, but will 
lose any accrued reward in the event that the balloon explodes. Different 
coloured balloons represent differing probabilities of popping as the balloon is 
pumped up, which must be learned over the course of the session. The 
suspense of increasing pumps and the surprise of an exploding balloon 
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naturally elicit affective engagement from participants. Jentsch and colleagues 
(2010) adapted this idea in a rodent BART, but with an additional dimension of 
uncertainty. Rats were presented with two levers, one that added an increment 
of reward and one that cashed out for reward delivery. The researchers varied 
the risk of losing a trial with the ‘add’ lever and the ‘cash out’ lever. In other 
words, the cash out lever was not risk-free, as is the case with the human task. 
Therefore, in the decision moment, subjects did not always have the dilemma 
of taking reward in hand versus potential increased reward. Furthermore, each 
additional bar press resulted in only one unit increase in reward, which meant 
that rats had little incentive to continue bar-pressing beyond the first press. 
Jentsch and colleagues found that inactivation of the rat mPFC increased the 
variability of responding in the task, leading to increased suboptimal behaviour, 
while OFC inactivation decreased response rates altogether. However, the 
authors did not specifically contrast behaviour after a gain with behaviour after 
a loss in either the baseline or inactivation conditions. Therefore, it is unclear 
how losses affected subsequent behaviour within the task. 
In the rat decision-making model carried out in this paper, strategic choices 
were based on manipulations of reward probability and magnitude. Similar to 
the BART, losses were operationalized as the omission of any accrued reward 
up to the point of an unsuccessful gamble. To implement this, we trained thirsty 
rats to nosepoke in a standard operant testing chamber to earn sweet liquid 
reward. The longer a rat poked, the greater the potential volume of reward, but 
also the greater the probability the reward would be cancelled and it would 
receive nothing.  In essence, at each moment during the nosepoke the rat is 
faced with a dilemma, for it could hold the poke longer to earn more reward, but 
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in so doing it also risks losing the reward already earned in the trial. This is the 
equivalent of the decision to ‘let a bet ride’ in human gambling contexts and 
may elicit a closer decision-making scenario to that of the human BART than 
other rodent versions of the task. The specific goal of this design was to elicit 
an internal representation of the volume of reward that was lost (i.e. loss 
encoding). It is possible that such a representation would also generate a 
negative emotional state (Kuhnen & Knutson, 2011) as well as a fictive reward 
prediction error8, i.e. a reward prediction error for an unchosen option 
(Boorman, Behrens, & Rushworth, 2011).  
Within the task, rats were faced with two types of decisions involving 
uncertainty: 1) the decision among nosepoke holes associated with varying 
rates of reward magnitude and probability, and 2) the decision at each 100 
msec interval of a poke to either unpoke and collect accrued reward or to 
continue poking for the chance at accruing more. Once rats’ performance had 
stabilized, we made the following hypotheses regarding nosepoke durations 
and hole choices on free-choice trials in the task:  
1. Each response will be contingent on manipulations of expected reward 
via probability of loss/reward-accrual rates, where risk-aversion will limit 
both poke durations and choice of the high-risk/reward contingency.  
2. Following a loss, rats will change behaviour in a way that is consistent 
with loss aversion in repeated gambles (Heilbronner & Hayden, 2013; 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979): increasing risk-seeking behaviour by 
poking longer and choosing the high-risk/reward contingency more 
often. 
                                                
8 It should be noted that there is a psychological distinction between learning 
from fictive prediction errors that represent options that were not chosen (regret) 
vs. options that were chosen but not obtained (disappointment), and that these 




Subjects were 29 male outbred Lister Hooded rats (Harlan U.K.) that were 
housed in groups of four in a climate-controlled colony room on a reverse 12-
hour light: 12-hour dark cycle (6PM lights off). Baseline data are pooled from 
two cohorts of 16 and 13 rats with similar training protocols. The discrimination 
task and pharmacological manipulation with cis-Flupenthixol described below 
were conducted with the cohort of 16 rats only. After three weeks of habituation 
to experimenter handling, rats were placed on restricted water access for the 
duration of behavioural training and testing with ad libitum food access in the 
home cage. Rats were tested 5 days a week. Water access was restricted to 1 
hour on weekdays following testing, but was available ad libitum on weekends 
from Friday at 4PM until Sunday afternoon (typically between 2-4PM). Rats’ 
weights were monitored so that no animal dropped below 85% of its maximum 
body weight and showed growth throughout the experiment. All procedures 
were carried out under the Project License number 60/4040, conformed to the 
United Kingdom Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (1986) and were approved 
by the Animal Welfare Ethics Committee of the University of St Andrews. 
Apparatus 
Testing was carried out in four 34mm × 29mm × 25mm Perspex inner 
chambers with metal bar flooring that were located within 60cm × 74cm × 55cm 
sound-attenuating outer shell boxes (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT) with 
closed caption video cameras and ventilation fans. The right metal wall of the 
inner testing chamber contained five square nosepoke holes, each 
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accommodating a recessed green LED light as well as an infrared sensor to 
record nosepokes. A recessed custom-built liquid reward magazine delivering 
0.3% w/v sodium saccharin solution at a rate of 0.05 ml/sec was located on the 
left metal wall of the inner testing chamber. The reward spigot was fitted with a 
lickometer (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT or Weignen 1989) to record 
licking behaviour, as well as a white LED (approximately 2072 mcd luminosity) 
and a piezoelectric buzzer (2900Hz, 85dB) to signal reward availability. Two 
electronically controlled syringe pumps (model PHM – 100, Med Associates 
Inc., St Albans, VT) dispensed liquid from 50 ml glass syringes with stainless 
steel plungers (Rocket Medical plc, Herts, U.K.) and an 18-gauge needle 
connected to the reward spigot by Teflon tubing. This setup allowed for 
precision in the timing and flow rate of reward delivery.  
Behavioural testing was interfaced by the MED-PC™ data experimental control 
system (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT) with an IBM® computer running 
Windows™ 98 at a temporal resolution of 2 msec. Summary measures were 
also available in an online display on the computer screen along side real-time 
video feeds.  Behavioural events were also time-stamped (2 msec resolution) 
and recorded for offline data analysis and session reconstruction. 
Task Design 
After three weeks in which rats were habituated to human handling, the animals 
were placed on water restriction and submitted to 30 min training sessions in 
the testing chambers with no fixed trial limit. First, thirsty rats were trained over 
2 days to associate a tone-light cue with delivery of 0.15 ml sweet liquid reward 
(sodium saccharin 0.3% w/v). Rats were subsequently trained over two 
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sessions to nosepoke in the three middle nosepoke holes of the five-hole array 
in order to receive the tone/light cue followed by the reward. Rats were then 
trained to sustain gradually longer nosepokes for up to 2 sec over 18 sessions.  
Task schematic 
 
Figure 9: Task Schematic. Rats were presented with blocks of trials in which forced- and free-choice trials 
were pseudorandomly interleaved in a proportion of 3:1. Lit LEDs indicated the available hole(s) in which a 
rat could poke on any given trial, and the locations of the holes associated with each contingency were 
counterbalanced across testing chambers. All LEDs in nosepoke holes were extinguished after the rat 
began poking into one of the lit nosepoke holes, but no changes in stimuli occurred if an animal poked into 
an unlit hole (error). If the animal either withdrew its snout from the nosepoke hole before a loss, or it 
successfully reached the full 2 sec limit without losing, a tone-light cue emanating from the reward 
magazine would indicate the availability of reward for collection. Movement time (MT) to reward was 
measured from the onset of the conditioned stimuli to licking onset at the reward spigot. The amount of 
reward earned was a function of nosepoke length (refer to plot at top right of figure), and the animal could 
commence licking at the reward spigot until the full amount was delivered. If a loss occurred during the 
course of a nosepoke, both cue and reward were omitted. A 15 sec timer was activated from the onset of a 
nosepoke response, and a trial ended either when the timer elapsed or with the end of a lick bout (an inter-
lick interval > 300 msec) after reward delivery, in which case a new trial began immediately. The animals 
were free to complete as many trials as possible over the course of the 30-minute session. 
Figure 9 depicts the risky decision making task, in which rats could earn reward 
for any duration of nosepoke in a lit hole that lasted between 0.1 and 2 sec. 




rate of reward accrual corresponding with the given nosepoke hole. Each 
nosepoke hole was associated with a rate of risk and reward accrual so that 
increasing nosepoke durations (max 2 sec) resulted in greater volumes of 
potential reward, but also a greater likelihood that that reward would be 
cancelled. Therefore, at each moment during a poke, a rat must consider 
whether to continue poking for more reward (akin to ‘letting the bet ride’), or to 
unpoke and keep any reward that it had accrued up to that point (akin to 
‘cashing out’). The rats chose between a high risk/high reward hole, a medium 
risk/medium reward hole, and a low risk/low reward hole, depending on which 
holes were lit and therefore available on any given trial. Poking into unlit holes 
was counted as an error. Rats had two ways of adjusting their behaviour in 
order to maximize reward within the task: 1) they could vary the duration of a 
nosepoke in order to maximize reward volume and minimize the probability of 
loss on a given trial, and 2) on free-choice trials, they could choose the 
nosepoke hole with optimal contingencies of reward probability/volume based 
on previous experience. As in training, testing sessions lasted 30 minutes with 
no fixed trial limit. 
The task was constructed so that even the steepest reward discounters would 
experience a discernable trade-off between the rate of reward accrual and the 
decreasing likelihood of receiving accrued reward. For example, a rat poking 
only until the first 100ms tick in the hole associated with low rate of reward 
accrual and low probability of losing had a 99.5% chance of success, whereas 
the probability of success dropped to 89% at the first 100ms tick in the hole 
associated with a high rate of reward accrual and high probability of losing. The 
expected value of poking in each contingency is displayed in Figure 10. 
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Expected value of future reward as a function of poke duration 
 
Figure 10: The expected value of future reward as a function of poke duration in stage III (mixed 
probability and magnitude of reward). In the low contingency, a rat would expect a low rate of reward 
accrual but also a low probability of losing over the duration of the nosepoke. Thus, one might expect a rat 
to poke for the full 2 sec duration in the low contingency in order to maximize expected reward. In the high 
contingency, the expected likelihood of losing outweighs any potential increase in reward accrual just 
before a 1 second poke duration. Thus, one might expect a rat to unpoke on average at about 900 msec. 
The medium contingency falls between the low and high contingencies. 
Discrimination task 
In order to confirm that rats were able to discriminate variation in rates of 
reward accrual and probability of winning between the contingencies, we 
manipulated the contingencies so that either only reward probability (stage I), 
only reward volume (stage II), or both reward probability and reward volume 
(stage III) varied across the holes in a subset of 15 rats. Stages I and II each 






























After the discrimination task was carried out, all testing was performed with 
contingencies of mixed probability of reward and volume accrual rates. For 
ease of comprehension, these contingencies will be referred to as: 
• Low Contingency: Low reward accrual rate and low probability of losing 
• Medium Contingency: Medium reward accrual rate and medium 
probability of losing 
• High Contingency: High reward accrual rate and high probability of 
losing 
Behavioural measurements 
Baseline data were from the last five days of stable performance. Given that 
rats were not limited in the number of trials that they were able to complete in a 
session, we calculated percentage choice (rather than absolute number of 
choices) using the number of trials chosen in a given contingency over the 5-
day period divided by the total number of free-choice trials over that period. The 
percentage of stay/shift trials was calculated as the total number of decisions to 
stay/switch after a previous trial across the 5 days, divided by the total number 
of free-choice trials across the 5 days.  The following variables were also 
measured and analysed per rat per trial separately across conditions: error rate 
per forced-choice trial, time spent (sec) in incorrect nosepoke holes, lick rate 
(Hz), and movement time to reward (sec).  
Data Analysis 
Session reconstruction with time-stamped data was performed using a program 
written by EMB in AWK programming language. Subsequent data analysis was 
carried out using Microsoft® Excel for Mac 2011 as well as R version 3.2.2 and 
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SPSS® version 21 for Mac. Discrimination task behaviour was analysed using 
the average percentage each contingency was chosen (on free-choice trials) 
across rats and days during the last five testing sessions in each stage. 
Repeated-measures ANOVAs were performed with contingency (three levels: 
high, medium, low) as the within-subject variable. The medium contingency 
was often utilized as a point of contrast between the low and high 
contingencies, and therefore while it is omitted from many graphical depictions 
of the data, it is always included in the underlying analysis. Baseline behaviour 
was analysed using repeated measures ANOVAs with contingency (three 
levels: high, medium, low) and session (5 levels: five testing sessions) as 
within-subject variables. Baseline performance was considered to be stable 
once there was no significant main effect of session over the previous five days 
of testing (Figure 12a). Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom and 
Sidak-corrected p-values were applied where appropriate. All means are 
reported with standard errors and any significant main effects are reported with 
associated planned contrasts. 
In order to avoid potential ceiling-effects using proportion data, arcsine 
transformations were used on all variables expressed as a percentage (Zeeb et 
al., 2009), although data are shown as raw values. Missing data were replaced 
with series means. Given that average poke durations could be biased by 
truncated loss trials, descriptive statistics and ANOVA’s including average poke 
duration are calculated based on successful trials only. All analyses measuring 
responses to a previous win or loss are defined as those trials immediately 
preceded by a win or loss, omitting the first trial of a session.  
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We also conducted survival analyses of poke duration and contingency choice 
by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model to the data. This analysis is carried 
out on a trial-by-trial basis, rather than averaging across subjects and sessions. 
The Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric model that makes no 
assumption about the shape of the baseline curve (e.g. linear), and takes the 
following form: 
ℎ 𝑡, 𝑥 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 exp 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!  
where the hazard rate of x occurring, h(t,x(t)), on trial t is conditional on p 
predictors. The β coefficients are estimated from the data. The associated 
survival function represents the cumulative proportion of the sample that has 
not experienced an event x by time t. Alternatively, this can be understood as 
the probability that an event will not occur until time t.  
While the model’s primary assumption is that the hazard associated with any 
given covariate is proportional across time, it can be extended to incorporate 
time-varying covariates and stratified to accommodate within-subject designs. 
By stratifying across subjects, the models fit here include individual baseline 
hazards for each animal, which accounts for the variance in survival rates 
contributed by individual subjects.  
Results 
Discrimination Task 
Rats demonstrably altered choice behaviour on free-choice trials in stages I - III 
(Figure 11). Rats’ choices minimized losses in stage I by choosing the low risk 
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nosepoke hole (Contingency: F(2,8)=576.80, p<.001, 𝜂!!=.99), maximized reward 
in stage II by choosing the high reward-accrual nosepoke hole (F(2,8)=79.50, 
p<.001, 𝜂!!=.95), and appeared to prefer a trade-off of high risk for high reward 
in stage III (F(2,8)=262.00, p<.001, 𝜂!!=.99). It is of note that stage III most nearly 
resembles stage II (reward maximizing) rather than stage I (risk minimizing). 
These results confirmed that the rats were sensitive to manipulations of reward 
accrual and risk in the task. 
Contingency choice during manipulations of probability, reward, and 
mixed probability & reward accrual rates 
 
 
Figure 11: Rats (N=16) predictably and reliably preferred the low-probability of losing (orange circles) 
contingency in stage I and the high-reward contingency (blue circles) in stage II. Although there was some 
initial uncertainty in responses to the mixed risk and reward in stage III, rats quickly began to prefer the 
contingency with the trade-off of higher risk for higher reward (blue circles). Error bars represent SE. 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Baseline Behaviour – Mixed Risk And Reward 
On free-choice trials, rats (N=29) demonstrated consistent choices across the 
three contingencies (Figure 12a), with a clear preference for the high 































































































significant main effect of Session on the proportion of contingency choices 
across the last the last 5 days of testing (F(4,112)=1.76, p=NS), which is 
suggestive of stable baseline behaviour. Average poke duration (Figure 12b) 
varied detectably among the three contingencies (F(2,56)=3.70, p<.05, 𝜂!!=.12), 
whereby animals tended to poke slightly longer in the low (568 ± 77 msec) and 
medium contingency (574 ± 67 msec) compared to the high contingency (501 ± 
64 msec). However, post-hoc tests revealed no significant difference between 
the high and low contingencies (p=.25). Average poke durations did not 
significantly differ across sessions (F(4,112)=2.17, p=NS), indicating that the task 
had elicited consistent nosepoke behaviour across days.  
Similarly, the rate at which rats licked the reward spigot was fastest in the high  
contingency (7.94 ± 0.15 Hz) and slowest in the low contingency, although this 
effect is weak (7.50 ± 0.24 Hz; Contingency: F(2,56)=5.14, p<.05, 𝜂!!=.16, 
Session: F(4,112)=2.28, p=NS). It is of note that all volumes of reward were 
delivered at the same rate on every trial (i.e. larger rewards equated to longer 
delivery times, see Methods), and therefore it was not strictly necessarily for 






Baseline differences in behaviour between the high and low 
contingencies 
A          B 
   
C          D 
   
Figure 12: (A) Rats consistently preferred the high contingency on free-choice trials, despite the relative 
certainty of receiving reward in the low contingency. (B) Poke durations tended to be shorter in the high 
contingency, although this difference was not significant. (C) Rats made fewer errors on forced-choice 
trials and (D) moved more quickly to collect reward in the high contingency. Error Bars are 95% CI’s.  
On forced-choice trials, animals poked in error in an unlit hole (Figure 12c) 
about 1.5 times more often (2.31 ± 0.21 pokes/trial) during trials in the low 
contingency compared to the medium (1.68 ± 0.17 pokes/trial) and high (1.46 ± 
0.13 pokes/trial) contingencies (Contingency, F(2,56) = 27.79, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .50), 
as though the rats were experiencing frustrative nonreward. This behaviour 
was stable throughout the last five baseline testing sessions (Session, F(4,112) = 
1.95, p = NS). As depicted in Figure 12d, movement time to collect reward also 






















































increased, with rats moving significantly faster to collect reward in the high 
contingency and slower in the low contingency (F(2,56)= 23.92, p<.001, 𝜂!!=.46).  
Loss-related behaviour 
Our primary topic of analysis focused on behavioural responses to losing in the 
task. We began by establishing whether or not rats’ behaviour was significantly 
altered by a loss vs. a win in the task on the aggregate level, and we 
proceeded by conducting trial-by-trial analyses of any potential behavioural 
response strategies with respect to contingency choice (e.g. win-stay/lose-
shift). 
To begin, we compared behaviour on trials that were immediately preceded by 
a win trial vs. loss trial. To identify whether rats differentiated between wins and 
losses in the task, paired-sample t-tests were carried out by previous outcome 
on the following three behavioural measures: Lick rate (Hz), MT (sec), and time 
spent poking in error (sec). A visual comparison of these analyses is provided 
in Figure 13. 
We found that two of the three measures reflected significant differences in 
behaviour on trials immediately preceded by a loss compared to those 
preceded by a win. Rats moved significantly more quickly to collect reward after 
a loss than a win (MT: t(28) = 3.14, SEM = 0.05, p < .01). Animals also spent 
more time poking in incorrect (i.e. unlit) holes on trials with a previous loss 
outcome vs. those with a previous win outcome (Error Time: t(28) = 4.32, SEM 
= 0.06, p < .001). However, we found no significant difference in lick rate 
between the two trial types (Lick Rate: t(28) = 1.10, SEM = .05, p = .28).  
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Behavioural responses to losing in the task 
 
Figure 13: Behavioural responses to losing in the task. The difference between trials that are immediately 
preceded by a win and those preceded by a loss are displayed for three behavioural measures: Lick rate 
(Hz), Movement Time (MT, sec), and error time (sec). Negative numbers signify a reduction in the 
measure on a loss trial vs. win trial. Rats significantly reduced both MT (p<.01) and the time spent poking 
in error (p<.001) after a loss. There was no significant difference in lick rate after a loss vs. a win (p=.28). 
Error bars represent 95% CI’s. 
Stay-shift behaviour 
We next analysed whether or not rats’ choices followed a strategy that was 
contingent upon the previous outcome, such as a win-stay/lose-shift pattern. 
Here, we began by conducting a simple paired-sample t-test on the proportion 
of stay trials after a win vs. loss. As depicted in Figure 14a, the results indicated 
that rats’ decision to return to the previous contingency was significantly 
affected by the previous outcome, t(28) = 3.02, p < .01. After a win, rats 
perform right around chance, choosing to stay on 32.4% (SEM = 1.4%). After a 
loss however, rats are 10% more likely to stay compared to a win. In other 
words, rats develop a win-shift/lose-stay strategy.  
It was also possible that rats shifted more away from some contingencies than 
others. Therefore, we next analysed whether or not rats stayed/shifted more as 
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a function of the previous contingency. Figure 14b illustrates the results of a 
repeated-measures ANOVA of the percentage of stay trials with Previous 
Contingency (3 levels: low, medium, and high) as a within-subject factor. A rat’s 
decision to return to the previous hole on a free-choice trial was strongly 
affected by the contingency associated with that hole (F(2,56) = 34.79, 𝜂!  ! =  .55, 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p < .001). If the previous hole was the high 
contingency, rats stayed on 51% of trials. Compared to the high contingency, 
rats stayed on average 16.7% (SEM = 5.1%) fewer trials in the medium 
contingency (p < .01) and 37.5% (SEM = 5.2%) fewer trials in the low 
contingency (p < .001). 
Effects of previous outcome on stay behaviour 
A           B 
  
Figure 14: (A) In contrast to a typical win-stay/lose-shift strategy, we find that rats exhibit win-shift/lose-
stay behaviour. Here, rats return to the same contingency about 10% more often after a previous loss 
than a previous gain (p<.01). (B) Whereas rats rarely returned to the low contingency after a loss (13.9% 
± 2.3% of trials), this proportion increased linearly as the rate of risk/reward-accrual associated with each 
contingency increased.  The linear trend was significant: F(1,28) = 10.62, 𝜂!  ! = .28, p < .01. The dotted lines 
denote chance at 33.3. Error bars represent 95% CI’s. 
Given this unexpected behaviour, we sought to establish whether the lose-
stay/win-shift strategy was attributable to rats’ preference for the high 
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contingency. Given that rats had a higher probability of losing in the high 
contingency, a preference to return to the high contingency would naturally lead 
to lose-stay/win-shift behaviour. In order to establish whether lose-stay/win-shift 
behaviour was attributable to the previous contingency, we fit a Cox hazard 
model to the data based on the number of free-choice trials that occurred 
between ‘stay’ choices. For example, if a rat chose to switch on the first two 
free-choice trials and then to stay on the third, the analysis would model the 
likelihood of a rat’s stay choice ‘surviving’ to the third consecutive free-choice 
trial, given any number of covariates (e.g. previous win/loss). If the rat chose to 
stay on a trial, the counting process would reset to zero. The model was 
stratified over subjects, and previous outcome (2 levels: win and loss) and 
previous contingency (3 levels: low, medium, and high) were entered as time-
varying covariates in the model.9 A PreviousOutcome*PreviousContingency 
interaction term was also added to the model. The reader is referred to Table 4 
of Appendix 1 for further particulars of the model coefficients. 
                                                
9 Due to their abil ity to change over the course of the counting process, these 
covariates would normally not satisfy the assumption of proportional hazards over 
t ime. A typical method of remedying this is to multiply each event by the log of 
t ime, represented in this model as the trial count. 
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Survival curves for stay behaviour as a function of previous contingency 
 
Figure 15: Survival curves for each contingency on free-choice trials are depicted above. Previous 
contingency was a significant predictor (p<.001) of stay ‘survival’, or the number of free-choice trials that 
elapsed before a rat was likely to return to the same contingency as the previous trial. The high 
contingency is associated with the steepest survival curve, which indicates that rats are more likely to 
choose to stay sooner in that contingency (p<.001) in contrast to the medium contingency. The relatively 
flat curve associated with the low contingency (p<.001) indicates that rats are only 40% likely to return to 
that contingency by the 15th free-choice trial. 
As Illustrated in Figure 15, Previous Contingency was a significant predictor in 
the model (p < .001). In contrast to the medium contingency, rats were much 
more likely to return to the high contingency on a free-choice trial (p < .001), 
and much less likely to return to low contingency (p < .001). Therefore, the 
results of this analysis corroborate previous findings from the analysis of stay 
trial proportions (Figure 14b). 
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A  Low Contingency  B  Medium Contingency 
  
C  High Contingency 
 
 
While Previous Outcome did not emerge as a significant predictor in the model, 
there was a significant effect of the interaction term between Previous Outcome 
and Previous Contingency on stay behaviour (p < .05). Figures 16a-c depict the 
survival curves of staying on free-choice trials with a previous win vs. a 
previous loss in each different contingency. The analysis suggests that rats 
tended to increase stay behaviour after a loss in the low and medium 
contingencies, while decreasing staying more after a loss in the high 
contingency. However, only the contrast of the interaction at the high 
contingency was significant (p < .01), and therefore trends in the other two 
contingencies should be interpreted with caution. However, these results 
Figure 16: The interaction between previous 
contingency and previous outcome was a 
significant factor in the model (p<.05), 
whereby (A) survival analysis of stay trials in 
the low contingency indicated that rats were 
more likely to return (i.e. would ‘survive’ 
longer) after a win than after a loss. However, 
the contrast of this interaction level did not 
reach significance (p=.10). (B) Although there 
was a marginal increase of stay trials after a 
loss in the medium contingency, this did not 
lead to a significant interaction. (C) In 
contrast, rats were significantly more likely to 
stay after a win compared to a loss in the high 
contingency (p<.01).  
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suggest that loss-stay behaviour cannot be entirely explained by rats returning 
to the more preferred high contingency after a loss. 
It should also be noted that the relatively low number of stay trials with a 
previous loss in the low contingency likely contributed to low power in modelling 
an interaction factor as depicted in Figure 16a. Of the 3525 free-choice trials 
used as data in the model, only 12 trials (0.34%) represent stay trials after a 
loss in the low contingency. This number increases to 52 trials (1.48%) in the 
medium contingency and to 172 trials (4.88%) in the high contingency.  
Effect of losing on poke duration 
Our final analysis of baseline loss-behaviour was carried out in order to 
determine whether a previous loss affected the duration a rat was willing to 
poke on a current trial. We performed a 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA on 
poke duration with Previous Outcome (2 levels: win and loss) and Contingency 
(3 levels: High, Medium, and Low) as within-subject factors. This analysis 
revealed that Contingency had a significant main effect on poke duration, F(2,56) 
= 5.48, 𝜂!  ! = .16, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p = .01. Planned contrasts 
indicated that this significant effect was attributable to differences in poke 
duration between the high and medium contingencies (p < .01) rather than the 
low and medium (p = .12) or low and high (p = .96). The effect of Previous 
Outcome on poke duration fell short of significance (F(1,28) = 3.97, p = .06). Nor 
did we find a significant interaction between Previous Outcome and 
Contingency, F(2,56) = 1.14, p = .33.  
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We furthered this analysis by fitting a Cox proportional hazards model to the 
data. This analysis has the potential for greater power given that that: 1) it can 
account for censored poke durations (i.e. premature unpokes due to losses) 
and, 2) it is computed on a trial-by-trial basis. Therefore, we fit a model based 
on poke duration with Previous Outcome (2 levels: win and loss) and 
Contingency (3 levels: low, medium, and high) as time-varying covariates. For 
example, if the rat nosepoked for a duration of 1.2 sec, the analysis would 
model the likelihood that any given poke would ‘survive’ from 0 to 1.2 sec, 
given any number of covariates (e.g. contingency). The model was stratified 
over subjects. The model survival curves for each contingency are illustrated in 
Figure 17.  
A             B 
  
Figure 17: (A) Poke duration significantly varies as a function of contingency (p<.001). In contrast to the 
medium contingency, rats poke longer in the low contingency (p<.01) and shorter in the high contingency 
(p<.001). (B) Poke durations are significantly shorter on trials immediately preceded by a loss compared 
to those immediately preceded by a gain.  
Contingency was found to be a highly significant factor in the model (p < .001), 
with longer expected poke durations in the low contingency (p < .01) and 
shorter expected poke durations in the high contingency (p < .001) in contrast 
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to the medium contingency. Note that this result (Figure 17a) differs to that of 
the ANOVA illustrated in Figure 12b. This is likely due to the increased power 
of the Cox proportional hazard model, which arises from its ability to 
incorporate censored data (i.e. both wins and losses). Previous Outcome also 
emerged as a significant factor in the model (p < .01), whereby poke durations 
were shorter on trials immediately preceded by a loss compared to a win. 
Although the contrast between previous outcome and the low contingency was 
significant (p < .05), the main effect of the interaction term was not significant (p 
= .14). A table detailing further particulars of the model coefficients can be 




The research presented here has been carried out with the specific intention of 
increasing the translational validity of animal decision-making research to work 
on risk-taking in humans. We have developed a novel task (Figure 9) that 
operationalizes loss in a way that is on par with human tasks (e.g. the BART) 
that are highly predictive of naturalistic risky decision-making, such as the use 
of illegal substances (Bornovalova et al., 2005). We demonstrate that rats are 
sensitive to manipulations of reward volume and probability, and that losses 
significantly affect subsequent behaviour in the task. Interestingly, we find that 
rats develop a lose-stay/win-shift strategy in the task, and that this strategy 
cannot be fully explained by preference for returning to the high contingency 
(which is associated with a greater likelihood of losing).  
We began by systematically manipulating either the magnitude or the 
probability of potential reward a rat could receive by nosepoking in one of three 
nosepoke holes. Although perhaps unsurprising given the rich history of 
operant work in rats (e.g. Chung & Herrnstein, 1967), we found that rats’ choice 
behaviour between the nosepoke holes was exquisitely sensitive to our 
contingency manipulations of reward probability and magnitude (Figure 11). 
Rats predictably chose the low-risk contingency when we manipulated the 
probability of losing only (Stage I) and the high-reward contingency when we 
manipulated the magnitude of reward only (Stage II). This suggests that rats 
learned how to adjust their choices to maximise reward given these 
contingency variations. When both risk and reward were varied simultaneously, 
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rats preferred trading off a higher probability of loss for a higher magnitude of 
reward.  
We predicted that rats’ choice allocation between contingencies would be a 
reflection of individual preferences for the trade off between probability of loss 
and reward. For example, more risk averse rats would choose the low 
contingency more often than more risk seeking rats. Instead, we found that 
choice of the high contingency remained high for all rats throughout baseline 
testing (Figure 12a) despite high loss rates, and that choice of the low 
contingency remained very low despite very low loss rates. The observed 
choice allocation reflects expected reward rates in each contingency with 
respect to rats’ rather short average poke durations (see Figures 12b and 17a). 
At poke durations of 500 – 600 msec, the expected reward was highest in the 
high contingency, followed by the medium and then the low contingencies. 
Instead of choosing the contingency with the highest rate of reward at that 
nosepoke, rats ‘matched’ their allocation of choices to the rate of reward in 
each contingency. Such deviations from optimal reinforcement maximization 
behaviour (i.e. not allocating 100% of choices to the option with the highest 
reward rate) have been observed previously in a number of tasks, species, and 
environments in an effect typically referred to as the ‘matching law’ (Chung & 
Herrnstein, 1967). This effect describes the robust tendency of an individual’s 
choice allocations to reflect environmental contingencies of reinforcement rate 
rather than to reward maximization (Herrnstein, 1990). The model in Figure 10 
suggests that, given a 500 msec poke, the matched allocation of contingency 
choices should be: 64.3% in the high hole, 28.6% in the medium hole, and 
7.1% in the low hole. Rats’ behaviour matches this very closely. Had rats 
 84 
averaged longer nosepoke durations (e.g. the maximum 2 seconds), then one 
would predict the greatest proportion of choices in the medium contingency, 
followed by the high and then the low. Thus, rats appear to have matched 
choices with the reward rates at their preferred nosepoke duration rather than 
to allocate choices to maximise reward or according to their individual risk 
preferences.  
We also predicted that rats would vary nosepoke lengths to maximise expected 
reward within each contingency, but also as a function of risk preference with 
shorter nosepokes reflecting risk-aversion and longer nosepokes reflecting risk-
seeking preferences. We found that rats modestly varied nosepoke length as a 
function of rates of reward magnitude/probability (Figure 17a), although the 
discrepancy between contingencies was much smaller than expected. 
However, it is of note that this result was not clear from the analysis of session 
averages (Figure 12b), which excluded the censored poke durations of loss 
trials from analysis. ‘Probe’ trials with no chance of losing could be incorporated 
in order to facilitate such analyses in the future. While the survival analysis of 
nosepoke duration did reveal an optimal ordinal pattern of nosepoke durations 
given the average nosepoke length (compare to Figure 10), nosepoke 
durations fell unexpectedly short of optimal. For example, rats should have 
poked for the full 2 sec maximum in order to maximize reward in the low 
contingency instead of 575 msec. This rather large discrepancy between 
optimal nosepoke length and observed length suggests that there was a 
missing factor from the Expected Reward calculation modelled in Figure 10. It 
is of note that rats responded in a similarly suboptimal manner in the rat BART 
task presented by Jentsch and colleagues (2010), whereby rats completed 
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much fewer bar presses than optimal even in no-risk conditions. Cognitive 
effort costs and discounting of future reward represent two plausible 
explanations for this behaviour. For example, the cognitive effort (Shenhav, 
Botvinick, & Cohen, 2013) involved in maintaining a nosepoke, e.g. without 
checking for reward at the reward spigot, may have been very high. This would 
effectively increase the ‘cost’ of each successive tick during any given 
nosepoke. Alternatively, rats’ shorter than expected nosepokes may reflect 
temporal discounting of future rewards. Delay discounting is a well-established 
characteristic of impulsive behaviour in humans (Green, Myerson, Oliveira, & 
Chang, 2014; Holt, Green, & Myerson, 2003), non-human primates (Hayden & 
Platt, 2007; Rajala, Jenison, & Populin, 2015) and rats (Calvert, Green, & 
Myerson, 2010; Valencia-Torres et al., 2012). If rats were steeply discounting 
delayed rewards, then a sooner reward would hold relatively more subjective 
value than a discounted delayed reward, which would result in shorter 
nosepoke durations. If either cognitive effort costs or delay discounting were 
meaningful factors contributing to shorter than expected nosepoke durations, 
then future studies could increase the rate of reward accrued at each tick in 
order to offset costs/discount rates. 
A central aim of the study was to develop a task that would facilitate the study 
of loss on behaviour and within the nervous system of rats. Thus, it was 
important to demonstrate that rats differentiated between wins and losses 
within the task. Multiple behavioural measures indicated that rats were indeed 
sensitive to losing in the task. Specifically, we found that rats’ behaviour was 
altered on trials immediately preceded by a win vs. those preceded by a loss 
(Figures 13 and 14a). Furthermore, it was clear from our analysis that rats 
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poked significantly shorter on trials with a previous loss compared to a previous 
gain. Together, significant differences in MT, error time, and poke duration 
suggest not only that rats differentiated between wins and losses in the task, 
but also that a loss outcome on the current trial affected behaviour on the 
subsequent trial.  
Of note was also rats’ unexpected development of a lose-stay/win-shift 
strategy, which is illustrated in Figure 14a. Although the task was not 
specifically designed to reinforce such behaviour, we found rats were more 
likely to return to a contingency after a loss compared to a gain. Lesion studies 
in rats have demonstrated that the acquisition of stimulus-response 
associations such as win-stay or win-shift strategies is critically dependent 
upon the nigrostriatal pathway (Da Cunha et al., 2003; McDonald & White, 
1993), which becomes the focus of investigations in future chapters.  
One possible explanation for loss-stay behaviour involves preference of the 
high contingency (Figure 14b) and could only be partially addressed here. 
Given that rats prefer the high contingency but that they are also more likely to 
lose in the high contingency, it follows that they are also more likely to return to 
a losing contingency on average. However, survival analysis indicated that rats 
are actually less likely to stay after a loss vs. win in the high contingency 
(Figure 16c). Whereas previous analysis (Figure 14a) suggested that there was 
a significant main effect of Previous Outcome on stay choices overall, previous 
outcome did not emerge as a significant predictor in the Cox proportional 
hazard model. This suggests that the addition of another factor (e.g. Previous 
Contingency or the PreviousContingency*PreviousOutcome interaction) may 
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have accounted for a large proportion of the variance previously attributed to 
Previous Outcome. Unfortunately, low numbers of loss-stay trials in the low 
contingency (Figure 16a) may have sufficiently reduced power to preclude any 
conclusion here.  Future work might address this by increasing the lowest 
probability of losing to ensure more losses in the low contingency. 
Another potential alternative explanation for the development of this behaviour 
is that rats may have treated losses as a varying response requirement (e.g. 
variable interval reinforcement schedule) rather than a lost trial. If this were the 
case, they would return to the previous contingency to respond again for 
reward. Alternatively, rats may have returned to a contingency after a loss due 
to the training protocol that was implemented before testing. Before testing, rats 
were gradually trained to sustain longer and longer nosepokes. If a rat failed to 
sustain a nosepoke for the required length of time, it received no reward. Thus, 
rats may have interpreted a loss in the task as a failure to sustain the requisite 
nosepoke length. Again, however, this would not explain why rats are less likely 
to stay after a loss in the high contingency, nor why rats poked shorter after a 
loss compared to a gain. Future studies should make the loss more explicit to 
avoid this potential confound.  
Finally, we found that rats made significantly more choice errors (i.e. poking in 
an unlit hole) in the least-preferred low contingency (Figure 12c). Since this 
behaviour was stable across testing sessions, it is likely that such errors 
represent a lack of inhibition or an expression of frustration rather than an 
absence of understanding in the task. For example, this could have resulted 
from an animal initiating a nosepoke first in a more-preferred contingency 
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rather than the low contingency on forced-choice trials. This would be in line 
with work on frustrative nonreward (e.g. Amsel, 1958), whereby frustration with 
task demands elicits increases in non-instrumental responses (e.g. increased 
grooming or error responses). However, the inverse error rate could provide a 
key behavioural measure of preference (or dislike) in the event that this is 
otherwise ambiguous. 
In conclusion, we have developed a rat gambling task that elicits risky decision-
making behaviour that could be more readily translated to human behaviour 
than previous task designs have allowed. Decisions about whether to continue 
poking for more reward occur on the millisecond-timescale, which is conducive 
to future research using neuroscience methods with high temporal resolution 
such as in vivo electrophysiology. Alternatively, decisions about which 
contingency to select on free-choice trials lend themselves to behavioural 
researchers in fields such as neuroeconomics. Future work is necessary to 
establish the optimally effective levels of reward magnitude and probability 
associated with each contingency and to disambiguate the separate effects of 
risk and reward on choices within the task. Given the flexibility of the task 
design, however, future iterations of the task present promising opportunities 
for ascertaining fundamental insights into loss-related behaviour in the brain.  
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Chapter 3  
 
Loss-stay behaviour in rats with more Substantia Nigra 





The nigrostriatal pathway has been implicated in reward-related motor learning, 
but it is uncertain whether it also plays a role in loss-related motor learning. 
Given the loss-related changes in behaviour observed in Chapter 2, we sought 
to identify whether pharmacological manipulation of dopamine availability could 
alter responding after a loss in the gambling task. A cohort of rats (N=16) was 
trained on the task presented in Chapter 2. Once baseline behaviour had 
become stable, we administered systemic injections of saline vehicle or three 
doses of cis-Flupenthixol, a nonspecific dopamine antagonist. Relative to 
vehicle, increasing doses of cis-Flupenthixol administration monotonically 
increased the survival time of a poke toward the maximum 2 sec on any given 
trial. This indicates that dopamine receptor blockade may lead to a reduction in 
the discounting of future rewards. Additionally, we reported a dose-dependent 
decline in the average number of errors made on forced-choice trials, 
suggesting dopamine antagonism also increased behavioural inhibition. In 
contrast, rats became more likely to choose the contingency associated with 
higher reward accrual rates and higher probability of losing as doses of cis-
Flupenthixol increased, which implies increasing tolerance to probability of loss. 
We also found that systemic dopamine blockade disrupted baseline lose-
stay/win-shift behaviour. Interestingly, rats with a greater number of putative 
dopamine neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) were more 
likely to ‘stay’ after a loss – and this effect was abolished by dopamine 
antagonism. These findings implicate nigrostriatal dopamine transmission as 
playing a role in the modulation of loss-related behaviour in rats. This may 
provide critical insight into the processes underlying diseases involving 





In Chapter 2, we demonstrated that rats’ behaviour is sensitive to losses in a 
gambling task. We next sought to identify whether win- and loss-related 
behaviour were modulated by similar neural mechanisms. The nigrostriatal 
dopamine system plays a key role in motor control and reward-based learning, 
and has been implicated in the signalling of prediction errors (Romo & Schultz, 
1990; Schultz et al., 1997), the attribution of incentive salience to predictors of 
reward (Wilson et al., 2006; Zhang, Berridge, Tindell, Smith, & Aldridge, 2009) 
and the formation of habits (Graybiel, 2008; Haber, 2003; Wise, 2009). This 
work has its foundations in the classical intracranial self-stimulation studies, 
which demonstrated that animals would learn to press a lever in order to 
receive a pulse of stimulation to the dopaminergic midbrain (Olds & Milner, 
1954). More recent work has been able to utilize optogenetics techniques to 
break down the midbrain areas responsible for different aspects of learning and 
performance of instrumental actions. For example, work by Rossi and 
colleagues (2013) demonstrated that selective optogenetic activation of the 
mouse substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) is sufficient to facilitate the 
acquisition of a new instrumental action. Others have found that optogenetic 
stimulation of SNc neurons elicits a positive affective state encouraging 
approach behaviour, while optogenetic inhibition of the area provokes 
avoidance (Ilango et al., 2014). Furthermore, dopamine-dependent plasticity 
from such learning can create long-term changes in nigrostriatal pathways 
(Wickens, Reynolds, & Hyland, 2003). Thus, the nigrostriatal dopamine system 
became a primary focus in the investigation of loss-related behaviour in the rat 
gambling task introduced in the previous chapter.  
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We hypothesized that the involvement of the dopamine system in risky 
decisions would be apparent through changes in poke duration and 
contingency choice after pharmacological blockade of dopamine. Specifically, 
we predicted that dopamine antagonism would increase poke durations by 
mitigating reward discounting (St Onge & Floresco, 2009) and reduce choice of 
the high contingency by attenuating rats’ propensity to take risks (St. Onge, 
Chiu, & Floresco, 2010). Finally, we hypothesized that dopamine antagonism 
would significantly disrupt strategic control of stay-shift behaviour after a loss. 
Methods 
The Methods used here are detailed extensively elsewhere (see Chapter 2, 
‘Methods’).  
Pharmacological Manipulation 
A cohort of 16 rats were trained on the risky decision-making task and 
submitted to the pharmacological challenge once baseline behaviour was 
considered to be stable. Intraperitoneal injections of the nonspecific dopamine 
antagonist cis-Flupenthixol (Sigma-Aldrich Co., U.K) or vehicle (saline) were 
administered 20 minutes prior to behavioural testing. 3 doses and vehicle 
(saline) were counterbalanced according to a modified Latin square design, 
with a minimum of 7 days between doses to minimize carry-over effects. cis-
Flupenthixol dissolved in 0.9% w/v saline was injected intraperitoneally at a 
volume of 1.0ml/kg (molecular salt weight) at doses of 0.125, 0.25, and 0.5 
mg/ml. The saline vehicle used as control was delivered at 1.0 ml/kg. 
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Histology 
Following the pharmacological testing, rats were euthanized via overdose with 
0.08 ml pentobarbital (Univet Ltd., Oxford, U.K.) and then perfused 
intracardially with 0.1% phosphate buffered saline followed with a 4% 
paraformaldehyde in 0.1M phosphate buffer fixative. Using a freezing 
microtome, the fixed brains were then cut into 50 µm sections and stored in 
0.1M phosphate buffer. One out of every four sections were subsequently 
stained for tyrosine hydroxylase and examined under a conventional light 
microscope. Sections were mapped onto standardized brain areas following 
Paxinos and Watson (1997) as depicted in Figure 18, and the number of 
tyrosine hydroxylase stained cell bodies were counted in the ventral tegmental 
area and substantia nigra pars compacta at 3 levels: -5.3mm, -5.8mm, and -
6.3mm posterior to bregma. 
Rat atlas cytoarchitechtonic guide to SNc and VTA 
 
Figure 18: adapted from Paxinos and Watson (1997). Three sections (-5.30mm, -5.80mm, and -6.3mm 
behind bregma) of the rats’ midbrains were stained for tyrosine hydroxylase (TH). TH-positive cell bodies 
were then counted under a conventional light microscope in the substantia nigra pars compacta (red) and 





 Count-recount correlations demonstrated highly reliable neuron counts 
(Pearson’s r = .953, p < .001). A random sample of 10 sections (5 from animals 
presented in this chapter and 5 from animals presented in Chapter 4) was 
selected for blind recount using a random-number generator. The inter-rater 
reliability between the original counts and the counts conducted by a second 
blind counter was also high (Pearson’s r = .987, p < .001). 
Data Analysis 
Session reconstruction with time-stamped data was performed using a self-
written program in AWK programming language. Subsequent data analysis was 
carried out using Microsoft® Excel for Mac 2011 as well as R version 3.2.2 and 
SPSS® version 21 for Mac. Behavioural effects of Flupenthixol were analysed 
using repeated measures ANOVA’s with contingency (three levels: high, 
medium, low) and dose (4 levels: vehicle, low, medium, high) as within-subject 
variables. In order to avoid potential ceiling-effects using proportion data, 
arcsine transformations were used on all variables expressed as a percentage 
(Zeeb et al., 2009). Missing data were replaced with series means. 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom and Sidak-corrected p-
values were applied where appropriate. All means are reported with standard 
errors and any significant main effects are reported with associated planned 
contrasts. 
Given that average poke durations could be biased by truncated loss trials, 
descriptive statistics and ANOVA’s including average poke duration are 
calculated based on successful trials only. All analyses measuring responses to 
a previous win or loss are defined as those trials immediately preceded by a 
 95 
win or loss, omitting the first trial of a session. Due to insufficient trial 
completion rates, the high dose was omitted from regression analyses and 
Pearson’s correlations performed in the association of neuron counts with stay-
shift behaviour. 
We also conducted survival analyses of poke duration and contingency choice 
by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model to the data. This analysis is carried 
out on a trial-by-trial basis, rather than averaging across subjects and sessions. 
The Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric model that makes no 
assumption about the shape of the baseline curve (e.g. linear), and takes the 
following form: 
ℎ 𝑡, 𝑥 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 exp 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!  
where the hazard rate of x occurring, h(t,x(t)), on trial t is conditional on p 
predictors. The β coefficients are estimated from the data. While the model’s 
primary assumption is that the hazard associated with any given covariate is 
proportional across time, it can be extended to incorporate time-varying 
covariates and stratified to accommodate within-subject designs. By stratifying 
across subjects, the models fit here include individual baseline hazards for 
each animal, which accounts for the variance in survival rates contributed by 
individual subjects.  
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Results 
Effects of Flupenthixol on behaviour 
We began by analysing any potential effects of Flupenthixol that may have 
emerged at the aggregate group level, followed by a more in depth trial-by-trial 
analysis of specific patterns of interest. We break down our primary analyses 
according to the two ways in which risky decisions are effected in the task: 1) 
length of a given poke and 2) choice among contingencies of risk/reward-
accrual.  
Based on session averages alone, we could not conclude that there was any 
significant change in the overall proportion of contingency chosen (Figure 19a) 
at any dose (Dose*Contingency: F(6,90)=0.73, p=NS). Rats chose the high 
contingency option on 71.3% (±4.0%) of trials, while choice of the medium 
contingency (21.4 ± 3.1%,) and low contingency (7.3 ± 1.8%) remained low.  
Flupenthixol increased animals’ choice accuracy (Figure 19c) on forced-choice 
trials (Dose: F(3,45) = 7.82, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .34). Post-hoc testing revealed that the 
medium (p < .05) and high (p < .01) doses significantly and linearly (p < .01) 
reduced error rates compared to vehicle. Although the error rates in the low-
risk/low-reward contingency fell considerably, Flupenthixol did not abolish the 
main effect of contingency at any dose (Contingency: F(2,30) = 44.73, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .75) and the interaction did not reach significance (Dose*Contingency: 
F(6,90) = 2.64, p = .68).  
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FIGURE 19: (A) Preference for the high-risk/high-reward contingency was not affected at any dose of 
dopamine antagonist Flupenthixol. (B) In the low-risk/low-reward contingency, rats poked on average 25% 
longer at the highest dose compared to the lowest dose (C) The number of errors made on forced-choice 
trials in the low-risk/low reward contingency decreased linearly with dose. (D) There was no significant 
change in movement time to reward across all doses. Error Bars are 95% CI’s. *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
Movement times were generally unaffected by dopamine antagonism, with 
animals moving more slowly in the low-risk/low-reward contingency (Figure 
19d) at each dose (Contingency: F(2,30) = 46.27, p < .001, 𝜂!! = .76). 
Flupenthixol did not significantly affect rats’ movement time to reward (F(3,45) = 




























































Effects of DA antagonism on poke duration 
We observed a main effect of both dose (F(3,45) = 5.14, p < .01, 𝜂!! = .26) and 
contingency (F(2,30) = 5.18, p < .05, 𝜂!! = .26) on poke duration (Figure 19b). 
Sidak-corrected pairwise comparisons revealed significant differences between 
the vehicle and high dose (p<.05) and between the high-risk/high-reward and 
low-risk/low-reward contingencies only (p < .01). The effect of Flupenthixol 
administration was most prominent in the low-risk/low-reward contingency, 
where animals poked on average 25% longer at the highest dose compared to 
the lowest dose. However, this interaction did not reach significance 
(Dose*Contingency: F(6,90) = 2.47, p = .065).  
In order to further our examination of the effect of Flupenthixol on poke 
duration, we conducted a trial-by-trial analysis by fitting a Cox proportional 
hazard model to rats’ poke durations at each dose. The model was stratified 
over subjects. The dose, contingency of the nosepoke hole,  and the outcome 
of the previous trial (win/loss) were added as time-varying covariates to the 
model to adjust for non-proportional hazards. Table 5 of Appendix 2 provides 
particulars of model coefficients.  
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Survival function for poke duration (sec) by dose 
 
Figure 20: The ‘survival time’ of a poke decreased as a function of poke duration, and this effect was 
significantly attenuated by cis-Flupenthixol (main effect, p<.001). Compared to vehicle, the low (p<.001), 
medium (p<.01) and the high dose (p<.001) significantly increased the likelihood of continuing any given 
poke. CI’s not shown; see Table 5 of Appendix 2. 
The survival curves depicted in Figure 20 reflect a dose-dependant increase in 
poke durations compared to the saline vehicle, (main effect, p < .001). 
Dopamine antagonism significantly increased overall poke survival times by up 
to 27% at the highest dose (p < .001). Consistent with baseline, there was also 
a main effect of Contingency (p < .001), whereby rats poked longer in the low 
contingency (p = .001) and shorter in the high contingency (p < .001) in 
contrast to the medium contingency. Interestingly, previous outcome did not 
emerge as a significant factor in the model (p = .11).  
Effects of DA antagonism on choice 
We next fit separate Cox proportional hazard models to assess the likelihood 
that a rat would choose either the low or high contingency on free-choice trials. 
The model was stratified over subjects and previous trial outcome (win/loss) 
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was added as time-varying covariate to the model. Dose was also added as a 
covariate. The reader is referred to Table 6 and 7 of Appendix 2 for details of 
the model coefficients. The curves depicted Figure 21a and b represent the 
‘survival’ time in trials until a rat chooses a given contingency. Steeper curves 
indicate that a rat was more likely to choose the contingency on an earlier trial 
than flatter curves.  
A Low Contingency 
 
 
B High Contingency 
 
 
These analyses indicate that, despite choosing the low contingency relatively 
infrequently on free-choice trials, there were significant dose-dependent 
decreases in choice of the low contingency (Figure 21a), main effect p < .05. In 
Figure 21: (A) Low Contingency. The 
survival function, which indicates the 
likelihood that a rat has not chosen the low 
contingency by a given number of free-choice 
trials, decreases as the sequence of free-
choice trials increases. The limited range of 
the y-axis indicates that there is generally a 
low probability that a rat chooses the low 
contingency option on any free-choice trial. At 
vehicle, there is an 85% probability that rats 
will choose the low contingency by the 17th 
free-choice trial. Compared to vehicle, the 
likelihood of choosing the low contingency on 
a free-choice trial is reduced in a dose-
dependent manner when DA agonist 
Flupenthixol is administered systemically.  
(B) High Contingency. Note the axes 
differences from Figure 21a, which reflect 
rats’ propensity to choose the high 
contingency over the low contingency on free 
choice trials. Here, the survival curve 
represents the likelihood that a rat did not 
choose the high contingency by the given 
free-choice trial. At all doses, rats do not last 
more than 6 free-choice trials without 
selecting the high contingency. The model 
indicates that 60% of rats chose the high 
contingency on the first free-choice trial in the 
saline condition and that this increases to 
70% at the high dose (p<.05). However, the 
overall effect of dose in the model fell at 95% 
significance (p=.05). CI’s not shown; see 
Tables 6-7 in Appendix 2. 
 101 
the saline control condition, there was an 87% likelihood that rats would 
complete over 15 trials before selecting the low option on a free-choice trial. 
This probability increased to 93% at the high dose of Flupenthixol. In contrast, 
rats tended to choose the high contingency more at the highest dose (Figure 
21b). Given that the high option was chosen within two free-choice trials about 
90% of the time, modelling of any increases in high contingency choice was 
naturally rather limited. Despite this, we did find that the highest dose was a 
significant factor in the choice model (p < .05), although the overall effect of 
dose was only at significance (p = .05) so this effect should be interpreted with 
caution.  
As demonstrated at baseline, choice of a given contingency may have also 
been influenced by a rats’ strategy to stay or switch based on the previous 
outcome or contingency. In order to ascertain whether strategy was affected by 
dose, we conducted a survival analysis of rats’ decision to stay/shift by fitting a 
Cox proportional hazards model with Dose, Previous Outcome, Previous 
Contingency, Current Contingency, and Contingency*PreviousOutcome as 
covariates (see Table 8 of Appendix 2). Previous Outcome and Contingency 
were entered into the model as time-varying covariates and the model was 
stratified by Subject.  
Figure 22 illustrates the mediating effect of DA blockade on rats’ propensity to 
return to the same contingency as the previous trial (main effect of Dose: p < 
.01).  Compared to baseline, each the low (p < .01), medium (p < .001) and 
high (p < .05) doses significantly increased contingency choices associated 
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with a shift from the previous trial. This is consistent with the DA system being 
involved in the modulation of stay-shift strategy. 
 
Survival function for shift strategy by dose 
 
Figure 22: Survival function for shift strategy by dose. Flupenthixol administration significantly 
increased shift behaviour (thereby decreasing stay behaviour) overall compared to saline vehicle, main 
effect: p<.01. Each the low (p<.01), medium (p<.001) and high (p<.05) doses decreased the likelihood that 
a rat would return to the same contingency as the previous trial. 
In order to further this investigation of the DA system’s role in stay-shift 
strategies, we used histological preparations of TH-stained brain tissue to 
correlate putative dopamine cell counts from rats’ midbrains with behaviour in 
the task. We found considerable variation between animals in the absolute 
number of TH-positive neurons from 3 representative sections of tissue (see 
Figure 23 for a photographic depiction) taken from the substantia nigra (SNc) of 
rats (N = 16 rats; min = 894; max = 1086; M = 984.93; SD = 66.26) and from 
the ventral tegmental area, or VTA (N = 16 rats; min = 757; max = 1242; M = 
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1010.16; SD = 137.26). SNc and VTA neuron counts were not correlated 
(Pearson’s r = .35, p = .19).  
 
A      B 
  
Figure 23: A) TH-positive dopamine cells of the rat SNc at ×4 magnification and (B) ×10 magnification. 
Given that the nigrostriatal pathway is implicated in reward-related motor 
learning (for review, see Wickens et al., 2003), we hypothesized that variability 
in SNc neuron counts may also be reflected in variability in stay-shift behaviour. 
To establish the contribution of midbrain neuron counts to loss-stay behaviour, 
we carried out individual regression analyses for the proportion of loss-stay 
trials at each dose and baseline. Given that midbrain dopamine neurons have 
been shown to affect feeding behaviour (Hommel et al., 2006), we included rat 
weight as a predictor variable. We used the stepwise method to enter average 
weight, VTA, and SNc neuron counts as independent predictors of loss-stay 
trials in a linear regression. Details of model coefficients of each analysis can 
be found in Table 9-10 in Appendix 2. Unfortunately, the number of trials 
completed at the high dose was not sufficient to support a reliable comparison 
here, and future studies should take this reduction in trial completion at high 
doses of Flupenthixol into consideration.  
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Loss-stay strategy in rats with more SNc neurons is mitigated by DA 
antagonism 
 
Figure 24:  Loss-stay strategy in rats with more TH+ SNc neurons mitigated by DA antagonism. We 
found that rats with greater numbers TH-positive neurons in the SNc demonstrated a greater propensity to 
stay after a loss at baseline (R2=.71) and at vehicle (R2=.25), but that this effect was mitigated by 
administration of DA antagonist cis-Flupenthixol at both the low (R2=.00) and medium doses (R2=.09). 
Rats did not complete enough trials at the high dose to establish loss-stay proportions. Dotted lines 
represent chance at 33%. Error lines represent 95% CI’s. ***p<.001, *p<.05.     
As can be observed in Figure 24, rats with a greater number of SNc neurons 
were also more likely to stay after a loss. Furthermore, we found that this 
correlation was abolished by DA antagonism at the low and medium doses, but 
not by saline. At baseline, only the SNc count (β = .84, 95CI[.53,1.15], p < .001) 
was entered as a significant predictor in the model (R2adj = .69), while VTA 
count and weight were not. Similarly, at the saline vehicle, only SNc count (β = 
.50, 95CI[.01,1.00], p < .05) was entered as a significant predictor into the 
model (R2adj = .20). At both the low and medium doses, no predictors were 
significantly entered into the model. Together, the results shown in Figure 22 
Baseline	  R2	  =	  .71***	  
Vehicle	  R2	  =	  .25*	  
Low	  R2	  =	  .00	  
Medium	  R2	  =	  .09	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and Figure 24 provide evidence that loss-stay behaviour in our task is 




In Chapter 2, we described the development of a rat gambling task and 
demonstrated that rats were not only sensitive to manipulations of reward 
volume and probability, but also that losses significantly affected subsequent 
behaviour in the task. Interestingly, we also found that rats develop a lose-
stay/win-shift strategy that leads to greater efficiency in earning reward in the 
task. Here, we present research that established the effect of systemic 
dopamine antagonism on behaviour. We observed dose-dependent increases 
in poke durations and choice of the high contingency as well as decreases in 
‘stay’ behaviour. These results not only suggest an important role for dopamine 
in guiding risky decisions in the task – but also implicate the substantia nigra 
directly based on correlations between behaviour and absolute cell counts. To 
the authors’ knowledge, such a correlation between normal (i.e. healthy, non-
lesioned) DA neuron counts and individual variability in behaviour has never 
been demonstrated. If such a relationship between neuron counts and 
behaviour were to stand up to further testing in the future, the implications for 
neuroscience are potentially quite wide – although we focus here on its 
prospective application to neuropsychological testing for early detection in 
Parkinson’s Disease (PD).  
Stay-shift pattern of behaviour 
In the previous chapter we note rats’ tendency toward lose-stay/win-shift 
behaviour. Although the task was not specifically designed to reinforce such 
behaviour, we found rats were more likely to return to a contingency after a loss 
compared to a gain. Lesion studies in rats have demonstrated that the 
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acquisition of stimulus-response associations such as win-stay or win-shift 
strategies is critically dependent upon the nigrostriatal pathway (Da Cunha et 
al., 2003; McDonald & White, 1993), which is characterized by afferent 
dopamine projections to the dorsal striatum from the substantia nigra (Haber, 
2003). It is hypothesized that reward-based motor learning is driven by 
dopamine-dependent plasticity at the synapse and at the whole cell (for an 
excellent review, see Wickens et al., 2003). Therefore, we next counted TH-
positive neurons in the SNc (Figure 23) and turned our investigation to the role 
of the midbrain dopamine system. 
Dopamine Antagonism 
Systemic injections of DA antagonist cis-Flupenthixol dose-dependently 
increased poke duration in the task. Since movement time to reward was 
unaffected by Flupenthixol administration, it is unlikely that increased poked 
durations reflect motor impairment. Given the probabilistic nature of accruing 
reward during a poke, potential future rewards are likely subject to probabilistic 
discounting during the decision process. Thus, this result would be consistent 
with previous work by St Onge and Floresco (2009), who found that 
amphetamine-induced probabilistic discounting was blocked by systemic 
dopamine D1 and D2 receptor antagonists (St Onge & Floresco, 2009). 
Therefore, these results support previous work demonstrating that Flupenthixol 
reduced rats’ subjective overweighting of reward probabilities when evaluating 
gambles. 
Our analyses suggest that systemic dopamine blockade decreased choice of 
the low contingency and increased choice of the high contingency at the 
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highest dose. This result is surprising given that a number of genetic, 
psychopharmacological, and imaging studies have implicated enhanced 
dopamine availability with risky decision-making (Kuhnen & Chiao, 2009; 
Mitchell et al., 2014; St Onge & Floresco, 2009). These findings also contrast 
with those of St Onge, Chiu, and Floresco (2010), who found that Flupenthixol 
decreased choice of the high-risk contingency on a risk discounting task in rats.  
However, this discrepancy may be attributable to differences in task designs. 
The previous study manipulated probability of the large/risky reward over four 
blocks of trials, whereas the task presented here maintained the same 
probabilities of reward throughout training and the task. Updating of reward 
probabilities and magnitude was necessary only while sustaining a nosepoke in 
the current task. It is possible that Flupenthixol may have impeded learning or 
updating of subjective reward probabilities (e.g. by blunting reward or risk 
prediction errors) over successive blocks of trials in the previous study. Thus, it 
is possible that choice of the high contingency in our task was maintained 
despite dopamine blockade solely due to preserved encoding of the larger 
magnitude of the reward (i.e. rats’ choices were insensitive to risk). While rats’ 
choices were highly sensitive to independent manipulations of risk (while 
reward magnitudes were constant) in the discrimination task (see Chapter 2), it 
remains possible that the discrepancy in reward accrual rate between the high 
and low contingencies was simply too large to motivate choice of the low 
contingency. This could reflect potential confounds arising from discounting of 
future rewards, or the tendency of individuals to preferentially weight rewards 
occurring sooner or with more certainty over those occurring later or with less 
certainty. This is a particularly relevant issue given that the dopamine system 
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has been heavily implicated in reward discounting, and that dysregulation of 
dopamine function often lead to exacerbated or abnormal discounting of 
rewards (Besson et al., 2010; Cardinal, Robbins, & Everitt, 2000; Dalley et al., 
2007; Wade, de Wit, & Richards, 2000). Future studies could either 
disassociate risk- and reward-accrual rates or decrease the difference in rate of 
reward contingencies to further this line of enquiry. 
Increasing doses of Flupenthixol reduced the average number of poke errors in 
a linear fashion. Interestingly, nosepokes appear to have become more 
deliberate at higher doses in the low contingency (Figure 19c). These results 
are consistent with previous work demonstrating that enhanced dopaminergic 
transmission potentiates premature responding while dopamine blockade 
reduces premature responding in the 5CSRTT (Passetti, Levita, & Robbins, 
2003; van Gaalen, Brueggeman, Bronius, Schoffelmeer, & Vanderschuren, 
2006). Choice errors in the current task may represent a form of frustrative 
behaviour in the face of a less-preferred option. Given that dopamine 
hyperactivity has been linked to aggression in both humans and animals 
(Brizer, 1988; Miczek, DeBold, & van Erp, 1994; for review, see Seo, Patrick, & 
Kennealy, 2008), the effect of Flupenthixol may be to diminish the negative 
emotion associated with an undesirable forced-choice trial. 
We discovered a significant relationship between rats with more TH-positive 
neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and a greater propensity 
for the win-shift/loss-stay strategy (Figure 24). This is bolstered by the finding 
that stay-shift strategies are significantly disrupted at all doses of Flupenthixol 
administration (Figure 22). While there is a well-established precedent for 
 110 
linking the activity of SNc neurons to instrumental behaviour (for review, see 
Wickens et al., 2003), there is less evidence to suggest that absolute numbers 
of dopamine neurons can affect activity levels at the local or systems level.  
A starting place may be the growing literature supporting a causal relationship 
between cognitive impairments and dopamine cell loss in Parkinson’s disease 
(PD) patients. Impairments in cognitive function, such as deficits in spatial 
planning and attentional set shifting, as well as the prevalence of depression 
and anxiety are present in both the early and late stages of PD, and often 
predate diagnosis (Dubois & Pillon, 1996; Lees & Smith, 1983; Lewis, Dove, 
Robbins, Barker, & Owen, 2003).  Indeed, given the subtle nature of the 
cognitive deficits in the early stages, non-motor symptoms are commonly 
unreported or overlooked by clinicians (Chaudhuri et al., 2010; Shulman, 
Taback, Rabinstein, & Weiner, 2002). In spite of this, research suggests that 
non-motor deficits typically precede the motor symptoms of PD by over a 
decade (Chaudhuri, Healy, & Schapira, 2006; Chaudhuri & Naidu, 2008). This 
is important to note because motor deficits in PD do not typically present until a 
substantial proportion (~70%) of dopamine neurons in the SNc have been lost 
(Truong, Allbutt, Kassiou, & Henderson, 2006; Zigmond, Berger, Grace, & 
Stricker, 1989). Surviving neurons exhibit a number of compensatory changes, 
such as: increasing dopamine release per terminal, decreasing dopamine 
reuptake, hemispheric inter-dependence, and increasing the proportion of 
active dopaminergic neurons (Blesa et al., 2011; Zigmond et al., 1989). Most 
researchers therefore expect that such compensatory mechanisms should 
preclude any observable differences in behaviour arising from natural variations 
in the absolute number of neurons in the substantia nigra (as demonstrated in 
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our findings). Given that we not only observe a moderate-to-strong correlation 
between neuron count and behaviour, but that this effect is also attenuated by 
systemic dopamine blockade, we believe these findings warrant further 
research. Replication of the study or direct manipulation of dopamine neurons 
in the SNc would be necessary to further substantiate such a claim. 
In conclusion, we have found intriguing evidence to support a novel relationship 
between the number of neurons in a healthy system and behaviour. Given that 
clinical presentation typically occurs at very late stages of PD, identifying 
cognitive domains that are susceptible to impairment at lower rates of 
dopamine cell loss in the SNc presents an exciting area for future research. 
Establishing a link between the number of SNc neurons and a capacity for 
dopamine-dependent plasticity could potentially lead to new methods of 
neuropsychological testing for earlier detection of PD.  
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Chapter 4  
 
Disassociating effects of dopamine neurons, 





In this chapter, we extend the novel gambling task developed in Chapter 2 and 
seek to replicate the association between loss-stay behaviour and neurons in 
the substantia nigra pars compacta from Chapter 3. We successfully 
dissociated the effects of high probability of losing vs. high reward accrual rates 
on poke duration and choice. High reward accrual rates exhibited greater 
influence over choice while high probability of loss exhibited a greater effect on 
poke duration. However, we were unsuccessful in attempts to elicit longer poke 
durations by offsetting any potential hyperbolic discounting. Modifications to the 
task design changed the way rats responded after a loss. While rats did not 
exhibit a general tendency toward loss-stay behaviour as in Chapter 2, 
individual variability in loss-stay behaviour was still positively correlated with 
neuron counts in the substantia nigra. This suggests that risky or compulsive 
behaviour may be under the control of the number of neurons in the substantia 
nigra.   
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Introduction 
In this chapter, we further develop the rat gambling task introduced in Chapter 
2 – addressing a number of the limitations associated with the previous version 
of the task. Furthermore, we attempt to replicate any findings associated with 
the correlation between loss-stay behaviour and the number of neurons in the 
Substantia Nigra pars compacta (SNc) presented in Chapter 3. In terms of task 
design, we focused on addressing three key limitations identified in the 
discussion of the previous task:  
1) The probability of losing and volume of reward both increased monotonically 
over the duration of a nosepoke, thus the distinct effects of either on behaviour 
were confounded. 
2) A loss was not explicitly signalled in the original version of the task, which 
meant wins were more salient than losses. Furthermore, rats may have 
considered loss trials simply as a variable ratio schedule.   
3) The volume of reward accrued in the low contingency was likely too low to 
make up for any effects of temporal discounting of delayed reward. Discounting 
of delayed rewards may have rendered longer poke durations in the low 
contingency less desirable than intended.  
To implement these changes, we began by expanding the number of available 
nosepoke holes from 3 to 5. The five contingencies varied either by rate of 
reward accrual or by probability of losing the accrued reward. Therefore, the 
five contingencies were:  
1. Low reward: low-reward/medium-probability 
2. High reward: high-reward/medium-probability 
3. Medium-Medium: medium-reward/medium-probability 
4. Low probability: low-probability/medium-reward 
5. High probability: high-probability/medium-reward 
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These separations allowed us to distinguish more clearly between the effects of 
reward and probability on choice and poke behaviour.  
In the previous version of the task, losses were not signalled to the rats. Not 
only did this disproportionately increase the salience of wins to losses, it was 
also possible that the unanticipated development of loss-stay behaviour was a 
misperception of losing in the task. For example, rats may have perceived the 
high contingency as a variable ratio reinforcement schedule (Ferster & Skinner, 
1957) requiring a varying number of responses to earn reward. To preclude this 
potential and to increase the salience of losses (our target outcome), we added 
a second auditory cue to the task. If the rat won, a win tone sounded and the 
reward magazine was illuminated as in the previous version of the task. In the 
event of a loss, the reward magazine was not illuminated and a second tone, 
distinct from the win tone, was paired with reward omission.  
Finally, we found that rats rarely poked for to the max 2 sec in the low 
contingency, despite the fact that there was a 90% chance of success even at 
the full 2 seconds (compared to 50% in the medium and only 10% in the high 
contingency). This may have been due to temporal discounting of reward, 
whereby delayed rewards are discounted more heavily the further away they 
are in the future (Ainslie, 1975). The hyperbolic reduction of perceived reward 
can be captured by a factor of: 
11+ 𝑘𝑡 
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where t is the duration of the delay until a reward is received and k is a 
constant discount rate per unit of time. Therefore to counteract any potential 
effect of reward discounting in the current version of the task, we included an 
extra reward ‘buffer’ at each successive 100msec tick.  
Methods 
Animals 
Subjects were 16 male outbred Lister Hooded rats (Harlan U.K.) that were 
housed in groups of three (2 additional cage mates were not included in 
testing) in a climate-controlled colony room on a reverse 12-hour light: 12-hour 
dark cycle (6PM lights off). After three weeks of habituation to experimenter 
handling, rats were placed on restricted water access for the duration of 
behavioural training and testing with ad libitum food access in the home cage. 
Rats were tested 5 days a week. Water access was restricted to 1 hour on 
weekdays following testing but was available ad libitum on weekends from 
Friday at 4PM until Sunday afternoon (typically between 2-4PM). Rats’ weights 
were monitored so that no animal dropped below 85% of its maximum body 
weight and showed growth throughout the experiment. All procedures 
conformed to the United Kingdom Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (1986) 
under Project License 60/4040 and was approved by the Animal Welfare Ethics 
Committee of the University of St Andrews. 
Apparatus 
The reader is referred to the ‘Methods’ section of Chapter 2 for a detailed 
description of the apparatus employed here. 
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Training 
After two weeks in which rats were habituated to human handling, the animals 
were placed on water restriction and submitted to 30 min training sessions in 
the testing chambers with no fixed trial limit. First, thirsty rats were trained over 
2 days to associate a tone-light cue with delivery of 0.15 ml sweet liquid reward 
(sodium saccharin 0.3% w/v). Rats were subsequently trained over 23 sessions 
to sustain gradually longer nosepokes in any nosepoke hole of the five-hole 
array for up to 2 sec in order to receive the tone/light cue followed by the 
reward. Finally, rats were trained to sustain nosepokes for 2 sec in only lit 
nosepoke holes of the five-hole array. During these sessions rats were trained 
to poke in lit holes only, where pokes in unlit holes resulted in a 2 sec ‘timeout.’ 
Testing proceeded once all rats were above 90% accuracy in nosepoking (36 
sessions). 
Task Outline 
As discussed above, the task is modified from the original presented in Chapter 
2. A brief description of the task is provided here. The reader is referred to 
Chapter 2 for a full description of the task and discussion of the associated 
behaviour.  
A task schematic is depicted in Figure 25. Lit LEDs indicated the available 
hole(s) of a 5-hole array in which a rat could poke on any given trial, and the 
locations of the holes associated with each contingency were counterbalanced 
across testing chambers. All LED’s in nosepoke holes were extinguished after 
the rat began poking into one of the lit nosepoke holes. If the animal either 
withdrew its snout from the nosepoke hole before a loss, or it successfully 
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reached the full 2 sec limit without losing, a tone-light cue emanating from the 
reward magazine would indicate the availability of reward for collection. If the 
rat lost the bet, a separate tone indicated the loss outcome and reward 
omission. Movement time (MT) to reward was measured from the onset of the 
conditioned stimuli to licking onset at the reward spigot. The amount of reward 
earned was a function of nosepoke length (refer to plot at top right of Figure 25) 
and varied by contingency. A 15 sec timer was activated from the onset of a 
nosepoke response, and a trial ended either when the timer elapsed or with the 
end of reward delivery, in which case a new trial began immediately. The 
animals were free to complete as many trials as possible over the course of the 
30-minute session.  
The major modifications to the previous task are illustrated in Figure 25. Here, 
one can see that the number of available nosepoke holes has been extended 
from three to five. The contingences associated with each hole vary from low to 
high either in probability of losing (depicted as ‘risk’ in Figure 25) or in the rate 
of reward accrual (depicted as ‘reward’ in Figure 25) with the ‘medium-medium’ 
contingency representing a medium rate of both. Furthermore, two distinct 
tones were incorporated as stimuli in the task. Tone 1 indicated to rats that a 
nosepoke had resulted in a loss and no reward would be available. Tone 2 
(paired with a light at the reward spigot) indicated to rats that a nosepoke had 








B  Expected value of future reward as a function of poke duration 
  
Figure 25: (A) Task Schematic. Note the major revisions from the previous version of the task (Chapter 
2). On the top left of the figure, five nosepoke holes are available during the contingency selection stage 
instead of three. The probability of losing (denoted simply as ‘risk’) increased either at a low or high rate 
(with medium rate of reward accrual) in the ‘Low Risk’ and ‘High Risk’ contingencies, respectively. 
Alternatively, the rate of reward volume accrual (denoted simply as ‘reward’) increased at either a low or a 
high rate (with a medium rate of probability of losing) in the ‘Low Reward’ and ‘High Reward’ 
contingencies, respectively. Reward accrual and probability of losing both increased at medium rates in 
the ‘Medium-Medium’ (MM) contingency. To convey these changing rates of reward volume and 
probability more clearly, the box on the top right depicts the trade-off between the decreasing probability of 
winning (inverse of the probability of losing) vs. an increasing volume of reward. One should also note the 
two distinct tones (marked ‘1’ and ‘2’) that indicated either a win or a loss to the animal. (B) Expected 
Reward. The expected value of future reward as a function of poke duration is depicted for each of the five 
nosepoke contingencies. Apart from the High Risk contingency, the maximum expected reward can be 



























































Baseline data were from the last seven days of stable performance. Given that 
rats were not limited in the number of trials that they were able to complete in a 
session, we calculated percent choice (rather than absolute number of choices) 
using the number of trials chosen in a given contingency over the 7-day period, 
divided by the total number of free-choice trials over that period. The 
percentage of stay/shift trials was calculated as the total number of decisions to 
stay/switch after a previous trial across the 7 days, divided by the total number 
of free-choice trials across the 7 days. The following variables were also 
measured and analysed separately across conditions: error rate per forced-
choice trial, time spent (sec) in incorrect nosepoke holes, lick rate (Hz), 
movement time to reward (sec). 
Histology 
Following testing, a subset of 9 rats (7 rats were chosen at random for a 
separate procedure not detailed here) were euthanized via overdose with 0.08 
ml pentobarbital (Univet Ltd., Oxford, U.K.) and then perfused intracardially with 
0.1% phosphate buffered saline followed with a 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1M 
phosphate buffer fixative. Brains were postfixed in the cold (at a refrigerator 
temperature of ~ 1.6°C) for 24 hours in 20% sucrose solution and then washed 
for 30 minutes with buffer. Using a freezing microtome, 50 µm serial sections 
were taken through the midbrain and stored in 0.1M phosphate buffer. One out 
of every four sections were subsequently stained with antibody to tyrosine 
hydroxylase (TH) using avidin-biotin complex (ABC) immunohistochemical 
methods (S. M. Hsu & Raine, 1981) and 3’3-diaminobenzidine (DAB) for 
visualization of the antigen. Sections were mounted and examined under a 
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conventional light microscope at ×20 objective. Sections were mapped onto 
standardized brain areas following Paxinos and Watson (1997) as depicted in 
Figure 26, and the number of tyrosine hydroxylase stained cell bodies were 
counted in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) at 3 sections: -5.3mm, -
5.8mm, and -6.3mm behind bregma. 
Rat atlas guide of SNc  
 
Figure 26: adapted from Paxinos and Watson (1997). Three sections (−5.30mm, −5.80mm, and 
−6.3mm behind bregma) of the rats’ midbrains were stained for tyrosine hydroxylase (TH). TH-
positive cell bodies were then counted under a conventional light microscope in the substantia 
nigra pars compacta (red) at ×20 magnification. 
 AH counted the number of midbrain dopamine neurons.  AH’s count-recount 
correlations demonstrated highly reliable neuron counts (Pearson’s r = .953, p 
< .001). A random sample of 10 sections (5 from animals presented in this 
chapter and 5 from animals presented in Chapter 3) was selected for blind 
recount using a random-number generator for inter-rater reliability. The inter-
rater reliability between the original (AH) counts and the counts conducted by a 






Session reconstruction with time-stamped data was performed using a program 
in the AWK programming language. Subsequent data analysis was carried out 
using Microsoft® Excel for Mac 2011 as well as R version 3.2.2 and SPSS® 
version 21 for Mac. Task behaviour was analysed using the average 
percentage each contingency was chosen (on free-choice trials) across rats 
and days during the last five testing sessions. Repeated-measures ANOVAs 
were performed with contingency (5 levels: high probability, low probability, 
medium probability/medium reward, high reward, and low reward) as the within-
subject variable. Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted degrees of freedom and Sidak-
corrected p-values were applied where appropriate. All means are reported 
with standard errors and any significant main effects are reported with 
associated planned contrasts. In order to avoid potential ceiling-effects 
associated with the use of proportion data, arcsine transformations were used 
on all variables expressed as a percentage (Zeeb et al., 2009). All analyses 
measuring responses to a previous win or loss are defined as those trials 
immediately preceded by a win or loss, omitting the first trial of a session. 
Poke durations longer than the maximum allowed 2 seconds were truncated to 
2 seconds for analysis. Furthermore, given that the average poke durations 
could be biased by truncated loss trials, descriptive statistics and ANOVA’s 
including average poke duration are calculated based on successful trials only.  
We also conducted survival analyses of poke duration and contingency choice 
by fitting a Cox proportional hazard model to the data. This analysis is carried 
out on a trial-by-trial basis, rather than averaging across subjects and sessions. 
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The Cox proportional hazard model is a semi-parametric model that makes no 
assumption about the shape of the baseline curve (e.g. linear), and takes the 
following form: ℎ 𝑡, 𝑥 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 exp 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!  
where the hazard rate of x occurring, h(t,x(t)), on trial t is conditional on p 
predictors. The β coefficients are estimated from the data. While the model’s 
primary assumption is that the hazard associated with any given covariate is 
proportional across time, it can be extended to incorporate time-varying 
covariates and stratified to accommodate within-subject designs. By stratifying 
across subjects, the models fit here include individual baseline hazards for 




We began by determining how successful rats were at earning reward in each 
contingency. We used the reward won and the reward lost on each trial to 
calculate the average net reward for each subject in each of the 5 
contingencies. The results are plotted in Figure 27. A repeated-measures 
ANOVA of net reward with Contingency (5 levels: high probability, low 
probability, high reward, low reward, and medium-medium) as a within-subjects 
factor confirmed that there was a main effect of contingency on net reward 
earned per trial (F(4,60) = 31.64, 𝜂!! = .68, p < .001). This suggests that our 
manipulations were successful. 
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Net reward earned per trial by contingency 
 
Figure 27: Net reward per contingency. On average, the net reward earned per trial was 
highest in the contingencies associated with a high rate of reward accrual and a low probability 
of losing. In contrast, rats netted the least reward in the low reward and high probability 
contingencies. Net reward earned in the medium-medium contingency fell in between these, 
which simple planned contrasts revealed was significantly different than all other contingencies 
(low reward: p<.001, low probability: p<.01, high reward: p=.001, high probability: p<.001). This 
suggests that our manipulations were successful. Error bars represent 95% CI’s. 
We next investigated whether the 5 contingencies of reward volume and 
probability had any effect on the various behavioural measures in the task. To 
establish the effect of contingency on hole choice during free choice trials, we 
conducted a repeated measures ANOVA for the percentage of trials each 
contingency was chosen on free choice trials, with Contingency (5 levels: high 
probability, low probability, high reward, low reward, and medium-medium) as a 
within-subjects factor. As depicted in Figure 28a, we found a significant main 
effect of contingency on rats’ choice of nosepoke holes on free-choice trials 
(F(4,60) = 14.50, 𝜂!! = .49, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p < .001). Although 
there appeared to be a linearly decreasing trend as the probability of losing 
increased, planned contrasts revealed that contingency choice did not 




(p = .54). There was a trend in the opposite direction as the reward accrual 
rates increased, with significant contrasts between choice of the low and high 
reward contingencies (p = .001) and medium-medium and high reward 
contingencies (p = .001). Overall, rats chose the high reward contingency the 
most (M = 42.9%, SEM = 4.4%), while they chose the high probability of losing 
contingency the least (M = 10.0%, SEM = 1.7%). One-sample t-tests revealed 
that only choice of the low probability contingency failed to differ significantly 
from chance (t(15) = 0.07, p = NS).  
A      B 
  
C      D 
   
Figure 28: (A) Choices appear to have been more affected by reward-type manipulations than 
probability-type manipulations. Despite earning the same net reward as the contingency 
associated with a low probability of losing, rats choose the high reward contingency 22.6% 
(SEM = 8.1%) more often on free-choice trials. The low reward, high probability, and medium-




dotted line). (B) Poke durations appear to have been more affected by manipulations of 
probability than reward-type manipulations. On average, rats poked the longest in the low 
probability contingency (M=0.67sec, SEM=0.07sec) and the shortest in the high probability 
contingency (M=0.41sec, SEM=0.03sec). (C) There was a significant main effect of 
contingency on error rates (p<.01), which appear to be the inverse of net reward (see Figure 
27). (D) There is a marginal trend toward faster lick rates in the high probability contingency 
and slower lick rates high reward contingency (Main effect: p=.05). Error bars represent 95% 
CI’s. 
Figure 28b illustrates the effect of contingency on the average time that rats 
were willing to sustain a nosepoke. We performed a repeated-measures 
ANOVA on average poke duration with Contingency (5 levels: high probability, 
low probability, high reward, low reward, and medium-medium) as a within-
subjects factor. The results indicate that there was a strong main effect of 
contingency on the duration a rat was willing to sustain a nosepoke (F(4,60) = 
12.85, 𝜂!! = .46, Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p < .001). In contrast to the 
medium-medium contingency, rats poked significantly shorter in the high 
probability of loss contingency (MDifference = 0.23 sec, SEM = 0.04 sec, p < .001) 
but not significantly longer or shorter in the low probability of loss contingency  
(MDifference = 0.02 sec, SEM = 0.04 sec, p = NS). Although rats did tend to 
exhibit quicker nosepokes in the low reward contingency (M = 0.55 sec, SEM = 
0.06 sec) compared to the high reward contingency (M = 0.61 sec, SEM = 0.05 
sec), the manipulations of reward accrual rate did not significantly affect poke 
durations. 
In the previous version of the task, we demonstrated that rats made more 
errors on forced-choice trials involving less preferred contingencies. To 
investigate this pattern, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the 
average number of errors per trial with Contingency (5 levels: high probability, 
low probability, high reward, low reward, and medium-medium) as a within-
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subjects factor. As depicted in Figure 28c, we again found that error rates were 
significantly affected by contingency (F(4,60) = 4.39, 𝜂!! = .23, p < .01). On 
average, rats made the greatest amount of errors per trial in the low reward 
contingency (M = 1.31 errors/trial, SEM = 0.15 errors/trial) and the fewest 
number of errors per trial in the high reward contingency (M = 1.04 errors/trial, 
SEM = 0.13 errors/trial).  
Based on the results from the previous iteration of the task, we also expected 
to find a significant effect of contingency on movement time to reward (MT). We 
performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the average MT (sec) with 
Contingency (5 levels: high probability, low probability, high reward, low reward, 
and medium-medium) as a within-subjects factor. While rats did move 
somewhat more quickly to collect reward in the high reward contingency (M = 
1.60 sec, SEM = 0.08 sec) compared to the slowest MT in the low probability 
contingency (M = 1.74 sec, SEM = 0.13 sec), we did not find a significant main 
effect of contingency on MT (F(4,60) = 1.04, p = .39).  
Similarly, we performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on the average lick rate 
(Hz) with Contingency (5 levels: high probability, low probability, high reward, 
low reward, and medium-medium) as a within-subjects factor. We had 
previously found a weak effect of contingency on lick rate, and this was again 
the case (F(4,60) = 3.31, 𝜂!! = .18, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p = .05), 
although it should be noted that this effect just reached our criterion for 
statistical significance. As can be seen in Figure 28d, planned contrasts 
revealed significantly faster lick rates when the probability of loss was the 
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highest (M = 7.78 Hz, SEM = 0.09 Hz, p < .05). Lick rates were slowest in the 
high reward contingency (M = .67 Hz, SEM = 0.09 Hz, p = .057).  
In order to gain a more detailed understanding of the effects of contingency on 
behaviour, we next evaluated poke duration on a trial-by-trial basis. To achieve 
this, we conducted a survival analysis by fitting a Cox proportional hazard 
model to the data. This analysis has the potential for greater power given that 
that: 1) it can account for censored poke durations (i.e. premature unpokes due 
to losses) and, 2) it is computed on a trial-by-trial basis. Previous Outcome (2 
levels: win and loss) and Contingency (5 levels: high probability, low probability, 
high reward, low reward, and medium-medium) were added as time-varying 
covariates and the model was stratified over subjects.  
A      B 
 
Figure 29: (A) The ‘survival’ time of a nosepoke varies significantly as a function of 
contingency (p<.001). Poke durations are the shortest when the probability of losing is the 
highest (p<.001) and longest when the probability of losing is the lowest (p<.001). Variations in 
rate of reward accrual had less of an apparent effect on poke duration, with the low reward 
contingency eliciting the shortest pokes (p<.05) while the high reward contingency did not 
significantly differ from the medium-medium contingency (p=.524). (B) Previous outcome was a 
significant factor in the model, but this effect was reversed and smaller in comparison to the 
previous task. Here, rats poked longer after a loss compared to a gain (p<.001). CI’s not 
depicted, for details the reader is referred to Appendix 3, Table 11. 
 
The model survival curves for each contingency are illustrated in Figure 29a. 
Contingency was found to be a highly significant factor in the model (p < .001). 
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The high probability contingency (p < .001) and the low probability contingency 
(p < .001) represented the shortest and the longest poke durations, 
respectively. In contrast to the medium-medium contingency, poke durations in 
the low reward contingency (p < .05) were shorter while those in the high 
reward contingency did not significantly differ (p = .524). Previous outcome was 
also entered as a significant factor in the model (p < .001), as depicted in 
Figure 29b. Interestingly, rats generally poked longer after a loss in the current 
version of the task, which contrasted with the previous 3-hole version (see 
Figure 17b). A table detailing further particulars of the model coefficients can be 
found in Table 11 of Appendix 3. 
Stay-Shift Strategy 
Given the surprising lose-stay/win-shift strategy in the previous version of the 
task, we were interested in determining whether this pattern was again present 
in rats’ behaviour in the current task. We began our analysis by conducting a 
paired-samples t-test on the proportion of trials a rat chose to stay after a win 
vs. a loss. This analysis revealed that rats were more likely to stay after a win 
rather than after a loss, t(15) = 2.21, p < .05). See Figure 30 for a graph 
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Figure 30: (A) Unlike in the previous version of the task, we found that rats developed a win-stay/lose-shift 
strategy in the current task. After a win, rats stayed on about 5% more trials than after a loss (p<.05). Note 
that the percentage of stay trials was significantly below chance on trials with both a previous win and a 
previous loss. (B) There was a main effect of contingency (p=.001), whereby rats returned to the high 
reward contingency significantly more often than any other contingency on free-choice trials. 
We also wanted to establish whether rats were more likely to stay/shift after 
trials with some contingencies compared to others. We therefore conducted a 
repeated-measures ANOVA on the average percentage of stay trials per 
session with Contingency (5 levels: high probability, low probability, high 
reward, low reward, and medium-medium) as a within-subjects factor. As 
illustrated in Figure 30b, rats were significantly more likely to return to the high 
reward contingency (M = 38.7%, SEM = 5.5%) than the other contingencies, 
where averages all fell below 20% chance, main effect: F(4,60) = 8.49, 𝜂!! = .36, 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p = .001. The contingency associated with a 
high probability of loss also had the lowest stay percentages, with rats choosing 
to return to it on only 11.6% (SEM = 2.3%) of free-choice trials.  
Neuron counts and behaviour  
In Chapter 3, we provided evidence of a significant relationship between loss-
stay behaviour and rats with more putative dopamine neurons in the substantia 




association was present in the current cohort of rats performing the new 
variation of the task. The number and variation of TH-positive neurons in the 
SNc (Figure 31) was first ascertained (N = 9 rats; min = 820; max = 1045; M = 
936.94; SD = 61.37). These values were similar to counts from the previous 
study, and an independent t-test revealed that the differences between groups 
were not significant, t(23) = 1.78, Cohen’s d = 0.74, p = .09. 
A      B 
   
Figure 31: (A) TH-positive dopamine cells of the rat SNc at ×4 magnification and (B) ×10 magnification. 
We implemented this analysis by regressing the percentage of lose-stay trials 
on neuron counts in the SNc. Given implications of midbrain dopamine neurons 
in feeding behaviour (Hommel et al., 2006), rat weight was also included as a 
predictor variable. We used the stepwise method to enter average weight and 
SNc neuron counts as independent predictors of lose-stay trials in a linear 
regression. The results of a linear regression (refer to Figure 32 and to Table 
12 in Appendix 3 for full details of the model coefficients) suggest a strong 
relationship between neuron count and behaviour (β = .83, 95CI[.33,1.33], p < 
.01, R2adj = .64). Rat weight was not entered as a significant predictor into the 
model nor did it raise any potential issues with collinearity (βin = .004, p =.99, 
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VIF = 1.28). These findings are in line with the positive relationship between 
greater numbers of SNc neurons and a greater propensity to shift after a loss 
identified in Chapter 3.  
Loss-stay strategy increases in rats with more SNc neurons 
  
Figure 32: The figure above depicts the relationship between counts of TH-positive neurons in the SNc 
and the proportion of trials on which a rat (N=9) chose to ‘stay,’ or return to the same contingency, after a 
loss. We similarly observed a positive relationship in Chapter 3 with a separate group of rats on the 
previous version of the task. The dotted line represents chance at 20%. Error lines represent 95% CI’s. 
 
  




This research was intended to extend and replicate previous work (presented in 
Chapters 2 and 3), which focused on the development of a novel rat gambling 
task. Here, we implemented three major changes to the task design: 1) 
Disassociated contingencies of varying probability and reward, 2) cued losses, 
and 3) ‘extra’ reward to offset hyperbolic discounting and incentivize longer 
poke durations.  
By varying the rate of magnitude and probability accrual separately between 
nosepoke holes, we were able to determine that rats’ choices (Figure 28a) 
reflect the expected reward rates in each hole (Figure 27). This finding was 
again in line with the matching law (Chung & Herrnstein, 1967), whereby an 
individual’s choices among alternatives reflect the relative rate of reward (rather 
than net reward) of those alternatives. Given two contingencies of differing 
expected reward (refer to Figure 25b) but comparable net reward (high reward 
vs. low probability of loss, Figure 27) rats demonstrably preferred the high 
reward contingency to the low probability contingency (and all other 
contingencies).  
Rats’ average nosepoke durations varied between 400 and 700 msec. This 
suggests that our previous assertion – namely that delayed rewards are 
discounted – remains true despite the additional reward ‘buffer.’ It stands to 
reason in the first instance that our assumption about the function of the 
discount factor was incorrect. For example, rats may discount reward 
exponentially as opposed to hyperbolically, which would render later rewards 
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once more less desirable. Although such a result would stand in opposition to a 
number of studies documenting hyperbolic discount rates in animals and 
humans (e.g. Mazur & Biondi, 2009; Rajala et al., 2015; Rodriguez & Logue, 
1988; Sopher & Sheth, 2006), future studies should test this assumption 
explicitly.  On the other hand, this may be a factor arising from the timed task 
design. In other words, with an unlimited number of trials to complete the task, 
rats may have developed the strategy of completing many short nosepokes 
rather than a few longer nosepokes. While we did restrict the minimum trial 
duration to 7 seconds, either integrating pseudorandom inter-trial intervals or 
limiting the number of trials per task to a set amount could potentially resolve 
this in future versions of the task. 
On average, poke durations did not increase greatly from the previous version 
of the task as intended. However, we were able to determine that high 
probability of losing was the most effective manipulation at eliciting different 
nosepoke durations (Figure 28b and Figure 29a). Survival analysis revealed 
that the low probability contingency did result in significantly longer poke 
durations than the medium-medium contingency – but this effect was not 
sufficiently strong enough to come through in the summary analysis of average 
behaviour. In contrast, the manipulations of reward accrual had little apparent 
effect on nosepoke behaviour. This suggests that rats do not have some 
predetermined threshold of either reward expectancy or effort expenditure. If, 
for example, a rat wished to achieve an arbitrary amount across all 
contingencies, it would stop poking sooner in the high reward contingency than 
in the low reward contingency. We observed the opposite effect (Figure 29a) – 
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nosepokes were the shorter in the low reward contingency than either high 
reward or medium-medium contingencies.  
This offers much room for speculation. It is possible, for example, that the small 
reward was (still) not worth the cognitive effort of sustaining a nosepoke nor the 
time lost from starting a new trial in a new hole. Alternatively, it may be that 
losing a large reward elicits more negative affect than losing a medium-sized 
reward – thus conditioning rats to reduce poke durations in the high reward 
contingency. Future iterations of the task could take advantage of individual 
differences in tolerance of increasing probabilities / rates of reward accrual to 
maximize desired behaviour by establishing subject-specific contingencies 
before training.  
We also integrated a second auditory cue for losses that was distinct from the 
win tone into the task. This was intended to increase salience of a loss, which 
was the target outcome of the task design and study. This was also 
implemented in order to minimize the potential that rats developed lose-stay 
behaviour because they incorrectly associated the high probability of loss 
contingency with a variable ratio schedule of reinforcement. Encouragingly, we 
found that rats performing in the current version of the task did not employ a 
lose-stay/win-shift strategy as in Chapters 2 and 3. Instead, rats were 
significantly more likely to stay after a win (Figure 30a). It is possible that the 
inclusion of an auditory loss cue effectively changed behaviour. However, this 
change may also be attributable to the fact that rats stayed on nearly 40% of 
trials in the high reward contingency (Figure 30b), which was well above 20% 
chance. Unfortunately, the large number of contingencies prevented us from 
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employing a Cox proportional hazard model to differentiate between any 
potential effects of a PreviousOutcome*PreviousContingency interaction, as 
was done in Chapter 2. We can, however, definitively state that rats returned to 
the contingency associated with a high probability of loss the least often of all 
five contingencies and that this was significantly less than chance. Thus, while 
it is unclear whether the switch from loss-stay to win-stay behaviour was 
motivated by addition of a loss tone or the change in contingencies (or both), it 
is unlikely that rats associate the high probability contingency with a variable 
reinforcement schedule. 
Given that we did not observe a pattern of loss-stay behaviour in this version of 
the task, it is perhaps rather surprising that we once more identified a 
significant positive relationship between rats with more TH-positive SNc 
neurons and a greater propensity to stay after a loss (Figure 32). This finding 
was intriguing in that it rules out the possibility that the correlation was only 
present in animals that have performed a task in which lose-stay is the 
preferred response. Furthermore, the current cohort of rats was drug-naïve – 
which indicates that the relationship was not the spurious by-product of altered 
neural tissue potentially arising from cis-Flupenthixol administration. We also 
did not observe any significant differences in neuron counts (Figure 31) 
between cohorts, although the mean count in the current cohort (M = 936.94 
cells) was somewhat lower than the previous cohort (M = 984.93 cells).  
Previous work by Baker, Joh, and Reis (1980) used a strain of inbred mice with 
20% greater midbrain DA neuron counts to establish that variation in midbrain 
TH activity is wholly accounted for by the number of neurons containing the 
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enzyme. The authors (Reis, Baker, Fink, & Joh, 1979) also performed a series 
of experiments and were also able to draw the conclusion that variability in both 
drug reactivity and behaviour was reducible to differences in neuron counts in 
the mouse nigrostriatal, mesolimbic, and mesocortical systems. Indeed, inbred 
mice with more midbrain dopamine neurons not only exhibited more 
exploratory behaviour and spontaneous motor activity, but their behaviour was 
also more sensitive to d-amphetamine administration. As a caveat, however, 
Sved, Baker, and Reis (1984) later found that DA neuron counts could not be 
used to predict overall neurotransmitter levels.  
The results of our study bear striking resemblance to the work done in an 
inbred strain of mice as detailed above (Baker et al., 1980; Reis et al., 1979; 
Reis, Fink, & Baker, 1982; Sved et al., 1984). The current study is comparable 
despite no known strain differences (rats from both studies were outbred by the 
same breeder), with the minimum count (820 cells) equal to ~22% of the 
maximum count (1045). This would suggest that either rats have greater 
natural variations in midbrain DA numbers than the mice did, that this genetic 
variant is also present in the subjects used here, or that some other potential 
factor affecting neuron counts exists. 
If variations in neuron count reflected faster instrumental learning in general, a 
plausible hypothesis would have been to predict a correlation between neuron 
counts and win-stay behaviour in the current task. In contrast, we found that 
neuron counts once again predicted loss-stay behaviour (Figure 32). This 
suggests that any putative dopaminergic control exerted on behaviour is related 
to either losses or a lack of spatial exploration. Given that Baker et al. (1980) 
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observed more spontaneous exploratory behaviour in mice with more midbrain 
numbers, it is more likely that this association is linked to losses. Repeating a 
loss can be seen as a risky, compulsive behaviour that putatively arises from 
the failure of a reward prediction error. If loss-related learning fell within the 
purview of SNc dopamine neuron populations, this could largely explain 
increased risk taking in, for example: susceptibility to addiction (Dalley et al., 
2007), variation in life financial outcomes (Brian Knutson, Samanez-Larkin, & 
Kuhnen, 2011), Parkinson’s Disease (Jee-Young et al., 2010), and those with 
genetic variations in the dopamine receptor D4 gene (Kuhnen & Chiao, 2009). 
Alternatively, loss-stay behaviour may be interpreted as compulsivity, which 
also has a substantial body of research linking it to the DA system (Eagle et al., 
2011; Evans, Lawrence, Potts, Appel, & Lees, 2005; Evans et al., 2006; 
McKeon et al., 2007; Voon et al., 2010). 
With the present chapter, we endeavoured to further advance the development 
of a novel rat gambling task. By replicating the correlation between loss-stay 
behaviour and neuron counts, but not an overall pattern of lose-stay behaviour 
in the task, our understanding of task behaviour and the neurobiological 
mechanisms governing that behaviour has also been critically expanded. This 
study provides evidence for a relationship between DA neuron counts and loss-
stay behaviour that both complements and extends beyond the work by Reis 
and colleagues (1979). These results seem to indicate that the self-regulating 
nature of the dopamine system still leaves enough variability to allow for 
quantifiable individual differences in behaviour.  Future work should focus on 
determining whether SNc neuron counts can also distinguish between 
individual differences in compulsivity and risk-taking. A number of viable 
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methods could further elucidate this potential relationship in future studies, 
including: psychopharmacology, targeted lesions, reversible inactivation, and 
optogenetics.  
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Chapter 5  
 
Rats exhibit anchoring, loss aversion and the 






Empirical research suggests that there are a number of behavioural biases that 
characterize systematic deviations from optimal trading behaviour in the stock 
market. Biases such as ‘anchoring’, ‘loss aversion’, and the ‘disposition effect’ 
all describe suboptimal behavioural patterns exhibited by human investors. 
Explanations for these biases, such as the ‘realization utility’ hypothesis of the 
disposition effect, are supported by theories of model-free reinforcement 
learning and dopaminergic reward prediction errors. This opens up the potential 
for exploring the aforementioned biases using more primitive models of 
behaviour. However, to date no research has explicitly tested whether or not 
anchoring, loss-aversion, or the disposition effect could be observed in rat 
behaviour. To this end, we have developed a stock market task in rats that 
simulates key aspects of investor decision-making. Using the notion of 
reference dependence from Prospect Theory, we first trained thirsty rats 
(N=24) to develop a reference point set at 0.15 ml of sweet liquid reward. 
Thereafter, cohorts of four rats drove a virtual stock market by nosepoking first 
to select an asset, followed by a second nosepoke to subsequently buy, sell, or 
hold the selected asset. If a rat chose the buy or sell option, the reward earned 
on that trial was equal to the reference point plus (minus) the liquid equivalent 
of the gain (loss) incurred by the trade. Choice of the hold option always 
resulted in a gain, albeit much smaller in volume relative to a potential gain 
from either the buy or sell options. Analysis of rats’ choices relative to changes 
in price of the selected stock revealed that rats learn either to buy, hold or sell 
optimally (but not all three). Our results indicate that rats move much more 
slowly to collect reward after a loss than after a gain. Furthermore, rats choose 
the riskier buy and sell options more often than the safer hold option on trials 
immediately preceded by a loss. These findings suggest that rats’ behaviour 
reflects both reference-dependence and loss aversion. Our results also indicate 
that rats – like humans – demonstrate a significant disposition toward selling at 
a gain relative to selling at a loss (i.e. the disposition effect). Together, these 
results suggest that behavioural biases such as anchoring, loss aversion, and 
the disposition effect can be elicited in a simulated rat stock market task.   
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Introduction 
One of the most robust empirical findings in behavioural finance is the tendency 
of investors to hold on to losing stocks too long and to sell winning stocks too 
quickly. Shefrin and Statman (1985) characterize this bias as the ‘disposition 
effect.’ Evidence for the disposition effect, along with a number of other 
behavioural biases, represents a mounting challenge to normative economic 
theories predicated on ‘rational,’ utility-maximizing Bayesian updaters. 
Irrespective of the prescriptions for portfolio management laid out by leading 
standards such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (Markowitz, 1959; Sharpe, 
1964), individual investors dependably exhibit a reluctance to realize their 
losses. While such systematic deviations from rationality appear to be 
ubiquitous across cultures (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001), professional money 
managers (Shapira & Venezia, 2001), and even primate species (M. K. Chen et 
al., 2006; Lakshminaryanan et al., 2008), the origins of such behaviour remain 
unclear.  
Although a number of potential theories have been posited to account for the 
disposition effect (e.g. Hirshleifer, 2001; Kaustia, 2010; Weber & Camerer, 
1998), the ‘realization utility’ hypothesis is unique in its ability to explain a 
number of behavioural biases (Barberis & Xiong, 2012; Shefrin & Statman, 
1985) while also garnering support from neurobiological and psychological 
research (Barber & Odean, 2011; Frydman et al., 2014; Frydman & Rangel, 
2014). The hypothesis posits that in addition to the utility derived from 
consumption, an investor receives a ‘burst’ of realization utility at the moment of 
sale that is proportional to the amount gained or lost in the trade. Frydman et 
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al. (2014) have recently used human fMRI BOLD activity to provide particularly 
compelling neural evidence for this hypothesis. The observed ‘bursts’ of utility 
closely align with learning signals described by reinforcement learning models 
(Erev & Roth, 1998; Sutton & Barto, 1998) in their potential to increase the 
likelihood of (not) repeating an (un)successful action in the future. Indeed, 
Charness and Levin (2005) demonstrate that utility maximization via Bayesian 
updating often fails when Bayes’ rule clashes with reinforcement. The authors 
find that participants violated Bayes’ updating rule on nearly 50% of trials where 
Bayesian updating and reinforcement were in conflict, yet hardly ever when the 
two rules were aligned. Thus, naïve reinforcement learning may lie at the heart 
of investor bias in situations where the immediate disutility of realizing a loss 
conflicts with an individual’s ability to update priors to achieve the optimal 
outcome. This assertion has gained traction in a growing number of studies 
(Choi, Laibson, Madrian, & Metrick, 2009; Fuster, Laibson, & Mendel, 2010; 
Kaustia & Knüpfer, 2008) and highlights a role for more primitive models of 
investor behaviour.   
Given the evidence implicating the potential contribution of reinforcement 
learning rules to investor bias, it may be possible to test such assertions using 
animal models. On the face it may seem a rather unusual notion to simulate 
financial decision-making behaviour in animals, but such models constitute an 
important basis for research in reinforcement learning (Lee & Dorris, 2014; 
Tolman, 1932). Indeed, animal models represent a critical means of 
interrogating the more primitive subcortical reward circuitry of neural systems 
without confounding ‘human’ factors, such as preconceived notions of how a 
stock market works or individual differences in numeracy and education.  
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This assertion is exemplified by previous research investigating economic 
decision-making in capuchin monkeys (M. K. Chen et al., 2006), pigeons 
(Kagel et al., 1975), and rodents (Kagel & Battalio, 1980), which has 
established that the foundations of rational economic choice extend further into 
humanity’s evolutionary past than one might expect. A group of researchers 
(Kagel & Battalio, 1980; Kagel, Battalio, & Green, 1995; Kagel et al., 1975) 
have demonstrated in numerous studies that when rats are given the 
opportunity to work (e.g. press a bar) to earn food and water in their home 
cage, they adjust their consumption patterns in a way that is consistent with 
rational economic pricing models. For example, when the ‘price’ of an item of 
food is increased from one bar press to three bar presses, rats naturally adjust 
their consumption patterns to reflect the new higher prices, revealing expected 
elasticities in demand. van Wingerden, Marx, and Kalenscher (2015) have 
recently extended this work, altering the experimental design of the previous 
authors to reflect an open economy (i.e. consumption was outside the home 
cage and not essential for homeostasis). By changing animals’ budgets (i.e. the 
number of trials in a session), the authors demonstrate that corresponding 
changes in consumption patterns imply that the subjective value attributed to a 
particular good is relative not only to price and preference, but also to the total 
budget. Together, these studies overcome the limitations of human 
experimental research and offer a valid model of behaviour that allows 
researchers to probe the neural representation of valuation in changing 
economic conditions.  
To a similar end, we have developed a stock market task for rats that simulates 
key aspects of investor decision-making. To facilitate such behaviour, we utilize 
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the notion of reference-dependence from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) 
Prospect Theory. In Prospect Theory, the subjective value of a prospect can be 
plotted on axes with an origin at some reference point (often the status quo), 
rather than at the objective value of zero. This implies that, given a gamble 
where most other players received an outcome of $100 and you receive an 
outcome of $5, a positive outcome can be viewed as a loss when it falls short 
of the reference point. We incorporate this concept in the rat stock market task 
by first establishing a reference point of reward, and subsequently by signalling 
losses and gains with respect to that reference point. Given that this is 
fundamental to the task design, our first hypothesis is therefore that rats are 
capable of reference-dependent behaviour. This directly challenges assertions 
that rodents do not possess the cognitive sophistication required for an 
organism to exhibit reference point effects (M. K. Chen et al., 2006).   
Based on the research outlined above, we further hypothesize that rats will 
display rational trading behaviour with regard to changes in prices. This would 
manifest as subjects buying stocks that are undervalued (i.e. at low prices) and 
selling stocks that are overvalued. Alternatively, we expect to see ‘irrational’ 
behaviour with respect to losses (e.g. loss aversion) and to the realization of 
negative returns (e.g. the disposition effect).  
Methods 
Animals 
Subjects were 24 male Lister Hooded rats, 8 of which were bred in house and 
16 of which were outbred (Harlan U.K.), with initial weights between 125g and 
250g. Animals were housed in groups of two or three on a 12-hour light: 12-
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hour dark cycle (6PM lights off). All testing was carried out in the light part of 
the cycle. Rats were habituated to human handling for two weeks and then 
placed on restricted water access. Rats received water ad libitum from Friday 
afternoon to Sunday afternoon and for one hour each weekday after testing. 
Rats weights were monitored daily before testing so that no animal was allowed 
to drop below 85% of its free-drinking body weight. All procedures were carried 
out under Project License number 60/4040, conformed to the United Kingdom 
Animals (Scientific Procedures) Act (1986), and were approved by the Animal 
Ethics Committee at the University of St Andrews. 
Apparatus 
The apparatus used here are detailed extensively elsewhere (see Chapter 2, 
‘Methods’).  
Behavioural testing was interfaced by the MED-PC™ data experimental control 
system (Med Associates Inc., St Albans, VT) with an HP® computer running 
Windows7™ at a temporal resolution of 2 msec. Summary measures were also 
available in an online display on the computer screen along side real-time video 
feeds.  Behavioural events were also time-stamped and recorded for offline 
data analysis and session reconstruction using a self-written program in AWK 
(Thompson Toolkit, Thompson Automation) programming language. 
Subsequent data analysis was carried out using Microsoft® Excel for Mac 2011 
as well as SPSS® version 21 for Mac and R version 3.2.2 for Mac. 
Training 
Thirsty rats completed three stages of 30 min training sessions in the testing 
chambers. In the first stage of training, rats were trained to pair a tone-light cue 
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with the availability of sweet liquid reward at the reward spigot. Thereafter, rats 
were trained to nosepoke in a lit nosepoke hole of the five-hole array in order to 
receive the cued reward. Finally, the animals were trained to complete a 
sequence of two nosepokes in the lit holes in order to receive the cued reward. 
Response accuracy was measured as the number of nosepokes into incorrect 
(unlit) holes versus the number of nosepokes into correct (lit) holes. In total, 18 
training sessions were required for rats to reach >90% nosepoke accuracy. 
Testing 
Task Outline 
In our task, four freely moving adult rats drive a virtual stock market by 
nosepoking in holes to select and subsequently buy, sell, or hold assets. At the 
beginning and end of a testing session, each cohort of four rats was carried 
together in one transport cage between the colony room and the testing room. 
Rats were then placed in one of four separate standard operant boxes 
(described above) and the outer sound-attenuating chamber doors were closed 
to indicate to the rat that the session had begun. On each trial, a rat was 
required to make two distinct nosepokes into a lit nosepoke hole within the 5-
hole array. Free-choice (three stock choices), paired-choice (two stock 
choices), and forced-choice (one stock choice) trials were randomly interleaved 
throughout the session. Each rat completed two blocks of trials: 1) a reference-
point establishment block lasting 15 trials and 2) a trading block with a 45-
minute duration from block onset.  
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Block 1 
At the start of a free-choice trial, the recessed nosepoke-hole LED lights of the 
three middle holes were illuminated to indicate that all three stocks were 
available for selection. The rat then made a ‘stock selection’ by poking its nose 
into one of the lit holes. The lights were then immediately extinguished for 2 
seconds. After this pause, the lights on both the left and right of the chosen 
hole, as well as the chosen hole itself, were re-illuminated. Rats then made an 
‘option selection’ by completing a second nosepoke into one of the three lit 
holes. Counter-balanced across subjects, rats poked into the left lit hole to 
select a ‘buy’ option and into the right lit hole to select a ‘sell’ option. The centre 
lit hole was always a ‘hold’ option. After an option was selected a reward tone 
and light indicated the availability of reward at the reward spigot. In order to 
establish a reference point, all trials in block 1 resulted in 0.15 ml of reward. 
Block 1 consisted of 15 trials, and all rats were required to complete all 15 trials 
before the cohort could progress to block 2. 
Block 2 
The trial structure of block 2 was similar to block 1, with the exception that rats 
received information about the market volume of each stock and could earn 
more or less reward than the 0.15 ml reference point depending on their stock 
and option selections. At the onset of a new trial, available stocks were 
indicated via blinking LED lights recessed in the nosepoke holes. The blink rate 
was proportional to the number of shares currently being held in that stock 
across all four rats (i.e. market volume). Rats were then able to select a stock 
by poking in one of the blinking holes. Once a ‘stock selection’ nosepoke was 
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made, the hole-lights were immediately extinguished and a 2-second pause 
ensued. After 2 seconds, the selected hole and the two adjacent holes (to the 
left and right) were once more illuminated, but no longer blinking. Rats 
nosepoked a second time into one of the illuminated holes to indicate either a 
buy, hold, or sell option. One of two tones immediately indicated whether this 
choice resulted in a gain or loss, and rats were free to lick at the reward spigot 
for reward. Movement time (MT) was measured from the onset of the tone to 
the onset of licking at the reward spigot. The volume of reward a rat received 
on a given trial was proportional to the amount gained or lost, added to the 
reference point.  
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Figure 33: Task Schematic: 
(A) In Block 1, a (free-choice) trial began 
with three centre nosepoke holes indicating 
the availability of stocks 1, 2, and 3. The rat 
then nosepoked in a lit hole to select a 
stock (here, stock 1), and the lights were 
immediately extinguished. After 2 sec, the 
selected hole and the adjacent holes on 
either side were illuminated, indicating that 
the rat could select an option to buy (B), 
hold (H), or sell (S). Once the rat poked to 
select an option, a tone immediately 
indicated that reward was available at the 
reward spigot. In block 1, rats always 
received 0.15 ml of reward in order to 
establish a reference point (RP).  
(B) In Block 2, hole lights blinked to indicate 
the market volume of a stock, whereby 
stocks with more total shares had faster 
blinking rates. As before, the rat nosepoked 
first to select a stock (1, 2, or 3) and again 
to subsequently select an option (buy, hold, 
or sell). After the second nosepoke, a gain 
or a loss tone immediately indicated the 
trial outcome. Movement time (MT) was 
measured from tone onset to lick onset at 
the reward spigot. The volume of reward 
delivered was greater than the RP for gains 
and less than the RP for losses. 
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Pricing 
When encountering a stock for the first time in a session, prices were arbitrarily 
set at 80, 140, and 200 for stock 1, 2 and 3, respectively. All rats were initially 
endowed with 100 shares of each stock. Prices in all boxes would update 
dynamically from that initial price point as rats bought or sold shares of a stock. 
A stock’s price depended on its total number of shares across all four rats 
(market volume), with greater market volumes leading to higher prices and 
lower market volumes resulting in lower prices. The price of a share at any 
given moment was equal to: 
Share Price = (Initial Price × Total # of Market Shares)/400 
The blink rate was a 50/50 on/off cycle (i.e. the time between each flash was 
equal to the flash length). The on/off time period is the reciprocal of blink rate 
(Hz): 
On/Off Period = [2/(Total # of Market Shares/100)] × 60 seconds 
Selling 
Take, for example, the investor that buys a stock at $100 and subsequently 
sells it at $110 for a $10 profit. Likewise, rats could choose the ‘sell’ option, 
which decremented the number of shares held by that rat by 10. In the task, if 
the price of a stock had increased from the last time that a rat selected that 
stock (or from the arbitrarily set price on an initial encounter), then the rat 
gained reward on that trial. The volume of reward received was calculated as 
the reference point (0.15 ml) plus the liquid equivalent of the profit. On the other 
hand, if the stock had decreased in price since it was last selected, the rat lost 
reward on that trial. The volume of reward received was calculated as the 
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reference point (0.15 ml) minus the liquid equivalent of the loss. In the event 
that a rat lost 0.15 ml of reward or more, it received nothing upon licking at the 
reward spigot. Rats were not allowed to ‘short-sell,’ i.e. in the event that a rat 
no longer held any shares of a selected stock, the ‘sell’ option was not 
illuminated and only the ‘buy’ or ‘hold’ option could be chosen. 
 A            Sell Option     C                 Buy Option 
      
B      D      
      
Figure 34: Trading  (A) The rat chooses the sell option and the price of a stock on the current trial (Pn) has 
increased since the previous trial (Pn-1), resulting in a gain. The rat receives the reference point (RP) plus 
the liquid equivalent of the profit gained from the sale. (B) The rat chooses the sell option but the price has 
decreased since the previous trial, resulting in a loss. The rat receives the RP minus the liquid equivalent 
of the loss incurred from the sale. (C) The rat chooses the buy option but the price has gone up since the 
previous encounter with that stock, which represents a loss. The rat receives the RP minus the price 
differential between the two time points. (D) The rat chooses the buy option and the price has gone down 
since it was previously encountered, which represents a gain. The rat receives the RP plus the price 
differential between the two time points. 
Buying 
Take, for example, the investor that has a chance to buy a stock at $100 but 
waits until the next day, only to find that it had gone up in price to $110. Or 
perhaps that the stock price had gone down to $90 and the waiting had paid 
off. Likewise, rats could choose the ‘buy’ option, which incremented the number 
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increased in price since the last encounter (or from the arbitrarily set price on 
an initial encounter) with that stock, then the rat lost reward on that trial. 
However, if the price of a stock had decreased since the previous selection, 
then the rat gained reward on that trial. Similar to the selling option, the amount 
that the rat received was equal to the reference point plus or minus the liquid 
equivalent of the gain or loss, respectively.  
Holding 
Rats also have the option of ‘holding’ on any given trial, which results in a 
‘dividend’ payment and no change in the number of shares being held in the 
selected stock. The dividend amount was based on the individual subject’s 
current share holdings of that stock, and had a 2/3 probability of being low (e.g. 
2% of holdings) and a 1/3 probability of being high (e.g. 6% of holdings). The 
dividend gains were the ‘safe’ option, but on average resulted in a smaller 
reward than could have been earned with either the buy or sell options. In the 
event that a rat no longer held any shares of a stock, the hold option delivered 
only the reference point 0.15 ml of reward. 
Data Analysis 
We compare individual choices and behaviour recorded over seven testing 
sessions. Since Block 1 was intended to set a reference point only, all analyses 
are performed on trials from Block 2 unless otherwise specified. We use 
repeated-measure ANOVAs in order to evaluate basic behaviour in the task, as 
well as the effects of our reference-point manipulation and any potential effects 
of loss aversion. In order facilitate comparison of rat behaviour with human 
behaviour, we also adapt the methodology used in the behavioural finance 
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literature (Barber & Odean, 2011; Odean, 1998) to evaluate any potential for 
the disposition effect. 
Summary Measures 
For summary measures, data were averaged per subject across the last seven 
testing sessions. Behavioural measures were: percentage choice of each 
stock, percentage choice of each option, movement time to collect reward 
(MT), choice errors (pokes in unlit holes), lick rate (Hz), inter-poke interval (IPI), 
and post-pump licking (PPL). PPL can be thought of as rats ‘savouring’ reward, 
and has been identified as a putative measure of ‘liking’ vs. ‘wanting.’ PPL is 
defined as the amount of time spent licking at the reward spigot after 
mechanical cessation of reward delivery. Greenhouse-Geisser corrections to p-
values have been applied where appropriate, although uncorrected p-values 
are reported for ease of comprehension. Trial durations > 40 seconds were 
omitted from analysis. 
Proportion of Realized Gains & Losses 
Adapted from Odean (1998), we calculated the proportion of gains realized 
(PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR) in order to establish whether 
rats exhibited the disposition effect (PGR > PLR) in our stock market task. 
Unlike the previous author, we perform these calculations on a subject-wise 
level. Odean (1998) computed PGR and PLR as: 
𝑃𝐺𝑅 = #  𝑜𝑓  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠#  𝑜𝑓  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 + #  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑔𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 
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𝑃𝐿𝑅 =    #  𝑜𝑓  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠#  𝑜𝑓  𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + #  𝑜𝑓  𝑝𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟  𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 
Above, the denominator represents the number of opportunities to realize a 
gain (loss). In the rat task, this is slightly less straightforward. Given the forced-
choice and paired-choice trials within a session, rats did not have the 
opportunity to realize a gain (or loss) on every stock on every trial. Therefore, 
the PGR (PLR) denominator was calculated on a stock-by-stock basis as any 
trial on which the rat had the opportunity to select and sell a stock that had 
gone up (down) in price since the previous purchase.  
Cox Proportional-Hazard Modelling 
The cox proportional-hazard model is a semi-parametric analysis that makes 
no assumption about the shape (e.g. linear) of the baseline hazard rate. This 
model has been employed in a number of behavioural finance studies (Barber 
& Odean, 2011; Feng & Seasholes, 2005; Shumway & Wu, 2005; Strahilevitz, 
Odean, & Barber, 2011) to characterize the likelihood of selling a stock in a 
time-series conditional on some factor (e.g. return magnitude and valence). 
The estimated model takes the following form: 
ℎ 𝑡, 𝑥 𝑡 = ℎ! 𝑡 exp  (𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!) 
where the hazard rate, h(t,x(t)), on trial t is conditional on p predictors. The β 
coefficients are estimated from the data. The main assumption of the model is 
that the hazards are proportionally dispersed at all time-points, but this model 
can be extended to include time-varying covariates (e.g. blink-rate). This model 
can also be stratified to incorporate repeated-measures designs, which has 
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been done here. From this model, one can predict the hazard ratio of a subject 
choosing to sell a given stock at time t for each covariate k as: 
exp 𝛽! =   ℎ! 𝑡 exp  (𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+   𝛽! 𝑥! + 1 +⋯+   𝛽!𝑥!)ℎ! 𝑡 exp  (𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥! +⋯+ 𝛽!𝑥!)  
Here, the hazard ratio, exp(βk), is the ratio of two stocks with the same k 
covariates and where the numerator stock has an xk that is one unit greater 
than the denominator (Barber & Odean, 2011). To maximize the potential of the 
model, a continuous variable (such as return on sale) can be transformed into 
dummy variables that represent 4% wide bins, taking on the value of 1 on trials 
that fall into that range and 0 otherwise. This allows the model to isolate the 
marginal hazard contributed by each bin when all other bins are zero. The 
reader is referred to Cox and Oakes (1984) for further details on the Cox 
Proportional Hazard analysis. For any sale trial x, return on sale was calculated 
as: 
𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛(𝑥) =   𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!"#$ − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!"#$!!"#𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒!"#$!!"#  
where the difference in current sale price and previous purchase price was 
averaged relative to the previous purchase price. Trials were included in the 
analysis only if the selected stock had been purchased at least once previously. 
The model was stratified over subject, stock, and session to account for the 
effects of the repeated-measures design. Blink rate, counterfactual reward, and 




Cumulatively, rats (N=24) completed 19,323 trials over the course of 7 testing 
sessions. On average, rats completed 115.02 (SD = 27.96) trials and earned 
18.78 ml (SD = 4.75 ml) of reward per session. The mean trial duration was 
19.62 (SD = 1.91) seconds. This equated to an average rate of reward of 3.36 
(SD = 0.39) µl per trial second over the 45-minute duration of Block 2. During 
trading (i.e. when a buy or sell option was selected), rats received a profit on 
nearly 2/3rd of trials (63.53%) and a loss on 36.47% of trials. Although rats 
profited on a greater proportion of trials, rats lost an average of 0.052 (SD = 
0.005) ml per trial while profiting only 0.026 (SD = 0.006) ml of reward on 
average (MDifference = 0.027 ml, SEM = 0.001 ml). The results of a paired-sample 
t-test indicated that rats lost significantly more reward than they gained on 
average, t(23) = 21.04, p < .001. Rats that lost more reward on average did not 
also gain more reward on average, Pearson’s r = .37, p = .08.  
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Example price fluctuations of three stocks in a rat stock market 
     
Figure 35 depicts share price fluctuations during a single testing session from one cohort of four rats. Each 
coloured line represents the evolution of price (in arbitrary units) of the three stocks over the course of the 
45-minute session. From the graph, it is apparent that stock prices move both up and down over time. 
Since price is a function of market volume, the steep decreasing price of the blue line represents 
continuous sales of shares in that stock (i.e. lower market volume) up until about minute 24. After that 
point, sales of the blue stock level out and rats begin buying shares of it again, causing share price to 
begin a slow recovery. 
Rats nosepoked in error an average of 1.88 (SD = 0.29) times per trial, with the 
error occurring either during stock/option selection or during the 2 second 
pause between stock and option selection. To ensure that these errors did not 
reflect a lack of understanding about the task demands (i.e. poking twice in a lit 
nosepoke hole, but not in an unlit nosepoke hole) that was subject to learning 
over further training sessions, a repeated-measures ANOVA was performed on 
error rate with Session (7 levels) as the within-subject variable. A significant 
effect would potentially suggest that rats were learning over the course of the 
sessions. However, the results indicate that there were no significant 
differences in error rates across the seven testing sessions (F(6,138) = 1.45, p = 













affective/cognitive factors (e.g. frustrative non-reward, impulsivity, exploration, 
habit, etc.) rather than a misunderstanding of the task.  
At the beginning of any given testing session, each of the three centre 
nosepoke holes was randomly assigned stock 1, 2 or 3. This remained 
constant throughout the session. It is therefore possible that over many 
sessions, rats could develop a preference for a stock based on its original 
starting price. However, we did not find any indication that rats developed 
preferences for a particular stock across testing sessions. On free-choice trials, 
the average proportion of trials that subjects chose Stock 1, 2, and 3 were 
distributed tightly around chance at .33, .35, and .32, respectively. There was 
no significant effect of Stock on choice (F(2,46) = 0.51, p = NS).  
Manipulation check: Trading payoffs are greater than dividend 
payoffs 
When a rat chose to hold a selected stock instead of a trade option, it received 
a dividend payout. Dividends were calculated as a percentage of the rats’ 
current holdings of the selected stock. Theoretically, the percentage paid was 
sufficiently small that the expected value of a hold option was on average 
distinctly lower than that of either a buy or a sell option. As a manipulation 
check to ensure that this played out in reality, we analysed the average reward 
earned per trial second under each option using a repeated-measures ANOVA 
with Option (3 levels: Buy, Hold and Sell) as the within-subject variable.  
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Rats earn more reward when trading as compared to holding 
 
Figure 36: On average, rats earned almost twice as much reward per trial second when selecting a trade 
option (buy or sell) as compared to a hold option. 
As theorized, we found that the proportion of trials on which each option was 
selected had a highly significant effect on rate of reward, F(2,46) = 48.30, ηp2 = 
.68, p < .001. Either trading option was nearly 50% more profitable than the 
hold option (p < .001 for both contrasts), with the hold option averaging 1.73 
µl/trial sec and the buy and sell options averaging 2.69 µl/trial sec and 2.84 
µl/trial sec, respectively. Neither buying nor selling more resulted in significantly 
greater payoff rates than the other (MDifference = 0.14 µl/trial sec, p = .33). Using 
the variability of outcome volume as a measure of an option’s risk, we found 
that the sell option was the most risky (σ2 = .0028) although not significantly 
more so than the buy option (σ2 = .0026, p=NS). As intended, the hold option 
was a much safer option (σ2 = .0006), leading to the average reward more than 
four times more reliably than either of the trade options. 
The transaction cost of trading within the task  
Within the operant boxes, the spatial location of the buy and sell options on 
either side of the hold option may have added a temporal disadvantage to 
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trading. Although such a disadvantage could potentially increase the face 
validity of the task when translating to human behaviour (e.g. due to transaction 
costs), we endeavoured to identify and quantify such a cost, should it exist. 
Since the hold option involved poking for a second time in the same nosepoke 
hole, the inter-poke interval (IPI) was shorter on hold trials (M = 2.42 sec, SEM 
= 0.05 sec) compared to buy (M = 2.76 sec, SEM = 0.06 sec) and sell (M = 
2.66 sec, SEM = 0.07 sec) trials. A repeated measures ANOVA with Option as 
a within-subjects factor revealed that there was a significant main effect of 
Option on IPI, F(2,46) = 7.81, ηp2 = .25, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p < .01. 
Planned contrasts determined that this effect was primarily due to the 
significant differences between hold trials and each buy (p < .001) and sell (p < 
.01) trials. We found no significant difference between buy and sell IPI’s. Thus, 
while the added cost of trading compared to holding may be small (MDifference = 
285.5 msec), it is nonetheless significant.  
Given that the 2 sec pause also allows ample time to move between spatial 
locations, it may also be possible that this difference represents deliberation 
time. Although the task design does not allow us to conclude with certainty one 
way or the other, evidence of this lies in the discrepancy between IPI after a 
gain (M = 2.49 sec, SEM = 0.08) vs. after a loss (M = 2.79, SEM = 0.11). A 2-
way repeated-measures ANOVA of IPI with Previous Outcome and Current 
Option indicated that both Previous Outcome (F(1,23) = 4.54, ηp2 = .17, p < .05) 
and Current Option (F(2,46) = 6.06, ηp2 = .21, Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted p = 
.01) had significant main effects on IPI. The interaction term was not significant 
(F(2,46) = 1.50, p = .23). Therefore, rats take longer to deliberate between 
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options on trials preceded by a loss, and this effect is independent of option 
choice.  
Rats exhibit reference-dependent behaviour 
Within the task, a rat could incur losses and gains based on its stock and option 
selection. After the rat had made its selections, the profit (loss) was translated 
into a liquid equivalent and added to (subtracted from) a 0.15 ml reference 
point. To determine whether or not rats’ behaviour demonstrated reference-
dependence, we evaluated the movement time (MT) to collect reward after the 
tone onset. Given that even loss trials resulted in reward, there should be no 
observable difference in MT after a loss tone vs. gain tone if rats did not form a 
reference point at 0.15 ml. The exception to this would be trials where a rat 
incurred a very large loss (greater than the liquid equivalent of 0.15 ml), 
resulting in a payoff of zero reward. However, such trials represent on average 
only 0.7% of all trials encountered by the animals and are therefore unlikely to 
strongly bias such behaviour.  
We performed a repeated-measures ANOVA on rats’ mean MT with Current 
Outcome (3 levels: loss, gain and dividend) as a within-subjects factor. The 
results indicate that the outcome signalled by the gain/loss tone has a large 
significant effect on movement time to reward (F(2,46) = 43.88, ηp2 = .66, 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected p < .001). Rats were 1.73 sec (SEM = 0.25 sec) 
faster to collect a dividend reward compared to a trading loss reward (p < .001), 
and 1.51 sec (SEM = 0.22 sec) faster to collect a trading gain reward compared 
to a trading loss reward (p < .001). There was no significant difference between 
MT after a trading gain and a dividend gain (p = .13).  
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Rats are faster to collect a gain reward than a loss reward 
A            B 
     
Figure 37: (A) Upon hearing a gain tone (as the outcome of either a trading profit or a dividend payout), 
rats moved ~2 sec faster from the tone onset to collect reward from the spigot on the opposing wall. This is 
contrasted with rats’ average movement time to reward after a loss tone. (B) The trend is alternatively 
displayed in 0.025 ml reward bins, with grey circles indicating movement time to collect reward after a gain 
and white circles indicating movement time after a loss. ***p<.001, NS = Not Significant. 
In support of these analyses, we also found other behavioural measures 
suggestive of reference-dependency. For instance, we observed that rats spent 
on average 250 msec longer licking at the reward spigot (PPL) on a gain trial 
compared to a loss trial (t(23) = 4.68, p < .001), suggesting that rats ‘savoured’ 
the gain rewards more (Wilson et al., 2006). Animals also increased the 
number of erroneous pokes into unlit holes on trials with a loss outcome (M = 
2.60 pokes/trial, SEM = 0.14) with respect to a gain (M = 2.06 pokes/trial, SEM 
= 0.13), which was supported by a paired-sample t-test t(23) = 5.63, p < .001. 
This suggests that the erroneous pokes observed in our task are in part an 
affective response to losses (e.g. frustrative nonreward). Together, these 




































Rats are more risk-seeking after a loss than after a gain (loss-
aversion) 
We next analysed rats’ choices on a trial-by-trial basis to determine whether or 
not individual animals’ behaviour was significantly affected by a previous loss 
compared to a previous gain. Under Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979), loss aversion manifests in repeated gambles as an individual’s 
increased propensity to take risks following a loss. Thus, we analysed whether 
there were any differences in choices of the risky trade options vs. the safe 
hold option on trials with a previous loss vs. previous gain. We performed a 2-
way repeated-measures ANOVA on the mean proportion of trials that each 
option was chosen. Within-subject variables were the Current Option (3 levels: 
Buy, Hold and Sell) and Previous Outcome (2 levels: Gain and Loss). The 
analysis indicates that rats chose the hold option on a greater proportion of 
trials overall (Effect of Current Option: F(2,46) = 37.81, ηp2 = .62, p < .001), but 
that this effect was attenuated by a previous loss trial compared with a previous 
gain trial (Interaction Effect of CurrentOption*PreviousOutcome: F(2,46) = 10.63, 
ηp2 = .32, p < .001). We subsequently performed paired-sample t-tests to 
assess individual contrasts. On trials with a previous loss, rats reduced their 
choice of the safer hold option by nearly 10% compared to trials with a previous 
gain (Loss: 43.1% vs. Gain: 51.7%, t(23) = 3.99, p = .001). Instead, rats were 
increasingly likely to choose the riskier buy (Loss: 29.6% vs. Gain: 24.6%, t(23) 









We were therefore able to use the difference between the proportions of trials 
on which the hold option was chosen after a gain vs. after a loss as a proxy 
measure of loss aversion. This measure also correlated with a general bias 
against selection of the buy and sell options (Pearson’s r = -.54, p < .01). We 
found that this individual measure of loss aversion was also negatively 
Figure 38: (A) On trials immediately 
preceded by a gain, rats select the 
‘safe’ hold option on 51% of trials. The 
remaining proportions of choices were 
distributed evenly between the buy 
(25%) and sell (24%) trading options. 
When the current trial was preceded by 
a loss, rats chose the hold option nearly 
10% less overall. Instead, rats 
increased selection of the two trade 
options. Since the trade options are 
associated with more variability in 
reward volume, this redistribution of 
choices represents a general shift 
toward more risk-seeking behaviour. 
Post-hoc paired-sample t-tests 
revealed significant differences 
between previous gains and loss at 
each the buy (t(23)=2.64, p<.05), hold 
(t(23)=3.99, p=.001) and sell 
(t(23)=2.38, p<.05) options. *p<.05, 
***p<.001 
(B) As an individual measure of loss 
aversion, we calculated the difference 
in proportion of choices between gains 
and losses in the hold option shown in 
Figure 5a above. Loss aversion was 
negatively correlated with average rate 
of reward earned per unit of time 
across sessions (Pearson’s r = -.54, 
p<.01). In a linear regression analysis, 
individual loss aversion significantly 
accounted for nearly 30% of average 




Loss-averse behaviour in rats 
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correlated with the average rate of reward that a given rat earned per session 
(Pearson’s r = -.54, p < .01). A simple linear regression analysis revealed that 
loss aversion was a significant predictor of lower volumes of reward per trial 
second, R2adj = .26, β = -.54, and where the equation was significant: F(1,22) = 
8.95, p < .01. This indicates that loss aversion was disadvantageous in the 
task. 
Rats perform suboptimally when trading 
In the task, rats were given information about the market volume of a stock (i.e. 
the cumulative number of shares being held by all four rats) via the relative 
frequency of blinking LED lights. Lights blinked faster as rats bought more 
shares of a stock, and slower as rats sold shares of a stock. It was therefore 
necessary to investigate whether rats were capable of using memory of blink 
rates from previous trials to guide behaviour on a current trial (i.e. contrasting 
the previous blink rate with the current blink rate). Within the task, an optimal 
strategy would be to sell when a stock price has gone up since the previous 
trial, to buy when the stock has gone down since the previous trial, and to hold 
when the stock has made no change in price. Note that due to the interleaved 
forced-choice trials, rats did not always see the price of a given stock on every 
trial. Thus, Price Change was calculated as the difference between the price of 
the selected stock on the current trial and the price of the selected stock on last 
trial that it had been selected, and not necessarily the trial directly preceding it.  
We carried out a 2-way repeated-measures ANOVA with direction of Price 
Change (3 levels: No Change, Up, Down) and average proportion of trials on 
which an Option (3 levels: Buy, Hold, Sell) was chosen as within-subject 
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factors. The average count of each the buy, hold and sell options per rat were 
included as covariates to control for potential effects of individual rates of 
trading vs. holding.  
As previously discussed (see Figure 38a), rats chose the hold option on 
average on about half of all trials. This serves as an immediate indicator that 
rats are neither performing optimally nor randomly (33%) in the task. The 
results of this analysis indicated that the strong preference for the hold option 
did not significantly change between conditions, although it was slightly higher 
in the no change condition (M = 54.78%, SE = 0.76%) than conditions where 
the price increased (M = 51.68%, SE = 0.73%) or decreased (M = 50.73%, SE 
= 0.96%). Overall, there was no significant interaction between Price Change 
and the Option Choice (F(4,80) = 0.58, p = .68).  
We also classified option selection decisions based on whether the decision 
was optimal or suboptimal given the change of price from the previous trial 
(illustrated in the right panel of Figure 39b). A repeated measures ANOVA was 
carried out on the proportion of optimal decisions resulting from choice of each 
the buy, hold and sell options, with Option (3 levels: Buy, Hold, Sell) as a 
within-subject factor. Post-hoc one-sample t-tests were carried out to establish 
significance of sample means from chance (33%). Although we did observe an 
increase in the proportion of optimal hold decisions (M = 36.95%, SE = 1.22%) 
compared to buy and sell decisions, the main effect fell short of significance 
(Option: F(2,46) = 2.95, p = .06). On average, rats’ optimal decisions to buy (M = 
31.85%, SEM = 1.47%) and to sell (M = 32.30%, SEM = 1.48%) did not differ 
from chance (33%). However, the increased selection of the hold option on 
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trials with no change led to optimal responding that significantly exceeded 
chance (M 37.00%, SEM = 1.23%, t(23) = 2.95, p < .01), although this should 
be interpreted with caution given the lack of significance in the ANOVA results. 
Overall, these group-level analyses suggest that rats did not learn to perform 
optimally according to the task contingencies.   
A    B 
          
Figure 39: Optimal performance in the task would reflect three strategies: 1) to hold on trials where there 
has been no price change, 2) to choose the buy option when price had gone down, and 3) the sell option 
when price had gone up. (A) At the group level, there were no significant differences in the mean 
proportion of choices of each the buy/hold/sell options relative to the selected stock’s price change from 
the previous trial. Overall, rats chose the hold option on 52.4% of trials. (B) At the group level (right panel, 
N=24 rats), rats performed around chance when choosing the buy and sell options, with a modest increase 
in optimal hold responding that exceeded chance (t(23)=2.95, p<.01). Cluster analysis (left panel) 
classified three subsets of rats based on optimal responding in either the sell (Cluster 1, N=12), hold 
(Cluster 2, N=7) or buy (Cluster 3, N=5) option. Thus, it appears that different individuals learned one of 
the three optimal strategies, often at the expense of another. Dotted lines at 33% represent chance. Error 
bars represent 95% CI’s. 
We then investigated whether there were any subsets of rats that had learned a 
partial strategy. Given that there were three optimal learning rules (buy when 
down, sell when up, and hold when there is no change), it stood to reason that 
individuals learned one or even two of the strategies without learning all three. 
We performed a hierarchical cluster analysis with the squared Euclidean 
distance of the average linkage (between groups) method on the percentage of 
optimal responses when selecting each the buy, hold, and sell options.  
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We identified three clusters (see left hand panel of Figure 39b) based on these 
three indices. Rats in cluster 1 (N=12) exhibited increased optimal selling 
behaviour, but also suboptimal sell behaviour and chance hold performance. 
Rats in cluster 2 (N=7) learned to hold optimally, but sell behaviour suffered 
and choice of the buy option did not differ from random behaviour. Cluster 3 
(N=5) exhibited high optimal performance when choosing the buy option, while 
optimal choice of the sell and hold options was at chance. We performed a 
mixed 2-way ANOVA with Option Choice (3 levels: Buy, Hold, Sell) as a within-
subjects factor and Cluster as a between-subjects factor. A significant 
interaction between Option Choice and Cluster (F(2,42) = 25.92, ηp2 = .71, p < 
.001) confirmed that the cluster analysis was able to account for over 70% of 
the variance in optimal responding between options. Furthermore, planned 
contrasts revealed a strong interaction between optimal responding in the buy 
and sell options within each cluster (F(2,42) = 48.99, ηp2 = .82, p < .001), which 
suggests that rats learned either to buy or sell at the expense of the other. 
Together, these analyses suggest that rats were capable of both perceiving 
and learning from changes in blink rate, but that individual rats learned only one 
of three optimal strategies. Rats had particular difficulties learning both the 
optimal buy and sell strategies together, which makes sense given that the 
optimal buy and sell strategies require the same operational response, but the 
opposite instrumental response, to the other.  
We next sought to investigate the possibility that optimal responding could be 
driven by responses to market information from the current trial alone. In other 
words, we sought to clarify whether rats’ decisions to buy/hold/sell were based 
on the change in volume between trials or rather on the current volume alone. 
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We began by investigating whether rats chose stocks with greater market 
volumes on average, which could reflect a potential confound in stimulus 
saliency and stock selection (i.e. faster blink rates lead to a greater proportion 
of choices). We established the mean difference in chosen vs. unchosen stock 
volumes by subtracting the average unchosen stock volumes from the average 
chosen stock volume on a subject-wise basis. On average, the chosen option 
had a total volume that was 3.00 stocks (SEM = 4.11 stocks) greater than the 
average of the two unchosen options. A one-sample t-test revealed that this 
was not significantly different from zero, t(23) = 0.73, p = .47. Thus, we could 
conclude that rats’ initial stock choice was not a function of its current volume. 
We then carried out a Univariate ANOVA with mean difference in chosen and 
unchosen stock volumes as the dependent variable and cluster as a between 
subjects variable. The results indicated that there was no significant effect of 
cluster on the mean difference of chosen vs. unchosen stocks (F(2,21) = 0.50, p 
= .95). This suggests that there was no significant effect of stimulus saliency 
(i.e. blink rate)/market information (i.e. market volume) on the initial poke (i.e. 
stock choice) in isolation. 
In order to investigate whether rats’ reacted to changes in market information in 
their combined first and second pokes (i.e. the choice to buy, hold, or sell the 
selected stock), we began by performing a mixed ANOVA on the market 
volume of the selected stocks at each Chosen Option (within-subjects, 3 levels: 
buy, hold, sell) with Cluster as a between-subjects factor. The results indicate 
that there was a main effect of option (F(2,42) = 3.32, ηp2 = .14, p < .05), and 
planned contrasts revealed that this effect was primarily driven by significant 
differences in chosen volume between the buy and sell options (F(2,21) = 7.17, 
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ηp2 = .26, p < .05). We found that the average market volume of a selected 
stock was significantly lower when a rat chose to sell compared to when it 
chose to buy (MDifference = 8.71 shares, SE = 3.25 shares), and that this did not 
significantly differ between clusters (Option*Cluster: F(4,42) = .85, p = .50). If 
optimal responding was the product of decisions on a single trial, we would 
expect rats to chose the sell option more often at higher market volumes and 
the buy option more often and lower market volumes. Given that we observe 
the opposite effect here, we can conclude that optimal responding in the task 
was not the result of rats learning a general rule to buy at low blink rates and to 
sell at high blink rates.  
Given that we utilized blinking lights to convey market information, it is not 
possible to decouple changes in information content from changes in 
information saliency in the current task. Acknowledging this point, we modelled 
the likelihood that a rat would buy or sell based on the market volume and 
information saliency (i.e. Blinking Hz) on any given trial. We employed the Cox 
Proportional Hazard model to identify the hazard ratio of buying or selling 
(separately) at varying blink rates. Here, we create dummy variables for each 
stock on every free-choice trial according to its current blink rate.  The dummy 
variables span from <0.75 to ≥4.00 Hz in 0.25 Hz bins. A bin with a hazard ratio 
of 1 corresponds to a null effect on the trading choice. Hazard ratios above 1 
indicate that the likelihood of buying/selling is higher in that blink rate range, 
while hazard ratios below 1 denote a reduced likelihood of trading in that range 
of blink rates. Stratifying over subjects, we also included either buy count (for 







Figure 40: (A) The blink rate of any given stock significantly increased the hazard of purchase at rates 
below 1.5 Hz. Increased purchase rates at slower blink Hz translates to rats buying stocks with lower 
market volumes and lower prices more frequently. When blink rates exceed 3.25 Hz, subjects were 
significantly less likely to select the buy option. See Table 14 in Appendix 4 for further particulars 
regarding model coefficients and p-values. (B) The hazard of selling a stock was significantly increased at 
average blink rates between 1.75 Hz and 2.75 Hz and at high blink rates above 3.25 Hz. There was no 
significant effect of market information/salience on selection of the sale option at blink rates below 1.75 
Hz. See Table 15 in Appendix 4 for further details regarding model coefficients and p-values.  
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In Figures 39a-b, it is apparent that market information/saliency has less of an 
effect on trading at average values, but has a high impact on rats’ choices at 
the extremes (either blinking very fast or very slow). Rats are more likely to 
purchase a stock at very low market volume (slow blink rates) and less likely to 
buy a stock that has much greater market volume (fast blink rates). This is 
equivalent to buying an undervalued stock and not buying an overvalued stock. 
The opposite is true for sales, whereby rats are significantly more likely to sell a 
stock when it has either an average market value between 1.75 – 2.75 Hz, or a 
particularly large market value above 3.25 Hz. From these analyses, we 
conclude that rats’ trading behaviour is sensitive to large changes in market 
information, and that this behaviour conforms to both explanations of rational 
trading (e.g. buying stocks that are undervalued) and stimulus saliency. 
However, we cannot conclude that rats respond optimally within the blink rates 
centred around the mean. Given these results and those of our previous 
ANOVA of average chosen market volume, it is likely that rats did not 
dissociate between small differences in blink rate, but did dissociate between 
particularly large differences in blink rate. 
Rats exhibit the disposition effect 
In actual stock markets, empirical research suggests that humans behave 
suboptimally in sell decisions depending on whether the potential return is 
positive or negative (i.e. the disposition effect). In the simulated rat stock 
market presented here, the return on an ‘investment’ can be determined by 
evaluating price changes over the series of trials between a choice of the buy 
option and a subsequent sell option. Over the 7 testing sessions, returns from 
selling a stock ranged from -57.1% to 26.5% (SD = 8.5%), with an average 
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return of 0.3%. Here, we have a first indication that rats may exhibit something 
akin to the disposition effect based on the negative bias in the range of 
experienced outcomes. If rats held losses for too long – or rather, persistently 
avoided the sell option over successive trials – this would increase the potential 
for more negative returns once a loss was finally realized. Alternatively, if rats 
were selling gains too quickly, they would not get the chance to experience an 
equivalent level of positive returns. To further this line of inquiry, we follow the 
methodology of behavioural finance studies based on human subjects (e.g. 
Barber & Odean, 2011; Frydman et al., 2014; Odean, 1998).  
We begin by determining PGR and PLR for each rat across each stock and 
session (see Methods). We found that rats had an average PGR of .12 (SEM = 
.02) and an average PLR of .09 (SEM = .01). We then calculated the average 
difference between PGR and PLR per subject. There was no significant 
correlation (Figure 41a) between PGR and PLR, (Pearson’s r = .33, p = .12). 
The results of a paired-sample t-test reveal that individual rats realize gains 
significantly more often than they realize losses, t(23) = 2.22, p < .05.  
As often observed in human studies, we found that individual subjects exhibited 
a range of disposition effect strengths. Effect sizes ranged from -.09 to .23 (M = 
.04, SEM  = .02), with higher positive values indicating stronger tendencies to 
hold losses too long and sell gains too quickly. This effect (Figure 41b) was not 
significantly correlated with greater average volumes of reward per trial second 
(Pearson’s r = .10, p = .65). There were also no correlations between 
disposition effect strength and subjects’ average proportion of sales per 
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session (Pearson’s r = .13, p = .53) or overall proportion of trades (vs. holds) 
per session (Pearson’s r = .30, p = .15).  
A      B
   
Figure 41: (A) The proportion of gains realized (PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR) were not 
significantly correlated within individual subjects (Pearson’s r = .33, p = .12). (B) The disposition effect, 
calculated as the difference between PGR and PLR, was not significantly correlated with increased or 
decreased rates of reward (µl/trial sec), Pearson’s r = .10, p = .65.  
Our analysis of the disposition effect proceeded by fitting a Cox Proportional 
Hazards model (see Methods). Here, we create dummy variables for each 
stock on every trial according to its current return (in the case of a realized 
sale) or its current potential for return (in the case of an unrealized sale).  The 
dummy variables span from <-22% to ≥18% return in bins spanning 4% each. 
A bin with a hazard ratio of 1 corresponds to a null effect on the trading choice. 
Hazard ratios lying significantly above 1 indicate that the likelihood of 
buying/selling is higher in that range of returns, while hazard ratios below 1 
denote a reduced likelihood of trading in that range of returns. Stratifying over 
subject, stock, and session, we also included the subjects’ sales count and 
counterfactual reward as time-varying covariates in the model. Counterfactual 
rewards represent the volume of reward a rat could have earned had it chosen 
 175 
a different option. Interestingly, the addition of counterfactual reward 
significantly increased the model’s R2 from .57 to .65 (χ2(1) = 635.23, p < .001). 
This suggests that rats’ choices were influenced by the potential reward 
outcome of non-selected actions.  
 
Figure 42: The hazard ratio that a rat selects the sale option on any given trial as a function of return. The 
hazard rate for each return bin is calculated relative to zero return. Peaking around 14% returns, rats are 
up to 500% more likely to sell a stock when returns are positive. The opposite is true in the case of 
negative returns, whereby subjects demonstrate an increasing disposition against realizing losses as 
returns become more negative. To facilitate comparison, the inset at the top-left depicts typical human 
behaviour (e.g. Barber & Odean, 2011). See table 13 in Appendix 4 for further particulars regarding model 
coefficients and p-values. 
 
Figure 42 illustrates the ‘hazard’ of an animal selling a stock on a given trial 
based on the potential returns. Similar to human behaviour, rats are more likely 
to sell a stock at a gain than at a loss. An interesting deviation from human 
behaviour however, is the observation that rats are far less willing to sell at a 
loss. While this rather robust effect may represent a learned avoidance of 
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and overview to ascertain that selecting the sale option at a loss will reduce the 
potential for larger future losses. 
In order to determine whether loss aversion might be driving the disposition 
effect, we analysed the partial correlations between individual measures of loss 
aversion and the disposition effect while controlling for trading frequency. We 
found no significant correlation (Pearson’s r =.15, p = .51).  This suggests that 
loss aversion does not lead to the disposition effect in our task. We speculate 
as to the potential cause of disposition effect-related behaviour further in the 
discussion. 
Finally, we investigated whether the three different optimal strategies learned 
by each subset of rats also represented valid clusters with regard to the 
strength of their individual behavioural biases (i.e. the disposition effect, loss 
aversion, and anchoring). We conducted separate Univariate ANOVA’s with 
individual measures of each of the three behavioural biases as dependent 
variables and Cluster membership as a between-subjects variable. To attain a 
single individual measure of the anchoring effect, we computed the difference 
between average latency to collect reward after a trading loss vs. gain (MTLoss – 
MTGain) per rat. The results of our analyses are illustrated in Figures 43a-c.  
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Figure 43: The composition of individual measures of three behavioural biases was examined across 
clusters, where: Cluster 1 (N=12) responded optimally when selling, Cluster 2 (N=7) responded optimally 
while holding and Cluster 3 (N=5) responded optimally while buying. (A) There was a significant main 
effect of cluster membership on individual disposition effect measures, F(2,21)=17.13, ηp2=.62, p<.001. Rats 
that sold optimally (Cluster 1) exhibited a significantly greater disposition effect than those that learned to 
hold (p<.001) or sell (p<.01) optimally. There was no significant difference in the disposition effect between 
rats in Clusters 2 and 3 (p=NS). (B) There was no significant main effect of cluster membership on 
individual loss aversion (F(2,23)=1.69, p=NS) or (C) on anchoring (F(2,21)=1.91, p=NS), but these effects may 
have been obscured by the relatively low number of animals in Cluster 3 (N=5). Error bars represent 95% 
CI’s. 
We found that individual measures of the disposition effect varied significantly 
between clusters, F(2,21)=17.13, ηp2=.62, p<.001, (Figure 43a). Interestingly, 
planned contrasts revealed that rats with the highest proportion of optimal 
responding during selling also demonstrated the highest strengths of the 
disposition effect (M = 0.33, SE = 0.05) compared to clusters 2 (p < .001) and 3 
(p < .01). Therefore, we cannot argue that rats exhibit the disposition effect due 
to a lack of understanding about how to sell optimally in the task. In fact, those 
rats that learned to hold optimally (Cluster 2) and buy optimally (Cluster 3) 
exhibited negative disposition effects on average (M = -0.08, SE = .06 and M = 
-0.06, SE = .08, respectively). This indicates that rats in clusters 2 and 3 
realized losses slightly more quickly than gains on average, although not 
significantly so.  
Loss aversion was expressed most strongly in rats from Cluster 2 (M = 0.15, 
SE = .04). Rats in clusters 1 and 3 exhibited relatively lower levels of loss 
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aversion (Cluster 1: M = .06, SE = .03; Cluster 2: M = .07, SE = .05). While this 
trend was interesting, the results of the Univariate ANOVA indicated that 
individual measures of loss aversion did not significantly vary between clusters, 
F(2,23)=1.69, p = .21. Similarly, we found that the anchoring effect was strongest 
in Cluster 2 (M = 1.98, SEM = 0.39) compared to clusters 1 and 2 (M =1.53, 
SEM = 0.30; M = 0.80, SEM = 0.46, respectively). However, these differences 
were not significant, (F(2,21)=1.91, p=NS). It should be noted that the relatively 
small number of rats that learned to choose the buy option optimally (Cluster 3, 
N = 5) might have obscured potential significant effects. 
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Discussion 
In this paper we develop a reinforcement-learning task that creates a simulated 
stock market between cohorts of four rats ‘trading’ in networked operant boxes. 
Our results suggest that rodents successfully establish a reference point in 
Block 1, which has never before been demonstrated in rats. In Block 2, we 
found that certain subsets of rats learned an optimal buy, hold, or sell strategy 
(but not all three together). Our analyses indicate that rats exhibited two further 
suboptimal patterns of behaviour that are well-established in humans (and to 
some extent in non-human primates as well, see Santos and Platt (2014) for a 
review), but have never before been explicitly demonstrated in rodents: 1)  
loss-aversion, and 2) the disposition effect. Thus, rats not only demonstrated 
reference-dependency (otherwise known as anchoring) to experimenter-
determined expectations in the current task, but the animals also became more 
risk seeking on trials immediately preceded by a loss, as predicted by loss 
aversion in Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Furthermore, we 
also found that rats had a tendency to hold on to their losses for too long while 
selling their winners too soon – behaviour that is hallmark of the disposition 
effect in humans. This effect was primarily exhibited by rats that had learned 
the optimal sell strategy, which suggests that it was unlikely the result of 
random selling behaviour in the task, but rather a natural consequence of 
selling behaviour that was focused on short-term profits rather than long-term 
returns. Together, these results suggest that behavioural biases such as 
anchoring, loss aversion and the disposition effect are more deeply rooted in 
humanity’s evolutionary past than previously considered.   
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Reference Dependence (Anchoring) 
At the start of every testing session, rats completed a block of 15 trials that 
always resulted in a set volume of 0.15 ml sweet liquid reward. Block 1 was 
intended to establish a reference point for the subsequent trading block. To 
facilitate this, rewards less than 0.15 ml were paired with a loss tone, while 
rewards at or above 0.15 ml were paired with a gain tone during Block 2. 
Although the average loss trial still resulted in an average of 0.10 ml reward, 
rats took about 2 sec longer (~10% of the average trial time) to collect reward 
after hearing a loss tone as opposed to a gain tone. Before even experiencing 
the amount of reward, rats’ lugubrious approach after hearing the loss tone 
implies that the stimulus reshaped expectations about the desirability of the 
reward. Thus, rats’ behaviour is consistent with the idea that the loss tone 
conceptually reframed the 0.10 ml reward as a 0.05 ml loss. 
Aside from moving more slowly to collect reward, rats react to trading losses in 
other quantifiable ways as well. This is evinced by the observation that rats 
significantly increase the number of erroneous pokes into unlit holes on losing 
trials. Such responses may represent a frustrative reaction to the aversive 
stimulus (Amsel, 1958; Rescorla, 1992), despite the fact that animals are still 
receiving positive reward on (nearly all) loss trials. While it may be argued that 
animals find the tone itself aversive, this would not explain why rats move more 
slowly to collect reward. Furthermore, rats spend less time licking at the reward 
spigot (PPL) after a loss reward delivery compared to a gain reward delivery. 
PPL is thought to reflect the notion of ‘savouring’ in rats (Wilson et al., 2006), 
which would imply that rats savour losses less so than they do gains. All of 
these measures suggest that rats not only have the cognitive capacity to exhibit 
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reference-dependent behaviour, but that reference-dependent behaviour has 
been selected for throughout mammalian evolution.  
Loss Aversion 
In repeated gambles, loss aversion biases an individual toward risk-seeking 
behaviour on events preceded by a loss. After establishing that the hold option 
was associated with a lower variance in rate of reward (i.e. less risky) 
compared to either of the trade options, we conducted a trial-by-trial analysis to 
determine whether rats increased risk-seeking behaviour subsequent to a loss 
trial. On trials immediately preceded by a loss trial, we found that rats 
significantly decreased the average proportion of hold trials, choosing instead 
one of the riskier trade options (i.e. buy or sell). This serves as direct evidence 
that rats exhibit loss aversion.  
Furthermore, individual measures of loss aversion were negatively correlated 
with the average rate of reward that a rat earned per session and accounted for 
over 25% of the variability in observed reward rates. While we found no 
significant group-level preferences between the three stocks as differentiated 
by their starting prices, future studies could also manipulate the inherent 
riskiness of each stock in order to determine whether loss aversion can also be 
observed in stock selection choices. 
Disposition Effect 
In this study, we employed analyses from the existing behavioural finance 
literature (Barber & Odean, 2011; Frydman et al., 2014; Kaustia, 2010; Odean, 
1998) in order to: 1) determine whether rats exhibited the disposition effect, and 
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2) to increase the potential for translational links in behaviour between rats and 
humans. By calculating the difference between the proportion of gains realized 
(PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR), we found that rats exhibited 
a significant disposition toward realizing gains more often than realizing losses. 
In line with Kaustia (2010) and Barberis and Xiong (2009), who argue that loss 
aversion does not account for the disposition effect, we find no correlation 
between loss aversion and the disposition effect. Intriguingly, we found that rats 
that demonstrated the highest proportion of optimal sell behaviour (Figure 30b) 
also exhibited the disposition effect most strongly (Figure 43a). This suggests 
that the disposition effect arises from a focus on short-term profits rather than 
long-term returns. These results are in line with the realization utility hypothesis 
(Barberis & Xiong, 2012; Frydman et al., 2014), whereby an individual is 
postulated to receive an instantaneous neural reinforcement (dis)utility signal at 
the moment of the sale, which biases behaviour towards a suboptimal short-
term focus on gains/losses.  
By fitting an extended Cox Proportional Hazard Model to the data, we 
demonstrate that the ‘hazard’ of selling is increased over positive returns and 
decreased over negative returns. Intriguingly, we find that counterfactual 
reward is a significant predictor in the model. This suggests that rats are 
considering the potential value of all available options when making a trading 
decision. This result has also been identified in a simulated stock market task 
using human participants (Lohrenz, McCabe, Camerer, & Montague, 2007). 
Using fMRI, the authors found that the difference between experienced 
outcome and the counterfactual reward – or fictive error – was associated with 
BOLD activity in the ventral caudate nucleus. Furthermore, dysfunctional 
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processing of counterfactual rewards has been implicated in disorders such as 
addiction and depression (Chiu, Lohrenz, & Montague, 2008; Platt & Hayden, 
2011). Thus, this area represents a potentially exciting target for future work. 
In general, the hazard model for sales as a function of returns bears a striking 
resemblance to the human data (Barber & Odean, 2011). It diverges in that rats 
are notably unwilling to sell at negative returns. It is possible that this reflects a 
species-level difference in the general willingness or ability to incur a smaller 
immediate loss in order to avoid a larger future loss. However, it may also be 
the case that the rats in our task simply did not have enough 
information/experience to come to such a conclusion.  
We strictly limited the availability of information in the task to the current market 
volume of each stock and the outcome of a trade/hold option. This was done in 
the first instance in order to establish the contribution of reinforcement learning 
to the most basic elements of financial decision-making behaviour. In theory, 
restricting the kinds of available information to profit/loss and market volume  
afforded rats the ability to develop a personal memory-based trading history 
and to respond to other rats’ responses (albeit without explicit knowledge of 
doing so). On the other hand, such a restrictive model did not allow rats to 
directly associate changing blink rates with other rats’ actions or to ascertain an 
overview of current portfolio holdings. Although such capacities represent 
interesting additions to the task design and clearly constitute intriguing 
directions for future work, it is nonetheless striking that such behavioural biases 
can arise in a context where the potential for both theory of mind and portfolio 
optimization has been precluded. This suggests that behavioural biases such 
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as the disposition effect do not arise from mechanisms supporting higher levels 
of cognition, such as those implicated in the primate prefrontal cortex. In 
support of this notion, studies by Grinblatt, Keloharju, and Linnainmaa (2012) 
and G. Chen et al. (2007) demonstrate that the disposition effect is diminished 
in individuals with higher IQs and with greater trading experience, respectively. 
Information salience & content 
In the task, rats could glean information about market volume and respective 
changes in market volume from the blink rate of each stock’s associated 
nosepoke hole. While the proportion of choices of the buy/hold/sell options did 
not approximate random choice (i.e. 33% distribution between the three 
choices), they also did not reflect optimal performance. Therefore it remains 
unclear precisely what kind of strategy the rats were employing in the task. 
Aside from trials with very fast blink rates and very slow blink rates, our results 
suggest that rats did not use changes in blink rate to perform optimally in the 
task. This may have occurred due to limitations in working memory and/or to an 
inability to dissociate between small changes in blink rate. This would therefore 
be a particularly relevant area for improvement in future task designs. Given 
that the visual acuity of the rat is quite poor, future studies might employ a 
different stimulus to convey market information, such as a tone with varying 
pitch. Strain on working memory may be ameliorated by changing the 
contingencies so that an optimal response is relative to a stock’s historical 
average rather than the previous encounter with a given stock. Furthermore, it 
may be beneficial to carry out a related study in humans. Human participants 
may be able to more easily communicate any potential strategies that they may 
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have employed to maximize reward in the task, and this could in turn shed light 
on rats’ behaviour.  
Another important caveat to consider in the current task design is the 
correlation between information content and information salience. While we 
failed to demonstrate that trading behaviour was significantly influenced by 
blink rate on average, we did find some indication that rats’ choices were 
affected by market information when blink rates were either very fast or very 
slow. Both salience-based and content-based accounts present plausible 
explanations of the observed behaviour. Namely, it is equally reasonable to 
believe that rats are responding to the information contained within the blink 
rate (e.g. low price = better value) as it is to believe that they are responding to 
the saliency of the information (e.g. faster blink rate = more attention). 
However, while the notion that highly salient stimuli attract more responses 
cannot be disentangled from high market volumes eliciting higher sell rates, the 
salience hypothesis cannot explain the observation that purchase rates 
increase at low blink rates. A rational investor will buy stocks that she deems to 
be undervalued, while selling stocks that she believes to be overvalued. 
Translated to the task, consider the example where only a small number of 
shares are currently being invested in Stock 1 between all four rats. In this 
situation, the market volume will be low, which represents an opportunity to 
purchase the stock at a bargain. Thus, rats using information content will have 
an increased propensity to select the buy option when blink rates are low and 
the sell option when blink rates are high, as was observed (see Figures 39a-b). 
While this does not exclude potential saliency effects at high blink rates, the 
information content explanation fits more closely with the data overall. Future 
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studies could control for such effects by inverting the blink rates (e.g. convey 
higher market volumes with slower blink rates). 
The incorporation of two tones to indicate a loss or gain outcome before reward 
collection likely plays an important role not only in the presence of loss aversion 
as previously discussed, but also in eliciting the disposition effect. Frydman and 
Rangel (2014) demonstrate that making an investment’s original purchase price 
less salient can attenuate the strength of the disposition effect. Therefore, 
drawing attention to the amount to be gained or lost in a potential transaction 
enhances the disposition effect. In a similar vein, our task ensures that 
information regarding a gain or loss is made explicitly salient via auditory 
stimuli, albeit after choice. One might therefore predict that by either omitting 
the tones or by making them less salient, one might also reduce the disposition 
effect in rats.  
Future directions 
We believe this task represents an exciting opportunity for future 
neuroeconomic research to explore the neural correlates of financial decision-
making and its associated behavioural biases. For example, this task could be 
employed to further investigate the ‘realization utility’ hypothesis (Barber & 
Odean, 2011; Barberis & Xiong, 2012; Frydman et al., 2014). It would be 
possible to temporally separate the option selection nosepoke and the sound of 
the outcome tone in order to determine whether the ‘realization utility’ came 
from the action itself or from the signal of the gain/loss on a single neuron level. 
Furthermore, future studies could explore a number of manipulations of the 
task contingencies, such as higher transaction cost on trades (e.g. longer 
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required nosepokes), discrepancies between risk/reward between stocks, 
asymmetrical initial endowments or information (insiders), and visible 
competitors.  
While future prospects are many, it is also important to bear in mind that there 
are a number of limitations associated with the current task. For example, we 
do not require that rats liquidate at the end of a session, so there is little 
consequence to continuously buying stocks, or never selling bad stocks. Rats 
are also paid a ‘dividend’ each time they select the hold option, which is not 
consistent with real life. It may be possible to employ a delayed reinforcement 
schedule on hold options, although this would almost certainly lead to much 
higher proportions of trading relative to holding. Another critical obstacle that 
we faced was the fact that rats did not learn the full optimal strategy with regard 
to price changes from the previous trial (i.e. buy when price had gone down, 
sell when price had gone up, and hold when there was no change). Instead, we 
found that rats learned one strategy well, at the expense of one or both of the 
other strategies. This was especially problematic between the optimal buy and 
sell options, where rats that learned to respond to changes in one direction 
(e.g. nosepoke to the left sell option when price increased) did not learn the 
reverse instrumental response (e.g. nosepoke to the right buy option when 
price decreased). This may be a critical cognitive limitation, or it may be a 
matter that could be resolved through more targeted training paradigms. Future 
studies might ensure that rats are trained to respond optimally to each option 
(buy, hold and sell) independently before testing commences.  
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As previously discussed, another limitation to the study is that market volume, 
information salience, and stock price are all correlated under the current task 
design. Thus, disentangling the distinct effects of each proves challenging. 
However, one could either invert blink rates or change the stimulus that signals 
information in the task to ameliorate this confound. Finally, despite the fact that 
rats are transported together in one transporter cage from the colony room to 
the testing room, it is very improbable that they have any understanding of 
social competition within the task. Even communication through high-frequency 
vocalizations is unlikely to lead a rat to associate the presence of another rat 
with changing blink rates. A future study in which rats perform the task in high 
visibility chambers may resolve this issue.  
To conclude, the research presented here represents an initial effort toward 
modelling investor behaviour in rodents. Thus, this task forms a platform from 
which neuroscientists, psychologists, and financial economists alike may probe 
the neural underpinnings of financial decision-making. Future iterations of the 
task can be easily adjusted to address divergent research questions (e.g. 
asymmetry in initial resource endowment or insider information) as well as 
current shortcomings (e.g. optimal response training and correlation between 
information content and salience). However, the simple notion that the 
behavioural biases observed here instantiate from reinforcement learning 
provides key insight into the mechanisms that may be governing investor 
biases in the brain. Areas commonly implicated in reinforcement learning, such 
as the dopaminergic midbrain, represent an obvious target for primary 
investigations in the future. 
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The psychology and neuroscience of economics, and specifically the notion of 
financial loss, represented a central theme of this thesis. I argued that animals, 
like humans, perceive, encode, and react to a loss of resources in a 
categorically different way than to a gain of the same magnitude. Specifically, 
this work extends ideas first proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) from 
humans to rats. We began in Chapter 1 with a detailed introduction into 
normative models of economic valuation in order to demonstrate that 
prescriptions of ‘rational’ decision-making take objective valence as a 
presupposition. Put simply, economic models struggle to accommodate the 
subjective nature of losses and gains. At its very core, the definition of optimal, 
or ‘rational,’ behaviour is necessarily dependent on the basic notions of what 
constitutes a loss and what constitutes a gain. Given that an individual’s 
observable behaviour is often an unreliable proxy for internal preferences, and 
that we know relatively little about the neural underpinnings of resource loss, 
we posited that a better understanding of how neural mechanisms instantiate 
behaviour may lead to more reliable models of economic decision making. 
Furthermore, we argue that rats represent a viable animal model of risky 
decision-making for neuroeconomic research. 
The original research presented in Chapters 2 – 5 represents my endeavours 
to address this knowledge gap. By employing insight from psychology and 
economics, I developed models of rat behaviour that can be used to study the 
neural substrates of loss valuation in risky decision-making. I presented two 
behavioural paradigms (Chapters 2 and 5), while demonstrating novel loss-
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related correlations between the midbrain dopamine system and loss behaviour 
in Chapters 3 and 4. The results presented in Chapter 5 demonstrate that rats 
are capable of producing behavioural patterns, such as loss aversion and the 
disposition effect, that economists studying human behaviour would recognize. 
While addressing this critical gap in the existing literature, this work has also 
highlighted a number of areas for future research. 
Operationalizing Resource Loss 
Resource loss is inherently difficult to operationalize in animal decision-making 
tasks, which represents a critical obstacle in translating loss-related research 
outcomes between species. The use of rats to study decision-making allows 
one to avoid many of the potential confounds arising during the study of human 
participants, such as numeracy or a pre-existing notion of how a stock market 
works. However, in rat tasks it is not possible to create a token economy, nor is 
retracting a previously consumed reward an effective means of simulating loss. 
To overcome this problem, previous rat models of risky decision-making have 
often incorporated either punishment (e.g. footshock) or opportunity costs (e.g. 
time-out). Unfortunately, it is difficult to ascertain whether these substitutes are 
subserved by the same neural mechanisms as those resulting from human 
representations of loss.  For example, consider the purchasing strategy of ‘in-
app purchases’ increasingly employed by game developers, where gamers 
have to choose between a time-out from game progression (i.e. opportunity 
cost) or a small monetary cost (i.e. resource loss). The strategy is extremely 
successful, because gamers are often willing to pay the small sum to forgo the 
time-out and resume game play immediately. This serves as anecdotal 
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evidence that different types of costs are not necessarily equivalently 
perceived. To address this, we developed two novel rat decision-making tasks, 
each operationalizing ‘loss’ in ways that we believe constitute closer 
representations of resource loss.  
The gambling task (Chapters 2 – 4) was designed with the specific intention of 
eliciting a mental representation of potential losses. Thus, a loss in that task is 
represented by the loss of a resource that could have been consumed had the 
rat chosen differently just a moment earlier.  In the stock market task (Chapter 
5), rats were primed to perceive rewards that were smaller than a reference 
point as losses and those that were larger than the reference point as gains. 
Losses in this task were based on the prediction that rats, like humans, behave 
in a qualitatively different way when expectations are violated compared to 
when they are exceeded. On the single-neuron level, the gambling task 
provides a means for researchers to identify cells that putatively encode losses. 
On the behavioural level, the stock market task opens up the possibility of 
characterizing the transformation from loss-related learning to behavioural bias. 
Together, these two approaches to modelling resource loss in rats offer 
researchers the opportunity to tease apart the effects of loss on both brain and 
behaviour. Each adds a unique thread to the repertoire of the rapidly expanding 
neuroeconomics literature. 
Loss-dependent behaviour 
Humans exhibit a number of suboptimal behaviours in the wake of a loss. In an 
attempt to break even, gamblers often ‘chase’ their losses. Similarly, investors 
tend to hold on to losing stocks too long in the hope that the declining share 
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price might make a recovery. Both of these behaviours rely on the notion that 
some reference point has been set, and that this reference point is commonly 
not at absolute zero. For example, a professional trader trying to meet a 10% 
return target might perceive a 5% return as a loss, despite the fact that it is still 
a positive return. Thus, it is imperative that any study of the neural mechanisms 
subserving losses vs. gains takes reference-dependence into account.  
Given a single ‘one-off’ decision (see Figure 42a), Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) predicts that an individual will be risk-seeking over losses and 
risk-averse over gains. In other words, the loss-averse individual is willing to 
accept more risk in order to avoid a loss than to win the same amount, because 
she is more sensitive to decreases in wealth than to increases in wealth. 
Extended to a series of investment decisions, the effects of loss aversion 
depend on prior experiences of losses and gains. In general, Prospect Theory 
predicts that an individual will take more risk after a loss and less risk after a 
gain. It is thought that this occurs because the individual will either be in the 
convex (risk-seeking) domain after a loss, or in the concave (risk-averse) 
domain after a gain. This is exemplified by a study in which Coval and 
Moskowitz (2000) observed the trading activity of professional futures traders 
and found that individuals with daily losses at the middle of the day took more 
risks in the second half of the day. In contrast, individuals trading at a gain at 
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Figure 44: (A) given a single 50-50 gamble between losing $10 or gaining $10, an individual’s 
choice typically reflects the ‘S’ shaped value curve illustrated here. The steep, convex red curve 
in the loss domain demonstrates that a loss of $10 would bring about twice as much disutility as 
positive utility (flatter green line) from a $10 gain would. (B) Given a series of gambles, 
empirical data suggests that a previous loss causes an upward shift red tail and an associated 
reduction in the discrepancy between loss disutility vs. gain utility. Conversely, a previous win 
leads to a downward shift in the green tail and a relative increase in the discrepancy between 
gain utility and loss disutility. Theoretically, these curve shifts (i.e. changes in risk attitude) 
result from a (C) downward shift in reference point after a previous loss, and (D) an upward 
shift in the reference point after a previous gain.  
Given the example above, imagine the scenario in which an individual is trading 
at a loss at midday. As the outcome of each trade becomes integrated into the 
trader’s payoff expectation, the reference point is updated to a lower position. 
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The seeming shift in the value curve (Figure 42b) that reflects more risk-
seeking preferences after a loss is likely the result of a downward reference 
point shift along the ‘s-curve’ (Figure 42c). The opposite upward reference point 
shift (Figure 42d) would also correspond with the apparent downward shift of 
the green curve in Figure 42b after a previous gain.  
The explanation for this behaviour during a series of decisions highlights a key 
area for input from psychology and neuroscience. Critically, the reference point 
shifts in Figures 42c-d can be seen as the result of reinforcement learning as a 
decision maker uses previous outcomes to update predictions about future 
rewards. Thus, it is likely that one’s willingness to accept uncertainty (i.e. risk 
attitude) and one’s perception of valence (i.e. what constitutes a loss vs. what 
constitutes a gain) are both at least partially modulated by reward prediction 
errors generated in the midbrain dopamine system (Schultz et al., 1997). 
Despite the general evolutionary preservation of the midbrain dopamine system 
between rats and humans, it was unclear up until this point whether rats were 
capable of exhibiting reference-dependent behaviour. While we observed some 
indication that this might be the case in the gambling task, we were able to 
explicitly support this argument with the results of the stock market task in 
Chapter 5. By setting all reward volumes with respect to an arbitrary amount 
(i.e. 0.15 ml) and delivering only that amount on the initial 15 trials of every 
session, we were able to observe reference-dependent changes in movement 
time to collect reward for relative gains and losses. Furthermore, rats’ 
increased risk-seeking behaviour after receiving a volume of reward that was 
less than the reference point was indicative of loss aversion. These results 
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indicate that future studies can use this paradigm to explicitly test how 
reference points are represented and updated in the rat brain. 
In conclusion, the novel tasks developed here allowed us to conclude that rats 
often exhibit behavioural biases in a way that is remarkably similar to humans 
when faced with a loss compared to a gain. This suggests that the neural 
mechanisms governing such behaviour are evolutionarily conserved, which 
corroborates previous animal and human research implicating the midbrain 
dopamine system. Given the substantial evidence suggesting that reward 
expectations are encoded via phasic midbrain dopamine signals, one might 
speculate that this activity also acts as a switch or gating mechanism for the 
separable systems purported to be involved in valuation. For example, when 
expectations are not met, suppression of tonic dopamine levels via negative 
reward prediction errors may prime the system to selectively attend to the 
mechanisms subserving losses while inhibiting those associated with gains. 
Results compatible with precisely such a mechanism were highlighted in the 
histological characterization of brain and behaviour in our rat gambling task 
(Chapters 3 and 4).  
Brain and behaviour 
The notion that there are separable systems in the nervous system associated 
with losses and gains also introduces the potential for asymmetrical learning 
about losses and gains. The decision to stay or switch hole contingencies after 
a loss compared to a gain emerged as a significant factor in Chapter 2. Instead 
of adopting a win-stay/lose-shift strategy, rats tended to stay more after a loss 
than after a gain. Adding to a growing body of evidence suggesting that the 
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midbrain dopamine system is involved in the modulation of instrumental 
behaviour (for review, see Wickens et al., 2003), we also found evidence that 
this behaviour was under dopaminergic control. For example, the 
administration of dopamine antagonist cis-Flupenthixol dose-dependently 
decreased the likelihood that a rat would return to the same contingency as the 
immediately preceding trial. When this behaviour was analysed with respect to 
previous wins and losses, we found that rats with more putative dopamine 
neurons in the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) were also more likely to 
stay after a loss, which was replicated in a separate version of the task. 
Intriguingly, dopamine receptor blockade with cis-Flupenthixol mitigated this 
effect. These results suggest that in the rat, decision-making after a loss is 
critically modulated by dopamine neurons in the SNc.  
These results complement work done in Parkinson’s disease patients, who 
show improved learning from negative outcomes when off medication 
compared to controls (Frank, Seeberger, & O'Reilly, 2004). Conversely, 
patients show greater sensitivity to positive outcomes than negative outcomes 
when on medication. Cohen and Frank (2009) developed a neurocomputational 
model in support of these findings (see Figure 43), wherein efferent projections 
from the SNc play a central role.  
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Dopamine Subreceptor-Mediated Direct and Indirect Pathways  
 
Figure 45 reproduced* from (Clark & Dagher, 2014) and based on computational theory by 
(Cohen & Frank, 2009): Output from the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) influences 
choice via two distinct pathways (direct and indirect). Postsynaptic neurons of the direct 
pathway primarily express dopamine D1 receptors at the striatum, which then projects a ‘Go’ 
response through the internal global pallidus (GPi) and substantia nigra pars reticulate (SNr), 
and on to the thalamus and cortex. In the indirect pathway, the dopamine D2 receptors facilitate 
a ‘No Go’ response by disinhibiting the GPi (i.e. suppressing action selection) via the external 
global pallidus (GPe). Excitatory projections are illustrated in green and inhibitory projections 
are shown in red. *Reproduced under the open-access terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution License (CC BY). 
Dopamine D1 and D2 receptors have different affinities for dopamine, and 
indeed often have opposing functions in the brain (Beaulieu & Gainetdinov, 
2011). D1 receptors have a low affinity for dopamine, making them sensitive 
only to larger phasic changes, whereas high-affinity D2 receptors are 
responsive to lower tonic changes in dopamine concentrations. The Cohen and 
Frank (2009) model asserts that information about the utility of a gain is relayed 
via phasic dopamine activity and nigrostriatal D1 receptor signalling in the direct 
‘Go’ pathway, which elicits an approach response. Conversely, information 
about the disutility of a loss is conveyed via the indirect ‘No Go’ pathway, 
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whereby changes in tonic dopamine levels prompt D2-expressing striatal 
neurons to disinhibit the ‘Go’ response from the inner globus pallidus/substantia 
nigra pars reticulata.  Pharmacological manipulations of these receptors in 
humans support the model’s predictions in reinforcement learning (Frank & 
O'Reilly, 2006; Pizzagalli et al., 2007).  
Our findings are compatible with this model. Similar to Parkinson’s disease 
patients off of medication, rats with fewer SNc neurons were less likely to 
repeat a choice after a loss and therefore demonstrated greater 
responsiveness to negative outcomes. By contrast, rats with more SNc neurons 
were more likely to repeat a choice after a loss, indicating that they were 
relatively less sensitive to negative outcomes. After administering dopamine 
antagonist cis-Flupenthixol, the association between DA neuron number and 
repeating a choice after a loss was abolished. The primary mechanism of 
action is hypothesized to reflect suppression of the indirect ‘No Go’ pathway by 
cis-Flupenthixol, which has been shown to preferentially interact with D2 
receptors (Hess, Norman, & Creese, 1988). Some parallel D1 receptor 
blockade of phasic responses in the direct ‘Go’ pathway may have also 
counteracted any straightforward effect reversals. Relative differences in 
receptor densities could have subsequently led to an elimination of the loss-
stay bias by asymmetrically interrupting these two pathways. Furthermore, due 
to fast-acting autoreceptor feedback loops, dopamine antagonists effectively 
increase dopamine cell firing due to increased dopamine availability at 
autoreceptors after target receptor blockade (Bunney, Walters, Roth, & 
Aghajanian, 1973). This would further amplify the asymmetrical disruption to 
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the ‘No Go’ signalling pathway that putatively conveys information about 
negative outcomes.  
A number of cellular mechanisms are purported to compensate for system-level 
differences in neural cell counts, especially in the midbrain dopamine system 
(Blesa et al., 2011; Zigmond et al., 1989). It is believed that compensatory 
mechanisms, such as autoreceptor and dendritic spine densities, adaptively 
constrain dopamine levels and effectively preclude any meaningful effects of 
individual differences in healthy neuron counts on behaviour. Evidence to the 
contrary (i.e. in support of the notion that the number of neurons in a substrate 
can indeed lead to behavioural biases in healthy individuals) can be found in 
both animal and human literatures. For example, a number of studies 
investigating a genetic strain of mice with naturally increased midbrain 
dopamine cell numbers have also reliably linked variability in dopamine cell 
counts with variations in exploratory behaviour and drug reactivity (Baker et al., 
1980; Reis et al., 1979; Reis et al., 1982; Sved et al., 1984). Furthermore, 
studies in humans have indicated that patients suffering from 
neurodegenerative diseases of the dopamine system (e.g. Parkinson’s disease 
and Huntington’s disease) demonstrate cognitive deficits very early on in 
disease progression (Chaudhuri et al., 2006; Chaudhuri & Naidu, 2008; 
Chaudhuri et al., 2010), which denotes a putative link between neuron count 
and behaviour. These findings raise the general question of how much control 
a single neuron can have over activity at the local and systems level in any 
species.10 In conclusion, future research is warranted to establish whether such 
                                                
10 While beyond the scope of this discussion, the reader is referred to recent work 
by Pitkow, Liu, Angelaki, DeAngelis, and Pouget (2015) for a computational 
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a relationship between neural cell counts and behaviour extends to healthy 
human populations.  
Conclusions 
In this thesis, the research presented from the development of two 
experimental rat decision-making tasks brings together theoretical accounts of 
loss-related behaviour from economics, psychology and neuroscience. The 
experimental results are compatible with the notion that separable neural 
substrates and receptor pathways in the brain parallel the asymmetrical 
sensitivity that both rats and humans exhibit towards losses and gains. 
Individual differences in neuron densities in key substrates such as the SNc 
may underlie differences in reinforcement learning, which may in turn reflect 
reference point updating, macro-level biases and attitudes towards risk. In 
conclusion, rat models of risky decision-making, which are currently 
underutilized in neuroeconomic research, offer a critical link between the 
microscopic and macroscopic levels of behavioural analysis.   
  
                                                                                                                                         






Table 3: Cox Proportional Hazard model coefficients for nosepoke duration  
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevOutcome .059 .020 .003 1.060 1.020 1.103 
Log(t)Contingency -.024 .009 .008 .977 .960 .994 
PrevOutcome .080 .030 .008 1.083 1.021 1.149 
ContingencyMainEffect   .000    
ContingencyLow -.039 .015 .008 .962 .935 .990 
ContingencyHigh .075 .017 .000 1.078 1.042 1.115 
Contingency* 
PrevOutcomeMainEffect 
  .136    
ContingencyLow* 
PrevOutcome .063 .032 .047 1.065 1.001 1.133 
ContingencyHigh* 
PrevOutcome -.038 .032 .230 .962 .904 1.025 
 
 
Table 4: Cox Proportional Hazard model coefficients for stay behaviour on free-
choice trials  
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevOutcome -.122 .135 .367 .885 .680 1.153 
Log(t)Contingency .078 .059 .184 1.082 .964 1.214 
PrevOutcome .138 .098 .160 1.148 .947 1.393 
ContingencyMainEffect   .000    
ContingencyLow -.657 .120 .000 .518 .409 .656 
ContingencyHigh .433 .075 .000 1.542 1.331 1.786 
Contingency* 
PrevOutcomeMainEffect 
  .014    
ContingencyLow* 
PrevOutcome .284 .170 .095 1.328 .952 1.853 
ContingencyHigh* 







Table 5: Cox proportional hazard model coefficients for poke duration (sec) at 
each dose of cis-Flupenthixol  
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevOutcome .013 .062 .838 1.013 .898 1.143 
Log(t)Contingency -.031 .031 .319 .970 .912 1.030 
Log(t)Dose .020 .024 .398 1.021 .974 1.070 
DoseMainEffect   .000    
DoseLow -.188 .050 .000 .829 .751 .914 
DoseMedium -.203 .066 .002 .816 .718 .928 
DoseHigh -.309 .078 .000 .734 .631 .855 
PrevOutcomeLossContrast -.104 .065 .109 .901 .794 1.024 
ContingencyMainEffect   .004    
ContingencyLL .153 .049 .002 1.166 1.059 1.284 
ContingencyHH .046 .034 .183 1.047 .979 1.119 
 
 
Table 6: Cox proportional hazard model coefficients for choice of the Low 
contingency at each dose 
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevError .464 .389 .233 1.591 .742 3.410 
DoseMainEffect   .044    
DoseLow .423 .233 .069 1.526 .967 2.409 
DoseMedium -.080 .271 .769 .923 .543 1.571 
DoseHigh -.830 .376 .027 .436 .209 .912 
PrevOutcome   .553    
 
Table 7: Cox proportional hazard model coefficients for choice of the High 
contingency at each dose 
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevError -.163 .259 .530 .850 .512 1.411 
DoseMainEffect   .053    
DoseLow -.113 .064 .076 .893 .788 1.012 
DoseMedium -.103 .073 .157 .902 .781 1.041 
DoseHigh .174 .077 .025 1.190 1.023 1.385 






Table 8: Cox Proportional Hazard model coefficients for shifting contingency 
choice from previous trial 
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95.0% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevError .098 .143 .491 1.103 .834 1.460 
Log(t)Contingency .091 .059 .126 1.095 .975 1.230 
Log(t)Dose -.072 .051 .160 .931 .842 1.029 
Log(t)PrevContingency -.072 .048 .131 .931 .848 1.022 
DoseMainEffect   .002    
DoseLow -.220 .084 .009 .803 .681 .946 
DoseMedium .332 .095 .001 1.393 1.156 1.679 
DoseHigh .396 .174 .023 1.486 1.056 2.092 
PrevOutcome .019 .320 .953 1.019 .545 1.907 
Contingency   .000    
ContingencyLL .917 .197 .000 2.502 1.700 3.682 
ContingencyHH -1.176 .193 .000 .309 .211 .451 
PrevContingency   .000    
PrevContingencyLL .380 .066 .000 1.463 1.286 1.664 
PrevContingencyHH -.472 .172 .006 .624 .446 .873 
PrevOutcome* Contingency   .002    
PrevOutcome* 
ContingencyLL -.626 .239 .009 .535 .335 .854 
PrevOutcome* 
ContingencyHH .601 .170 .000 1.823 1.308 2.542 
 
 





95% CI for B 
B SE Beta Lower  Upper  
1 (Constant) 8.42E-17 .140  .000 1.000 -.301 .301 
SNc Count .841 .145 .841 5.804 .000 .530 1.151 
 
* Average weight was excluded from the model via stepwise entry method (βin 
= -.03, t = -0.20, p = .85, VIF = 1.03). 
** VTA count was excluded from the model via stepwise entry method (βin = 















95% CI for B 
B SE Beta Lower  Upper  
1 (Constant) -4.6E-17 .223  .000 1.000 -.479 .479 
SNc Count .504 .231 .504 2.186 .046 .010 .999 
 
* Average weight was excluded from the model via stepwise entry method (βin = 
.14, t = 0.60, p = .56, VIF = 1.03). 
** VTA count was excluded from the model via stepwise entry method (βin = -.11, t 














Table 11: Coefficients of Cox hazard model for poke duration 
 
 B SE Sig. Exp(B) 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Log(t)PrevOutcome -.038 .008 .000 .963 .949 .978 
Log(t)Contingency -.029 .033 .387 .972 .910 1.037 
PrevOutcome -.160 .040 .000 .852 .788 .921 
ContingencyMainEffect   .000    
ContingencyHighProb .668 .032 .000 1.950 1.834 2.075 
ContingencyLowProb -.156 .033 .000 .856 .803 .912 
ContingencyHighRew .022 .034 .524 1.022 .956 1.093 
ContingencyLowRew .087 .040 .028 1.091 1.009 1.179 
 
 





95% CI for B 
B Std. Error Beta Lower  Upper  
1 (Constant) 2.1E-16 .20  .00 1.00 -.47 .47 
SNc Neuron Ct .828 .212 .828 3.914 .006 .33 1.33 
* Average weight was excluded from the model via stepwise entry method (βin 





Table 13: Coefficients of a Cox Proportional Hazard Model of sales as a 
function of return 
 
 COEF. SE LOWER CI UPPER CI SIG. 
< -22% -1.16 0.48 -9.01 -2.01 * 
-22% − -18% 1.65 1.01 -3.59 -1.82  
-18% − -14% 2.13 0.88 -2.94 -1.52 * 
-14% − -10% 3.16 0.90 -1.65 -0.73 *** 
-10% − -6% 3.31 0.90 -1.48 -0.61 *** 
-6%− -2% 3.94 0.90 -0.77 -0.06 *** 
-2%− 2% 4.35 0.89 -0.31 0.31 *** 
2%− 6% 5.22 0.90 0.61 1.14 *** 
6%− 10% 5.69 0.91 1.09 1.59 *** 
10%− 14% 5.80 0.95 1.20 1.70 *** 
14%− 18% 6.09 1.02 1.50 1.98 *** 
≥18% 5.32 1.22 0.70 1.22 *** 
SALES COUNT -0.15 0.01 0.01 -30.04 *** 
COUNTERFACTUAL 
REWARD 
-6.19 1.23 0.27 -22.86 *** 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST(14) = 3352, P <.001  



















Table 14: Coefficients of a Cox Proportional Hazard Model of purchases as a 
function of blink rate 
 
 COEF. SE LOWER CI UPPER CI SIG. 
< 0.75 HZ -0.77 0.46 -1.88 0.35 *** 
0.75 HZ − 1.0 HZ -0.01 0.99 -0.49 0.49 * 
1.0 HZ − 1.25 HZ -0.01 0.99 -0.40 0.38 ** 
1.25 HZ − 1.5 HZ -0.06 0.94 -0.34 0.22  
1.5 HZ − 1.75 HZ 0.10 1.11 -0.13 0.34  
1.75 HZ − 2.0 HZ 0.19 1.20 0.05 0.33  
2.0 HZ − 2.25 HZ 0.17 1.18 0.01 0.32  
2.25 HZ − 2.5 HZ 0.25 1.28 0.06 0.43  
2.5 HZ − 2.75 HZ 0.27 1.31 0.02 0.52  
2.75 HZ − 3.0 HZ 0.22 1.25 -0.12 0.56  
3.0 HZ − 3.25 HZ 0.42 1.52 -0.14 0.98 * 
3.25 HZ − 3.5 HZ 0.67 1.96 0.15 1.20 *** 
≥ 3.5 HZ 1.26 3.54 0.45 2.08 ** 
BUYS COUNT 0.04 1.04 0.04 0.05 *** 
LOGS1BLINKHZ 0.03 1.03 0.01 0.07 * 
LOGS2BLINKHZ -0.02 0.98 -0.05 0.01  
LOGS3BLINKHZ 0.04 1.04 0.01 0.07 * 
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST(17) = 490.8, P <.001 










Table 15: Coefficients of a Cox Proportional Hazard Model of sales as a 
function of blink rate 
 
 COEF. SE LOWER CI UPPER CI SIG. 
< 0.75 HZ -0.77 0.46 -1.88 0.35  
0.75 HZ − 1.0 HZ -0.01 0.99 -0.49 0.49  
1.0 HZ − 1.25 HZ -0.01 0.99 -0.40 0.38  
1.25 HZ − 1.5 HZ -0.06 0.94 -0.34 0.22  
1.5 HZ − 1.75 HZ 0.10 1.11 -0.13 0.34  
1.75 HZ − 2.0 HZ 0.19 1.20 0.05 0.33 ** 
2.0 HZ − 2.25 HZ 0.17 1.18 0.01 0.32 * 
2.25 HZ − 2.5 HZ 0.25 1.28 0.06 0.43 * 
2.5 HZ − 2.75 HZ 0.27 1.31 0.02 0.52 * 
2.75 HZ − 3.0 HZ 0.22 1.25 -0.12 0.56  
3.0 HZ − 3.25 HZ 0.42 1.52 -0.14 0.98  
3.25 HZ − 3.5 HZ 0.67 1.96 0.15 1.20 * 
≥ 3.5 HZ 1.26 3.54 0.45 2.08 ** 
SALES COUNT 0.04 1.04 0.04 0.05 *** 
LOGS1BLINKHZ 0.06 1.07 0.03 0.10 ** 
LOGS2BLINKHZ 0.02 1.02 -0.01 0.06  
LOGS3BLINKHZ -0.02 0.98 -0.05 0.01  
LIKELIHOOD RATIO TEST(16) = 489.9, P <.001 
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